Problems of Communism

NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 1984

CONTRADICTIONS IN SOVIET SOCIALISM

Ernst Kux

MULLAHS, MUJAHIDIN, & SOVIET MUSLIMS

Alexandre Bennigsen

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

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Cover: Pëtr Fedoseyev, Vice President of the USSR Academy of Sciences, awarded the Karl Marx Gold Medal in April 1983 for his writings on historical materialism and scientific communism. Photo by TASS from Sovfoto.

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IN THIS ISSUE OF

Problems of Communism

Articles

Contradictions in Soviet Socialism
Ernst Kux

The many concrete difficulties of the USSR in the economic and political spheres have a counterpart in the ideological realm. According to Soviet leaders, Marxism-Leninism is proving in some ways an unreliable guide for solving the complex problems of the USSR. Both Andropov and Chernenko have written major ideological articles urging a "scientific" study of the Soviet system. The ensuing ideological debate has focused on the nature of contradictions in Soviet society. The orthodox position is of course that Soviet society—unlike bourgeois society—knows only "nonantagonistic" contradictions. However, some ideologists seem to imply that the USSR has no guarantee of a purely "nonantagonistic" development, and by extension, might fall prey to crises, class conflicts, and related "antagonistic" ills that in Soviet semantics should befall capitalist societies alone.

Mullahs, Mujahidin, and Soviet Muslims
Alexandre Bennigsen

While it is hard to amass direct evidence of the reinforcing influence of both the Islamic Revolution in Iran and the fierce resistance of Islamic freedom fighters in Afghanistan on the ongoing Islamic revival among Soviet Muslims, Soviet officialdom is behaving as if it believes that such an influence exists. Islam has joined capitalism as a force perceived as threatening to "contaminate" Soviet Central Asia.

Essay-reviews

Hellenic Time of Troubles
R. V. Burks

The Greek civil war of 1946–49 still arouses political passions. Recent reinterpretations, based on newly available sources, divide into two schools—revisionist and traditionalist. The revisionists see the communist-led wartime resistance movement, EAM, as the expression of a widespread popular desire for a genuinely democratic political order. The traditionalists see EAM as having a popular following only in the specific conditions of wartime Greece, and as losing much of its popular support once the Axis occupation ended—which accounts for the ultimate defeat of the communist insurgents in 1949.

(Abstracts continued on reverse side)

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Whatever Happened to Eurocommunism?
Michael J. Sodaro

The three largest West European communist parties—the French, Italian, and Spanish—continue to be trapped by their own past. Although they have distanced themselves from the Soviet Union, they have failed to detach themselves from it completely. They have not developed viable economic policies as an alternative to capitalism. They have also not solidified their democratic identities or become more democratic internally. Thus they are unlikely to be more than junior coalition partners in their countries' parliamentary governments.

Soviet "Active Measures"
John J. Dziak

The void in serious examination of Soviet "active measures" is beginning to be filled, as is demonstrated by recent books by Richard Schultz and Roy Godson and by Anatoliy Golitsyn. These studies cover some of the persons and institutions involved. It is now necessary to move on to detailed examination of how political deception is utilized to further Moscow's strategic ends.

Exploring Afrocommunism
Michael Clough

The 1969 military coup in the Congo Republic (Brazzaville) launched on the African continent a wave of political developments that has come to be known as "Afrocommunism." It is not yet clear whether this trend constitutes a qualitative departure from earlier "African socialism," as both critical and supportive commentators contend, or is only a new manifestation of populism, as skeptics maintain.

Urban Policy in China
William T. Rowe

In the attempt to realize their new "Chinese" model of industrial urbanism, Communist leaders have displayed a remarkable fertility of invention in organizational forms and mobilizational strategies, along with an equally notable willingness to backtrack and to discard experimental forms when necessary. Recent emphasis on the development of key coastal cities reinforces the party's commitment to the economic transformation of urban China.

Beijing and the Superpowers
Steven I. Levine

Recent studies have analyzed the impact of Sino-American relations on regional and global balances of power and, in particular, on relations between the Soviet Union and the United States. Most of the analysts reviewed recommend restrained, incremental adjustments in US policy toward China in part because they see the Soviet Union as unable to translate its growing military strength in Asia, the only realm in which it can seriously compete with the United States, into political influence.

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Contradictions in Soviet Socialism

Ernst Kux

Soviet leaders deny vehemently that the Soviet Union or the concept of Marxism-Leninism "is gripped by a crisis."[1] Such a diagnosis is for them simply an invention of "ideological enemies" who want to deny the "irreversible progress of the socialist system" and to minimize the crisis of capitalism. Nevertheless, Soviet leaders concede that their system is experiencing both contradictions and difficulties. Yet, they say that these contradictions can easily be overcome by a correct policy of the CPSU.[2] While most Western analysts anticipate that the Soviet Union will either have to introduce real reforms or continue to muddle through, a third possibility, that of growing crises and conflicts, cannot be ruled out, particularly since the Kremlin leaders themselves seem to fear such "deformations of socialism." During Leonid Brezhnev's last years, economic stagnation, failures in agriculture, emerging social and national tensions, and the problems in Poland and Afghanistan could be interpreted as indications of a systemic crisis in the Soviet empire. In the USSR, calls for a change of course became louder.

A "wind of change" was felt with Yuriy Andropov's accession to power in November 1982. He attempted to solve "the still outstanding problems left over from yesterday,"[3] and to correct Brezhnev's policy that had bogged down in stagnation, corruption, and muddling through. Andropov set things in motion with his harsh criticism of the shortcomings of "socialist building," in which he went beyond surface difficulties and mistakes to expose the deficiencies of the system itself. Since his aim was not to reform the system but to make it more efficient and modern, Andropov campaigned for better "organization, order, and discipline," weeded out some of the old, sated, and corrupt "Brezhnevites," and initiated a change of generations in party and state. To promote his policies with an appeal to the "patriotic duty of every Soviet citizen,"[4] Andropov projected the notion of danger from an "enemy without" and heightened the confrontation with the West. At the end of 1983, partly due to these measures, an economic upswing occurred even though its extent was overstated in statistics and speeches praising Andropov and his new line.

But the crisis itself was not mastered. On the contrary, it was sharpened by Andropov's death on February 9, 1984, and by the succession of Konstantin Chernenko four days later. Whether Andropov's rule will be a forgotten interim phase or a remembered turning point, it left the Soviet Union in a precarious situation to which de Tocqueville's dictum applies, namely, "the most perilous moment for a bad government is one when it seeks to mend its ways."[5] Two successions in the Kremlin within one and a half years, and the third already programmed by the selection of another old man, certainly affect the leadership system and increase doubts about its efficiency and permanence.

The emergence of Chernenko as the new party leader signifies not only a victory for the "old guard" and a prolongation of the gerontocracy in the Kremlin

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[1] Yuriy Andropov, "The Teachings of Karl Marx and Some Questions of Building Socialism in the USSR," *Kommunist* (Moscow), No. 3, 1983, p. 22.

[2] Ibid., p. 21.

[3] Ibid., p. 20.

[4] For the text of Andropov's speech to the December 1983 Central Committee plenum, see *Pravda* (Moscow), Dec. 27, 1983.

[5] Alexis de Tocqueville, *The Old Regime and the French Revolution*, New York, Doubleday, 1955, p. 177.

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Mikhail Gorbachëv, second from left, and Konstantin Chernenko, right foreground, are the principal pallbearers at the funeral of Yuriy Andropov in February 1984.

—TASS from SOVFOTO.

but also the return to power of the "Brezhnevites," whose hold was shaken in Andropov's days. Chernenko's "unanimous" election as general secretary does not hide the fundamental differences within the "collective leadership" about the correct line of the party and the continuation of the changes introduced by Andropov. These differences came into the open in the election speeches between February 9 and March 2, 1984, of the 5 Central Committee secretaries and the 18 candidate and full members of the Politburo. Of course, as always during a change in the Kremlin, all the members of the "collective leadership" professed their allegiance to "continuity of the internal and external policy of the CPSU." Yet, they differed quite clearly about what should be continued: some want to continue the "stability" of the Brezhnev era; others to procede with the changes introduced by Andropov.[6]

Chernenko himself takes a cautious attitude toward some of the measures introduced by his predecessor. While Chernenko mentioned Andropov's "clear creative mind" and "keen sense for the new," and praised his "weighty personal contribution to the collective activities of the Central Committee and its Politburo,"[7] he also made it clear that the line followed by Andropov was merely the steady implementation of the "principled policy of our party," as outlined in the collective decisions of the Politburo. In contrast to the initiative and drive of Andropov, his successor pleaded for caution and defined "continuity" as "ad-

[6]Andropov's call for action in his statement to the December 1983 CC plenum, which became his legacy, went as follows: "The most important thing now is not to lose the tempo and the general positive mood for action and more actively to develop positive processes." This call was toned down in the resolution of the CC plenum: "It is important to maintain the pace that has been set and the general mood of practically tackling tasks, to steadily raise the level of party and state leadership of the economy, and to develop more actively the positive tendencies of growth in efficiency, making them more stable in nature." See *Pravda*, Dec. 27 and 28, 1983.

Was it only Andropov's highly personal and precise diction being translated into party jargon, or was his call too "active" for a majority of CC members? Chernenko, after he was elected general secretary at the extraordinary CC plenum on February 13, 1984, promised continuation of policy, but did not revert to Andropov's call. He quoted almost verbatim the CC resolution about present tasks. However he forgot, whether by accident or on purpose, to mention "the growth in efficiency" in connection with the "positive tendencies." Ibid., Feb. 14, 1984.

[7]Ibid., Feb. 14, 1984.

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vancement relying on *everything that has been earlier accomplished.*" For this, "it is necessary to evaluate realistically what has been achieved, without exaggerating but also without belittling."[8] The conservative outlook of Chernenko expressed itself as follows: "This is how it was in the past. This will always be so!" Chernenko did not continue the sharp criticism of failures and mismanagement that Andropov had launched at the November 1982 plenum. The new leader sees it as "the duty of the Communist Party to constantly check its course, its decisions and actions," a hint that he intends to reexamine the activity of his predecessor. At the same time Chernenko is very eager to put his own mark on the party's line by emphasizing more than Andropov had the guiding role of the party apparat, the "links with the masses," the care for cadres, and the importance of moral incentives and ideological education.

The younger members of the Politburo who were promoted by Andropov, such as Mikhail Gorbachëv, Grigoriy Romanov, Vitaliy Vorotnikov, and the new CC secretaries Yegor Ligachëv and Nikolay Ryzhkov, took a different and even contrary position to the cautious and conservative line of Chernenko in their election speeches. They credited Andropov personally for the successes in 1983 and came out for a continuation of his policy. For them, "maintaining the tempo achieved," as advocated by Chernenko and his followers, is not enough and they press for its acceleration. Gorbachëv seemed to be the main advocate of change and innovation, and presented himself as the bearer of Andropov's banner and challenger to Chernenko. In his election speech in Stavropol' on February 19, Gorbachëv interpreted the party's task of "unconditionally ensuring continuity" to mean "consolidate and develop the positive trends, and bolster and augment *everything new and progressive that has become part of our social life recently.*"[9] The "key directions of work" are, according to Gorbachëv, "the assertion of Bolshevik *professionalism oriented toward practical* results in work, and the improvement of the style of party leadership and of all the activity of the state and economic apparatus, ... the acceleration of the development of the national economy and the improvement of its efficiency, ... a profound reorientation of social production toward increasing the people's well-being." One of the guarantees for progress is for him the selection and training of "cadres capable of thinking and acting in a modern way." Gorbachëv declared "complacency" as misplaced and, echoing Andropov, came out for "a mood of action, not of loud talk." Can there be a greater contrast than the one between Chernenko's defense of "everything that has been earlier accomplished" and Gorbachëv's commitment to "everything new and progressive"?

The different attitudes of Chernenko and Gorbachëv, who now appears to be the number two man in the CC Secretariat, became even more evident at the all-Union conference on problems of the agro-industrial complex convened in Moscow on March 26, 1984. In his introduction, Chernenko praised the achievements of Brezhnev's Food Program, introduced at the May 1982 plenum, and insisted on "fulfilling the resolutions of the 26th Congress and the economic strategies worked out by it for the 1980's," that is, on continuing Brezhnev's line.[10] On the other hand, Gorbachëv, who has been in charge of agriculture since 1979 but who has reservations about the Food Program, was not satisfied with the "general picture."[11] He pointed to the deficiencies in grain and food production and attacked the "substantial shortcomings of collective farms, regions, and ministries." He went on to ascribe the difficulties in the Soviet Union to "objective factors of competition between the two social systems and the well-known demographic peculiarities of the present stage of development, as well as increasingly complicated mining and geological conditions of the mining industry and the restricted possibilities of capital investment." To solve the "fundamental problems of our development," Gorbachëv declared, "the Party intends to continue the path of bold, innovative solutions, aimed at accelerating economic development and intensifying social production as a whole." Economic management must overcome "inertia and attachment to old ways" and should be "more dynamic and purposeful so that *everything new and progressive can be consolidated* and multiplied."

The different attitudes and proposals coming from Chernenko and Gorbachëv not only reveal major contradictions at the top between "conservatives" and "modernists," between "apparatchiks" and "Bolshe-

[8]Ibid. Chernenko's definition of "continuity" was defended with Marxist dialectics and elaborated by Academician M. Kim in *Pravda*, Mar. 15, 1984. For this leading Soviet historian, "real socialism has continuity links with a dual past, the past of the history of pre-socialist society, and with its own past."

[9]M. S. Gorbachëv, *Izvestiya* (Moscow), Mar. 1, 1983.

[10]For the text of Chernenko's speech to the All-Union Economic Conference on Problems of the Agro-Industrial Complex, see *Pravda*, Mar. 27, 1984.

[11]For the text of Gorbachëv's speech "On the Tasks of Party, Soviet, and Economic Organs in Increasing Economic Efficiency of Agriculture and Other Sectors of the Agro-Industrial Complex," see ibid. Important parts of Gorbachëv's report were missing in *Pravda*, but were transmitted by Radio Moscow, March 26, according to British Broadcasting Corporation, *Summary of World Broadcasts: USSR* (London), Mar. 28, 1984, pp. C/1ff.

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The meeting of Yuriy Andropov and other CPSU leaders with veteran party members on August 15, 1983; seen from left to right are: Mikhail Zimyanin, Grigoriy Romanov, Andropov, Mikhail Gorbachëv, Ivan Kapitonov, and Nikolay Ryzhkov.

—TASS from SOVFOTO.

vik professionals," but also are proof of an ongoing power struggle, connected to the as yet unsettled succession, between the followers of Brezhnev and the supporters of Andropov, between the "old guard" and the "young Turks." The differences among the "collective leaders" in essence express different responses to the decisive questions about the Soviet Union: is there a crisis and, if so, what are the reasons for it; and how can it be overcome. This dispute, which involves a clash among different power interests, is in itself proof of an existing crisis as well as a cause for its exacerbation.

Lenin's "Theory of Crises"

The diagnosis of a crisis in the Soviet Union does not imply a prediction of an imminent disintegration of its empire or of an imminent domestic revolution. Crisis can mean, on the one hand, a concurrence of problems that can be solved in time with adequate means, or, on the other, a cataclysmic situation from which there is no way out. In his *Reflections on History* the Swiss historian Jacob Burkhardt characterized the great crises of the past as a dialectical process, in which a historical power rises and then breaks up through "revolutions or gradual decomposition." For him the lesson of history was: "the more frequently and harshly an institution prevails over the spirit of innovation, the more inevitable will be its final fall."[12] In a similar way, Alexis de Tocqueville identified crisis with revolution, which breaks out "not always when things are going from bad to worse"; on the contrary, "it oftener happens that when a people which has put up with an oppressive rule over a long period without protest suddenly finds the government relaxing its pressure, it takes up arms against it.... Generally speaking, the most perilous moment for a bad government is one when it seeks to mend its ways."[13]

[12]Jacob Burckhardt, *Über das Studium der Geschichte* [On the Study of History], Munich, C.H. Beck, 1982, pp. 213, 228ff.

[13]Tocqueville, op. cit., pp. 176ff.

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The main theme of philosophy of history in the 19th century—the decline and fall of empires and civilizations—was taken up by both Marx and Lenin and developed into a crisis theory that claims to be able to analyze in a scientific way the origins of crises, and to provide the correct strategy for using a crisis for revolutionary aims. In his life and writings, Marx was overwhelmingly preoccupied with "revolutionary crises." He expected them anytime and anywhere, and when his predictions did not come true, as often happened, he tried to explain the failure of the given revolution and kept an unshakeable hope in "a new revolution in the wake of a new crisis, and the one is as certain as the other."[14] Marx retained his belief because, according to him, crises had to start when production relations and social conditions no longer corresponded to increased productive capacity and "these conditions became a hindrance to it, they were turned into fetters that had to be broken, and they were broken."[15] A "period of revolutionary crisis" comprises "the most motley mixture of crying contradictions," which Marx so vividly described in his analysis of the French revolution in 1848–51, as "a more confused mixture of high-flown phrases and actual uncertainty and clumsiness, of more enthusiastic striving for innovation and more deeply-rooted domination by the old routine, of a more apparent harmony of the whole society and more profound estrangement of its elements."[16]

Lenin had been actively involved in revolutionary developments in Russia in 1905 and in 1917, and under his own rule, in 1921. And his own experiences as a revolutionary leader served as the basis for his crisis theory. Every crisis, he noted, "at once extremely intensifies all political antagonisms, reveals the influences underlying many events, comes as the climax to a whole period of preceding development.... It compels us to give immediate answers to a number of problems that rapidly become urgent."[17] He also pointed out the "essential difference between a constitutional and a revolutionary crisis." The former may be resolved within the framework of the existing fundamental laws and order, while the latter "requires the breaking of laws and of the order of bondage."[18] Political and economic crises develop under certain circumstances into "revolutionary crises." In 1915, in *The Collapse of the Second International,* he identified three major symptoms of a "revolutionary situation":

(1) When it is impossible for the ruling classes to maintain their rule without any change; when there is a crisis in one form or another among the "upper classes," a crisis in the policy of the ruling class, leading to a fissure through which the discontent and indignation of the oppressed classes burst forth. For a revolution to take place, it is usually insufficient for "the lower classes not to want" to live in the old way; it is also necessary that "the upper classes should be unable" to live in the old way;

(2) when the suffering and want of the oppressed classes have grown more acute than usual;

(3) when, as a consequence of the above causes, there is a considerable increase in the activity of the masses, who uncomplainingly allow themselves to be robbed in "peace time," but, in turbulent times, are drawn both by all the circumstances of the crisis and by the "upper classes" themselves into independent historical action.

For Marxists, Lenin stressed, it is indisputable that a revolution is impossible without a "revolutionary situation", i.e., the "totality of all these objective changes," mentioned above, which are "independent of the will of individual groups and parties and even of individual classes." On the other hand, not every "revolutionary situation" gives rise to a revolution, because for that to happen the "objective changes" must be accompanied by "a subjective change, namely, the ability of the revolutionary *class* to take revolutionary mass action *strong* enough to break (or dislocate) the old government, which never, not even in a period of crisis, 'falls,' if it is not toppled."[19] In Lenin's view, "impoverishment of the countryside, depression in industry, a general feeling that there is no way out of the present political situation"[20] can produce economic and political crises, but these are not sufficient in themselves to escalate into a "revolutionary situation." More important and decisive for Lenin is a "crisis of government," such as occurred during the 1905 Russian revolution, brought on by "dynastic

[14]Karl Marx, "Class Struggles in France, 1848 to 1850," in Karl Marx/Friedrich Engels, *Gesamtausgabe* [Complete Works—hereafter cited as *MEGA*], Berlin, Dietz Verlag, 1977, Vol. 10, Part 1, p. 467.

[15]Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, "Manifesto of the German Communist Party," *MEGA*, Vol. 10, Part 1, p. 611. See also Karl Marx, *Das Kapital*, Berlin, Dietz Verlag, 1951, Vol. 3, p. 295.

[16]Karl Marx, *Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*, New York, International Publishers, 1981, p. 22.

[17]V. I. Lenin, *Sochineniya* [Works], 2nd ed., Moscow, Gosudarstvennoye Izdatel'stvo, 1926–1932, Vol. 10, p. 33.

[18]Ibid., Vol. 10, p. 369.

[19]Ibid., Vol. 18, pp. 244ff.

[20]Ibid., Vol. 12, p. 384.

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and other conflicts among bureaucratic, military, and Court elements,"[21] the struggles between a "liberal bureaucracy" and a "reactionary Court clique,"[22] that is, by "contradictions within the ruling class."

In his report to the second Congress of the Communist International in July 1920, Lenin argued against the view of bourgeois economists that the crisis existing then was only a "temporary disturbance," as well as against the expectations of revolutionaries "that there is absolutely no way out of the crisis."[23] For him, there can be two consequences of a crisis, the outbreak of a revolution or a muddling through for a "long dreary period."[24] He did not deny the possibility that the "ruling classes" could stay in power, the economy come out of the depression, and the revolutionary forces prove too weak, "in which case society decays, and this process sometimes drags on for decades."[25]

Both Marx and Lenin saw all societies of their time as being crisis-prone, but they were convinced that the communist society of the future would be crisis-proof. Their crisis theory applied exclusively to bourgeois society. Marxist-Leninist theorists up to our days have continued to predict a final "general crisis of capitalism." However, the development of similar crises in a communist system remains unthinkable for them. The only Marxist to envisage the possibility of a decline and breakup of an established communist regime was Mao Zedong, who saw the possibility that if "our cadres were corrupted, divided and demoralized, then it would not take long, perhaps only several years or a decade, before a counterrevolutionary restoration

[21] Ibid., Vol. 7, p. 331.
[22] Ibid., Vol. 8, p. 354.
[23] Ibid., Vol. 25, p. 340.
[24] Ibid., Vol. 7, p. 340ff.
[25] Ibid., Vol. 8, pp. 350ff.

Tsarist soldiers breaking up the procession of Father Georgiy Gapon on January 9, 1905, the "Bloody Sunday" that triggered the first Russian Revolution.

—Soviet Life from SOVFOTO.

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on a national scale inevitably occurred, the Marxist-Leninist party would undoubtedly become a revisionist party or a fascist party, and the whole of China would change its color."[26]

In already established socialist regimes, leadership by a vanguard party, central planning, and totalitarian controls are justified as means necessary to promote "revolutionary changes" toward a communist society of the future, changes that were sometimes attempted through artificial crises or "revolution from above," e.g., Stalin's collectivization or Mao's Great Leap. At the same time, these institutions of dictatorship were installed to make the established party system crisis-proof and to prevent the outbreak of crises and revolutions that might run counter to the rule and expectations of communist leaders.

In reality most of the existing "socialist states" have gone through crises and experienced "revolutionary situations" in which the workers rose against communist rule, beginning with the Kronstadt Uprising of 1921 in Soviet Russia. Crises became an infection in the communist bloc that came into being after World War II, with strikes by East German workers in 1953, the widespread upheavals in the Soviet empire that culminated in the Hungarian revolution in 1956, the Prague Spring in 1968, the still unfinished crisis in Poland since 1980, not to speak of the great troubles in Mao's China, and unrest in Vietnam and Cuba. These events showed that communist systems are indeed crisis-prone. Of course, the present situation in the Soviet Union can be said to have nothing in common with these events. It can also be regarded as different from the crises in 19th-century Europe or in prerevolutionary Russia which were analyzed by Marx and Lenin. Thus, the point can be made that the analyses of Marx and Lenin do not apply to the contemporary USSR. Nevertheless, it seems more proper to apply Marx's and Lenin's views of crises to a system that claims to be based on Marxist-Leninist theory, than to use the concepts of Western democracy and capitalist market economy to evaluate reforms and changes in the Soviet Union. Not only can Marxist-Leninist theory explain to a certain degree why the present difficulties and problems amount to a severe crisis for the Soviet system. More important, the contradictions between Soviet ideology and reality are one of the main reasons for the current crisis, which is not only economic in nature, but which has at its core a crisis of leadership and ideology.

[25]Mao Tse-tung, *On Khrushchev's Phoney Communism and Its Historical Lessons for the World*, Beijing, Foreign Languages Press, 1964, p. 71.

Decline of Ideology

Marxist-Leninist ideology is the foundation and the roof of the Soviet edifice.[27] Thus, a crisis of ideology is for Soviet leaders potentially much more serious than even acute crises in the economic sphere because it chips away at the cornerstone of their system. Although they dismiss "the unfounded myths about a 'crisis' in Marxist-Leninist thought,"[28] their repeated appeals for an improvement in ideological and educational work, and their zealous attempts to adapt theory to changing conditions, show the seriousness of their concern. The decline of the attraction of communist ideology for the younger generation was recently admitted in *Komsomol'skaya Pravda:*

Some young people begin to grumble and even become indignant.... In any case, one sometimes comes up against questions such as: How come? Why is socialist reality not as ideally good and harmonious as we were taught at school? (And why make a secret of it—many people were taught precisely that.) Why do shortcomings, disproportions, contradictions, and conflicts exist under socialism? Why are we unable to meet all our needs directly, and why are our aims not always realized, or realized not quite in the way we wanted or dreamed of? What is the relationship between the communist ideal and our life, between the theoretical Marxist-Leninist concept of the future and present-day practice?[29]

At the same time, Soviet leaders, who stress "the

[27]Ideology in the original interpretation by Karl Marx always meant a distorted reflection of reality or a "false class-consciousness." Modern Soviet theory uses this concept in a broader, more positive, sense and defines it, for instance, as follows: "Ideology usually means the system of views, beliefs, and ideals of a certain class or social stratum. Marxism-Leninism is the scientific-theoretical expression of the class-consciousness of the proletariat and its ideology. ... The very definition of the concept of 'ideology' indicates the organic connection between its theoretical content and politics. The latter concentrates within it the interests of the class, which ideology substantiates theoretically. Unlike economics, which is concerned with material relations, politics is the sphere of those social relations which, before they take shape, definitely pass through the consciousness of classes, social groups, and individual people. Here, in the crucible of social awareness, ideology exerts a formulating influence upon politics." Yuriy Krasin, "The Correlation of Ideology and Politics in the Revolutionary Movement," *Mirovaya Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnyye Otnosheniya* (Moscow), No. 5, 1984, p. 80.

[28]Chernenko, "The Task of the Whole Party, of Each Communist," *Kommunist*, No. 15, 1983, p. 21.

[29]A. Volodin, "Steps Toward the Ideal," *Komsomol'skaya Pravda* (Moscow), June 9, 1984. These questions of "young people" are supposed to be answered "without sidestepping controversial points" in a new book by V. A. Pechenev, *The Socialist Ideal and Real Socialism*, Moscow, Politizdat, 1984, that is reviewed by Volodin. Pechenev has published in recent years books and major articles about "developed socialism," the "socialist way of life," and the "world socialist system," and he is now an adviser to General Secretary Chernenko.

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enormous part played by ideology and the ideological struggle in the world today" in connection with "the most intense and fierce postwar confrontation between the two diametrically opposed world outlooks of socialism and imperialism,"[30] see their ideological supremacy not only threatened by a new "anticommunist crusade started by reactionary US imperialists," but even more so by the fundamental criticism of Soviet theory and reality coming from communist comrades in Beijing, Belgrade, Warsaw, Rome, or Paris, and feel compelled to take a defensive position. Surely it was not without reason that in response to such criticism Richard Kosolapov, the editor-in-chief of *Kommunist,* quoted Pushkin's "we must not retreat in the field of the mind."[31]

For the CPSU as a "party of scientific communism," its ideology is the sole and undisputable legitimation of its power and of the rule of its leaders. It is supposed to determine the "building of socialism and communism," to give direction for an invariably correct policy, and to organize and rally the masses: "It is with Marx, Engels, and Lenin that the CPSU checks its every step."[32] Marxism-Leninism, claiming to be an infallible "science" that contains an exact knowledge of the objective laws of nature and society, "enables one not only to find one's way among complex social contradictions, but also to anticipate the future, ... and provides the deep conviction that the victory of communism in the whole world is a historic necessity."[33] Claiming "unity of theory and practice," Communists justify with this ideology the use of any means for reaching the goal of communism. In this sense, the ideology is said to be fundamentally different from all other ideological systems, as Chernenko boasted:

The scientific character, democratic spirit, revolutionary nature, and humanism of this ideology fundamentally distinguish it from bourgeois ideology, which justifies and blesses exploitative systems and the aggressive policy of imperialism and preaches nationalism and chauvinism. In contrast to bourgeois ideology, communist ideology attracts the minds and hearts of millions by its truth and honesty as well as integrity and optimism.[34]

Bourgeois ideology is presented as a "distorted consciousness that blocks the accurate understanding of objective reality."[35] The struggle between the two ideologies is perceived as antagonistic and uncompromising. It must not slacken even in times of coexistence and will go on regardless of global policy turns. As the absolute truth, Marxism-Leninism cannot be changed or put into doubt, and it does not allow other ideologies to coexist with it. The slightest deviation—"right" or "left," "revisionism" or "dogmatism"—is anathema, and so is any form of "pluralism." Should another ideology be able to challenge successfully the absolute and universal claims of Marxism-Leninism, the legitimacy of the party's rule, the policies of its leaders, and the allegiance of the masses would be shaken. Therefore, the control and interpretation of ideology become the main tasks of communist leaders and constitute the principal source of their power. From this it follows that the control and use of the "powerful information and propaganda complex" are at least as important for them as the economy, the government, or the military.

All Soviet leaders since the time of Lenin presented themselves as chief ideologists and true followers of "Lenin's course." At the same time, they undertook a so-called creative development of Marxism-Leninism by manipulating the theories of the "revolutionary teachers" and by revising the theoretical guidelines of their predecessors. For example, Stalin abandoned Lenin's New Economic Policy, Khrushchev launched de-Stalinization, and Brezhnev attacked Krushchev's "subjectivism and voluntarism." In his speech on the 112th anniversary of the birth of Lenin, on April 22, 1982, Andropov criticized indirectly the still presiding General Secretary Brezhnev by declaring that "the teachings of Lenin, like Marxism-Leninism as a whole, are a science and like any other science, they cannot tolerate stagnation."[36] Upon becoming party leader, Andropov promptly started to revise the policy of his predecessor. In his trail-blazing article on the occasion of the 100th anniversary of the death of Karl Marx, Andropov, in the role of chief ideologist, declared some basic dogmas of Marxism-Leninism to be not working or not valid, and called for "modernization" and a greater realism in the theoretical work of the party.[37] Andropov conceded that developments in the Soviet Union did not follow the laws laid down by

[30] G. L. Smirnov, "For a Decisive Change of Philosophical Research on Social Practice," *Voprosy Filosofii* (Moscow), No. 9, 1983, p. 3.

[31] Richard Kosolapov, "Socialism: Organic Integrity of a Social System," *Pravda*, Mar. 4, 1983, pp. 2–3.

[32] Andropov, in *Kommunist*, No. 3, 1983, p. 22.

[33] *Osnovy marksizma-leninizma* [The Principles of Marxism-Leninism], Moscow, Gospolitizdat, 1960, pp. 7ff.

[34] For Chernenko's report to the June 1983 CC plenum, see *Pravda*, June 15, 1983.

[35] K. Rusakov, "Aggravation of the Global Ideological Struggle and the Political Education of Working People," *Kommunist*, No. 16, 1982, p. 33.

[36] Andropov, "Leninism—the Inexhaustible Source of Revolutionary Energy and Creativity of the Masses," *Pravda*, Apr. 23, 1982.

[37] Andropov, in *Kommunist*, No. 3, 1983, pp. 9–23.

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Marx and Engels when he stated: "The specific historical ways of the emergence of socialism have proved to be not in all respects what the founders of our revolutionary theory expected." In spite of this admission, Andropov attacked "critics of the October Revolution who allege that it took place contrary to all of Marx's expectations." He brushed aside the conclusion of "ideologists of the bourgeoisie and reformism" that the "new society" built in the USSR does not conform to the kind of socialism visualized by Marx, and he criticized "voices heard sometimes"—which seemed to be coming from his own camp—"that new phenomena in social life 'do not fit' into the concept of Marxism-Leninism."

Nevertheless, Andropov repeatedly addressed specific issues concerning the disparity between the Marxist ideal and Soviet reality. The abolition of private ownership and the socialization of the means of production, deplored Andropov, had not yet produced a "collectivist mentality and behavior"; even after the final establishment of "socialist" production relations, "some people preserve and even reproduce individualistic habits." The people, "the supreme and undivided owners of all public wealth," had not become "its true, wise, and thrifty master." Nor had the historical mission of socialism "to make work, once an unpleasant and compulsory duty, a primary vital need for the individual" been yet realized. Indeed, as Andropov noted, there still were in the Soviet economy "a great number of physically arduous, unattractive, and routine jobs," with the share of manual, nonmechanized labor in industry still reaching 40 percent. In addition, the basic idea of Marx that the progress of the productive forces must have corresponding forms of organization in economic life was not translated into "the concrete language of practice." Andropov explained these undeniable contradictions between Marxist-Leninist ideology and Soviet reality by stating that Marx's ideas contained only "a most generalized indication of the remote goal" and therefore "the validity of Marx's views should be judged not only on the basis of the experience of the last few decades but should be appreciated also from the vantage of a longer perspective." On the other hand, he admitted that mistakes in the appreciation of Marx's views had been made—for example, of the "principle of socialist distribution," of the "law of saving work time," and of the "establishment of democracy"—and that Marxist laws and norms had not always been put correctly into practice. The new party leader reiterated that the "most important law of the building of socialism and communism, the leading role of the communist party," no longer works in practice, that the orders from above are not executed lower down, plans are not fulfilled, "signals are not heeded and much needed measures are not taken," and "people make do with mere forms and the appearance of action."[38] This was a clear admission that the communist system of party rule, justified by Marxist-Leninist ideology, is in fact not functioning as it should. The diagnosis of this malaise of party rule, and not merely the stagnation of the economy, is the reason why Andropov prescribed "discipline and order."

Soviet laborers hurry to complete construction for the 1980 Olympic Village in Moscow.

—David Burnett/Contact.

Furthermore, a third fundamental tenet of communist ideology—the progressive unification of socialist countries on the basis of "socialist internationalism"—has not been realized. On the contrary, the "world of socialism, ... even if it seemed to us at one time that it would be more uniform," has shown in the past two decades "how diverse and complex it is," according to Andropov. Within socialist countries "nationalistic sentiments" did arise, and between them

[38]Andropov's speech at the June 1983 CC plenum, *Pravda*, June 16, 1983.

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interstate conflicts broke out, Andropov complained, "for which, it would seem, there is no basis in the socialist world."[39] Andropov culminated his revelations and criticisms by saying that in reality the stage of development in the Soviet Union is not as high as it was presumed to be. He cautioned against "possible exaggerations in gauging the level of the country's progress toward the higher stage of communism" and reminded his comrades that "developed socialism" cannot be achieved in a day, that there still are "outstanding problems left over from yesterday" and "difficulties of growth." Thus, he said, "it will take some time to draw up the straggling rear and to forge ahead."[40] Andropov left no doubt that the building of "mature socialism" would proceed at a much slower pace than hitherto forecast and that the communist future was much farther off than had been envisaged in the party program adopted at the 22nd CPSU Congress in 1961.

The Crash of the Party Program

The party program of the CPSU is supposed to set the general party line for a long period and to serve as a guide for the domestic and foreign policies of the Soviet Union. However, the program adopted in 1961 quickly became defunct. The grandiose hopes raised by this program led to disillusionment among both party members and the general population, especially the youth. The repercussions of this crash still haunt Soviet leaders, who try to write off the program, once supported by most of the present Politburo, as an "unjustified jumping of the gun." Pro forma, the program is still valid. The repeatedly postponed attempts to write a new party program point to disorientation about theory and policy. No decision has yet been made about who will write the new program that the party congress of 1986 ought to adopt and what its general line—"leading into the 21st century"—will be.

The 1961 program was a striking reflection both of Khrushchev's personal optimism and of the general feeling among Soviet leaders that history was on their side. Excited by the success of "Sputnik" and challenged by Mao's Great Leap, Khrushchev had proclaimed at the 22nd CPSU Congress that "socialism had triumphed *fully and finally* in our country and we have entered the period of the *full-scale building of communism*."[41] The new party program, presented by Khrushchev, predicted: "The present generation of Soviet people will live under Communism."[42] In it the ambitious goal was set "to create the material and technical base of communism in the course of two decades." According to the detailed plans incorporated into the party program, it was expected that the Soviet Union "in the current decade (1961–1970) will surpass the strongest and richest capitalist country, the USA, in per capita production.... Everyone will be assured of material sufficiency; by the end of the second decade (1971–1980) there will be assured an abundance of material and cultural benefits for the entire population."[43] Khrushchev, who at the 21st party congress in 1959 had already set the goal to catch up and overtake America on the wings of the scientific-technical revolution, boasted two years later "that the socialist express will overtake and pass capitalism," the USSR will "approximately within the next decade surpass by 50 percent the present US level of per capita output of farm products and will exceed the US level of national income, ... and by 1980 our country will leave the United States far behind in per capita output of industrial and agricultural goods."[44] At the same time, Khrushchev predicted that a "classless society" would appear and a "new man" would be molded; that Soviet people would be supplied with the most modern equipment, and labor transformed into a "source of joy, inspiration and creativity"; and, that the "cup of abundance" would "always be filled to the brim."[45] Communism would emerge as the "greatest creative force in the history of mankind" and the competition between socialism and capitalism would be permanently decided in favor of socialism.

It did not take long for the "remarkable rocket," which, in Khrushchev's colorful language, "is to carry us into the orbit of communism," to prove to be a dud. After his ouster in October 1964, Khrushchev's successors accused him of "adventurism" and "harebrained schemes." They saw that the "unlimited opportunities for the development of the productive forces, ... unlimited possibilities of scientific progress, ... wonderful prospects for agriculture," which were to provide the raw material for the "communist edifice,"[46] did not exist. Ten years later, at the 24th party congress in 1971, Brezhnev painted a different, more sober picture:

[39] Ibid.

[40] Andropov, in *Kommunist*, No. 3, 1983, pp. 14 and 20.

[41] N. S. Khrushchev, "On the Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union," *XXII s'yezd KPSS, stenograficheskiy otchët* [The 22nd CPSU Congress: Stenographic Report], Moscow, Politizdat, 1961, Vol. 1, p. 210.

[42] Ibid., Vol. 3, p. 335.

[43] Ibid., p. 276.

[44] Ibid., Vol. 1, pp. 224ff.

[45] Ibid., pp. 161ff.

[46] Ibid., p. 169.

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The so-called extensive factors of growth in the national economy are becoming more limited, ... opportunities for enlisting additional manpower will decline, ... the growth-rates of capital investment also have their limits.[47]

The "communist program for abundance" was thus scratched. The theoretical vacuum was filled by the elaboration of the concept of the "developed socialist society." According to this construct, intervening between the revolutionary overthrow of the bourgeoisie and the final erection of a "communist society" is a "period of revolutionary transformation of the one into the other," in which different stages of "socialism" (still infested with "remnants of capitalism") ascend into the higher stages of "communism." At the end of this process "the withering away of the state" takes place.

The definition of the stages of "socialism" and "communism," their qualities and duration, has been a subject of dispute between "dogmatists" and "revisionists" since the days of Marx. The substitution of the imminent leap into the higher "communist" stage by an interposed stage of "gradual improvement of developed socialism" was a major revision of theory and policy, which served to cover up the disaster of Khrushchev's program. At first, the concept of a "developed socialist society" contained proposals for radical reforms: the creation of "a modern industrial, scientific, and technological base"; "first of all an upswing in agricultural production"; the "utilization of such categories as profit and material interest"; and "the transformation of the entire superstructure."[48] A sharp debate began about when Soviet society had entered the "new historical stage of developed socialism," for which different names and definitions—

[47] "L. I. Brezhnev's Report on Behalf of the Central Committee to the 24th CPSU Congress, March 30, 1971," in *XXIV s'yezd KPSS, stenograficheskiy otchët* [The 24th CPSU Congress: Stenographic Report], Moscow, Politizdat, 1971, Vol. 1, p. 79.

[48] Fëdor Burlatskiy, "On Constructing a Developed Socialist Society," *Pravda*, Dec. 21, 1967, p. 4.

The rostrum at the 22nd CPSU Congress in October 1961, which formally adopted the new Party Program; in the first row, from left to right, Leonid Brezhnev, First Secretary Nikita Khrushchev, Frol' Kozlov, and Mikhail Suslov.

—TASS from SOVFOTO.

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"mature socialism," "real existing socialism," and "integral socialism"—were offered.[49]

The originally reformist intentions of this concept were soon forgotten and a conservative, status-quo orientation prevailed instead. The main characteristics of "developed socialism" were defined by Brezhnev as "the organic *integrity* and dynamism of the social system, its political *stability* and its *internal unity*." These were to be realized and improved through "the steady growth of the party's leading role," the progressive "socialization of the economy," the "homogenization of society," the "further increase of the country's economic might," the "strengthening of our glorious Armed Forces," and the "enlarging of the influence of the USSR on world developments."[50] Consequently, the new concept became the justification for Brezhnev's policy of stabilization and for Soviet expansionism during the 1970's. Its theoretical sterility had produced an ideological torpor even before stagnation seized the economy and the entire social fabric.[51] At the beginning of the 1980's, the "scientific calculations" outlined in the party program had definitely proven false, the real output of the Soviet economy was way down from the set plan-targets, and the "inevitable collapse of capitalism," foreseen in 1961, had not taken place. The 26th CPSU Congress in 1981 decided "to introduce necessary changes and additions into the existing program" and to prepare a new version for the next party congress in 1986.[52]

This task was taken energetically in hand by Andropov after he became party chief. In typical Orwellian "doublethink" he maintained at the CC plenum in June 1983: "The Party Program now in effect correctly defines on the whole the laws governing world social development, and the aims and basic tasks of the struggle waged by the Party and Soviet people for communism. Its fundamental principles have been corroborated by the realities of life. Much of what is recorded in the Program has already been fulfilled."[53] But at the same time he pointed to the fundamental defects in this program and exposed the reasons for its failure: "Some of its provisions—this must be stated frankly—have not stood the test of time in full measure, since they contain elements divorced from realities, anticipation of events, and unwarranted specification of details." Andropov also sketched the areas that needed further elaboration in the new program. They seemingly encompass all activities of the CPSU. He called first for a "deep theoretical analysis" of the changes in the past two decades and a "realistic analysis of the existing situation." In this context Andropov made this frank and sensational admission:

We have not yet studied properly the society in which we live and work, and have not yet fully revealed the laws governing its development, particularly economic ones.[54]

Andropov deplored that the supposedly omniscient leaders of the CPSU "have to act at times empirically, so to speak, by the quite irrational trial-and-error method."[55] The disaster with the party program and Andropov's frank admission that Marxist-Leninist theory was unable to come to grips with modern times revealed as never before the antagonism between the pretensions of theory and the reality of the Soviet system. Apparently, Soviet ideology, which already has lost much credibility inside and outside the communist movement, no longer serves as the unshakeable "fundament of fundaments" for the CPSU and as infallible guidance for Kremlin leaders. Undoubtedly, they remember Lenin's warning that "the absence of theory deprives a revolutionary trend of the right to existence and inevitably condemns it, sooner or later, to political bankruptcy."[56]

Complexities of Contradictions

Soviet leaders have begun to say openly that everything in their system is becoming more complex and complicated. They cannot evade the fact that real socialism in the early 1980's was confronted with "objectively determined difficulties" in the Soviet Union and other socialist countries—for example, economic stagnation, growing social tensions, and escalating worker unrest. Party theorists began to argue against

[49]Kosolapov, "Contributions of the 24th, 25th and 26th CPSU Congresses to the Elaboration of the Theoretical and Political Problems of Developed Socialism and the Transition to Communism," *Kommunist*, No. 5, 1982, pp. 54–67; and the editorial "The Activity of the CPSU in Building Developed Socialism in the 1960's," *Voprosy Istorii* (Moscow), No. 4, 1984, pp. 3–14.

[50]Brezhnev, *Leninskim kursom* [On a Leninist Course], Moscow, Izdatel'stvo Politicheskoy Literatury, Vol. 2, 1970, pp. 101 and 129ff.; and Vol. 6, 1978, p. 293.

[51]The "ideological counterreformation" during Brezhnev's era was analyzed by Helmut Dahm, "Marx-Lenin-Andropov: A Report on the Ideological Situation after the Leadership Change in Moscow," *Berichte des Bundesinstituts für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien* (Cologne), No. 32, 1983.

[52]Brezhnev, "Report of the Central Committee to the 26th CPSU Congress," *XXVI s'yezd KPSS, stenograficheskiy otchët* [The 26th CPSU Congress: Stenographic Report], Moscow, Politizdat, 1981, Vol. 1, p. 376.

[53]*Pravda*, June 16, 1983.

[54]Ibid., Nov. 23, 1982.

[55]Ibid., June 16, 1983.

[56]Lenin, *Sochineniya*, Vol. 5, p. 147. This warning was quoted by Chernenko in *Kommunist*, No. 6, 1982, p. 26.

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a too simplistic interpretation of history and to warn "that ideas about the development of the new system as a totally unclouded victorious march also cause palpable damage." This approach toward the "study of the new system's nature" must be overcome, and it is necessary to analyze "real socialism in all its complexity and contradictoriness."[57] References to complexity abound in the official pronouncements of recent years. Brezhnev had complained at the 26th party congress in 1981 that "the path of social progress is difficult and sometimes painful" and that the degree of complexity of many questions studied by the Politburo is increasing all the time.[58] Andropov spoke about "the complex process of improving developed socialism,"[59] and Chernenko about "the increase in scale and complexity of the task of communist building."[60] The resolution of the CC plenum in June 1983 pointed to the "enormously complicated problems of social development."[61] Not only are "complex processes" taking place in the "socialist world," but today's international situation is also of a "complex nature."[62]

Party ideologists began to explain that "in the 1970's social development became essentially more complicated, ... phenomena and problems appeared that deviate from accustomed practice and often are totally new."[63] Chernenko mentioned "that the scientific and technical revolution, the increased complexity of the fuel and energy, raw material, and certain other conditions of the functioning of the national economy, and the worsened population problems are having an increasingly tangible influence on the development of our society."[64] What complicates the building of socialism and communism, according to Yuriy Novopashin, sector chief in the Institute of the Economy of the World Socialist System, is that "real socialism includes not only those trends that promote its progress, but also those that impede its progress, in particular either an unjustified jumping the gun, or, on the contrary, the conservation of some forms of sociopolitical and socioeconomic life that no longer accord with the level of development attained."[65] He foresaw a "perceptibly slower pace of socioeconomic development in the socialist countries" that is affected by "specific historical causes." This slowdown in development is accompanied by a "growth of the difficulties of the transition to the intensive type of development." Novopashin's conclusion is that these problems not only put in doubt the "experience of the USSR" as a world model, but diminish as well the "influence of real socialism on the world revolutionary process" that, in any case, has become "a complex, multifaceted phenomenon constituting a mixture of positive and negative aspects."

The crucial task for the Soviet leaders is not only to find solutions for "complexities," as they call them, but above all to understand their causes and to explain them within the framework of Marxist-Leninist theory. After more than six decades of Soviet rule it is no longer convincing to explain "negative phenomena" as "relics of the past," "vestiges of capitalism," or "imperialist aggression." Andropov had brushed these obsolete explanations aside with the remark: "Whether these phenomena have been a continuation of past practices, or whether they are brought upon us from abroad," the important task is "the overcoming of contradictions and difficulties" in a "most complex process."[66] Nor can the complex problems be attributed only to "subjective mistakes" of this ministry or that functionary. Indeed, in order to understand the problems, party theorists have introduced a distinction between those "errors and difficulties" that could have been prevented or corrected "given a more consistent pursuit of Marxist-Leninist policy" and those that were "inevitable" because "the new is always asserted in a strenuous struggle against the old as a result of the interaction and antagonism of various trends of social development."[67]

When communist leaders and ideologists start to talk about "antagonism" and "contradiction," as they did in recent years, then the situation is really serious.

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[57] Yuriy S. Novopashin, "The Influence of Real Socialism on the World Revolutionary Process: Methodological Aspects," *Voprosy Filosofii*, No. 8, 1982, pp. 3–16.

[58] Brezhnev, "Report of the Central Committee to the 26th CPSU Congress," pp. 88 and 98.

[59] *Pravda*, Apr. 23, 1982.

[60] Chernenko, "The Vanguard Role of the Party of Communists: Important Condition for its Growth—On the Unity of Ideological and Organizational Work," *Kommunist*, No. 6, 1982, p. 29.

[61] *Pravda*, June 16, 1983.

[62] *Novoye vremya* (Moscow), No. 11, 1984, p. 5.

[63] Pëtr Fedoseyev, "The Dialectics of Social Life," *Problemy Mira i Sotsializma* (Moscow), No. 9, 1981, pp. 28ff.

[64] *Kommunist*, No. 6, 1982, p. 29.

[65] Novopashin, loc. cit., p. 4. He lists the following "specific historical causes" for the slowdown of progress:

- *the inefficient flexibility of national systems of planning and economic management, including systems concerned with the introduction of the achievements of scientific and technical progress into production;*
- *the fall in return on capital and the increase in incompleted construction;*
- *the slowing in the growth of labor productivity and the growing manpower shortage;*
- *the tense situation with the fuel and metal balance;*
- *shortage of certain food and consumer goods and frequent low quality of such goods;*
- *the rate of growth in the people's well-being has fallen somewhat.*

[66] *Pravda*, Apr. 23, 1982.

[67] Novopashin, loc. cit., p. 4.

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For Marx, "antagonisms and contradictions" were the "fountain of all dialectics" and the motive force of nature and history. They alone produce progress, are the source of all class struggles in history, and are "at the same time the formative element of a new and revolutionary moment in the old society."[68] In the effort to erect in backward Russia the first "socialist society," Marxist theory had to resolve how to generate progress without incurring the negative consequences of "contradictions," such as class struggles. Lenin found a simple solution by distinguishing between "antagonisms" and "contradictions," of which "the former disappear, and the latter will remain under socialism."[69] Stalin evolved this notion in the 1930's into the theory of "antagonistic and nonantagonistic contradictions," which remains part of Soviet ideology up to today. According to this distinction, *"antagonistic contradictions* exist between social groups or classes whose fundamental interests are mutually exclusive," as between workers and capitalists, and they vanish only as a "result of the socialist revolution." On the other hand, *"nonantagonistic contradictions"* exist in a society "in which the fundamental interests of classes and social groups coincide," that is, in a "socialist society" where contradictions can be resolved "through common efforts of the friendly classes and all social strata under the leadership of a Marxist-Leninist party."[70] In the early 1980's it became, according to Chernenko, a "question of paramount theoretical and practical significance" to study "the nature and types of contradictions characteristic of the contemporary stage of the Soviet society's development and the objective and subjective factors that cause them."[71]

Chernenko's call generated a broad discussion of "contradictions," started by Vadim Semënov, editor-in-chief of *Voprosy Filosofii,* in which different opinions clashed and various typologies and rankings of "fundamental," "main," and "dominant" contradictions were presented.[72] While Soviet leaders and party theorists agreed that an exact understanding of "contradictions" is the precondition for their solution, they have limited themselves so far to more or less abstract definitions and comparisons. This cautious and scholastic approach was criticized by Anatoliy Butenko, chief of a sector of the USSR Academy of Sciences's Institute of the Economy of the World Socialist System, who called for "a more flexible approach than before" and presented a much more realistic dialectical interpretation of "contradictions."[73] He refuted the "theory of conflictlessness," which assumes that socialism develops free not only of antagonisms but of contradictions as well, and confirmed "that the number of real

Vadim Semënov, editor-in-chief of Voprosy Filosofii.

—*Zhurnalist* (Moscow), April 1978, p. 14.

[68] Karl Marx, *Das Kapital,* Vol. 1, 1951, pp. 626 and 529.

[69] *Leninskiy sbornik* [Lenin Reader], Moscow and Leningrad, Institut Lenina pri Ts.K.V.P.(b), 1929, Vol. 11, p. 357.

[70] *Osnovy marksizma-leninizma,* pp. 90ff.

[71] *Kommunist,* No. 6, 1982, p. 30. Chernenko redefined this task at the CC plenum in June 1983 and limited its scope: "What is needed today is an all-round study of the *nonantagonistic contradictions* inherent in mature socialism, of the specific aspects of resolving them in conditions of strengthening the social, political, and ideological unity of Soviet society. Here, just as in any social organism, a *struggle between the new and the old* is taking place, and not only creative but also negative tendencies exist. These, for example, include parochialism and the narrow compartmentalized approach, bureaucratism, and conservatism. The cause of these and other such phenomena must be revealed, and means of overcoming them found." *Pravda,* June 15, 1983.

[72] V. S. Semënov, "Problems of Contradictions in Socialism," *Voprosy Filosofii,* No. 7, 1982, pp. 17–32, and No. 9, 1982, pp. 3–21. Semënov distinguished between "horizontal contradictions," i.e., between productive forces and production relations, and "vertical contradictions," i.e., between industry and agriculture. He elaborated this typology in a second article, "Toward the Theoretical Deepening and Concretization of the Analysis of Developed Socialism," ibid., No. 2, 1984, pp. 130–40, in which he distinguished among "fundamental," "main," and "dominant" contradictions. A summary of the theoretical discussion about "contradictions" was published in ibid., No. 2, 1984, pp. 116–23.

[73] A. P. Butenko, "Contradictions of the Development of Socialism as a Social System," *Voprosy Filosofii,* No. 10, 1982, pp. 16–29. He elaborated his views in a second article, "Once More About the Contradictions of Socialism," ibid., No. 2, 1984, pp. 124–29, in which he reviewed the discussion and criticized the position taken by V. S. Semënov in the same journal.

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existing contradictions cannot even approximately be estimated." According to Butenko, the difficulty with an analysis of "contradictions in socialism" is that it touches "the interests of the most different groups," hinting at the politically dangerous ground into which such an analysis may lead. Moreover, he pointed out, a "primitive, philistine idea about contradictions as something 'abnormal' and 'unnatural' to socialism" still prevails in public opinion.

The debate gave rise to different and contradictory definitions as to what constitutes the *fundamental contradiction* of a particular socioeconomic formation that "expresses its essence, reveals the decisive internal source for the development of this formation," and "forms the foundation on which all other contradictions rest."[74] This is, for most theorists, "the contradiction between the growing productive forces of society and the real existing system of socialist production relations."[75] Others differ with this definition and identify "the contradiction between the limited production potential and the society's growing requirements" as the "basic" one.[76] There exists, according to this definition, only one fundamental contradiction in the "base" of each society, but in it may appear several *main contradictions* related to the specific stages of social development. For example, there is the contradiction between the *equal* relationship of working people to the means of production and to socialist property that has been achieved and secured and the *unequal* method of distribution according to labor, and not according to need, which persists due to the inadequate level of development of production forces.[77] Whatever the utility of these scholastic exercises, at least the enumeration of the so-called *dominant contradictions,* which, according to Semënov, are "the most pressing, urgent, and decisive for ensuring the socialist society's progress," provides a comprehensive catalogue of the unresolved problems with which the Soviet system is faced. For example:

- *the objective demands in the conditions of mature socialism of comprehensive, integrated, balanced social development on the one hand and, on the other, certain phenomena and trends of unhealthy, disproportionate development that persists in actual practice;*
- *the existing extensive development and the objectively necessary intensive path of development;*
- *production and the system of economic machinery, planning, and management;*
- *the levels of development in industry and in agriculture;*
- *production and consumption;*
- *the development of centralization and the development of democratic principles;*
- *general and private interests;*
- *positive and negative social phenomena.*[78]

These "contradictions" are said to be of a systemic, "essentially and properly socialist nature" and therefore "nonantagonistic." In reality they are contradictions between theory and practice, between the pretensions of a functioning and successful "real socialism" and the true situation within the Soviet Union. Together they provide a picture of a deep crisis, of which the origins and solutions are in dispute under the cover of a discussion about "contradictions."

In the theoretical discussion about "contradictions," two differing schools of thought emerged. One group of ideologists followed, supported, and elaborated Andropov's dictum that "in socialist society ... antagonisms do not arise."[79] According to this view, in conditions of "developed socialism" only "nonantagonistic contradictions" appear. For the other group of theoretists, e.g., the prominent party philosopher Pëtr Fedoseyev, it is a "methodological simplification" to maintain that in a socialist society "all contradictions always and under all circumstances are only nonantagonistic."[80] Indeed, Fedoseyev did not rule out that "under special conditions—as a consequence of major and persistent mistakes in the organization of economic construction and cultural development, and in leading social affairs—nonantagonistic contradictions may acquire the features of antagonistic contradictions." Similarly, Vadim Semënov spoke about "the growing of nonantagonistic contradictions into antagonistic contradictions."[81] Yet all theorists maintained that "contradictions in socialism" are "fundamentally

[74]Semënov, in ibid., No. 2, 1984, p. 134. Semënov, like other ideologists, illustrates the theory of contradictions with a dogmatic Marxist interpretation of capitalist society: "In capitalist society the fundamental contradiction acts as an antagonistic contradiction between the specific social nature of production and production forces on the one hand, and private property, capitalist form of ownership, and production relations on the other. Under socialist conditions, this basic contradiction is qualitatively entirely different in its special structural nature, but exists within the same sphere of social existence: it is a nonantagonistic contradiction between the specific social nature of production and production forces on the one hand, the concrete social forms (or form) of socialist ownership and production relations on the other."

[75]Ibid., No. 10, 1982, p. 21.

[76]Yu. K. Pletnikov, "The Specifics of the Law of Development of Socialist Society," ibid., No. 2, 1980, pp. 16–27.

[77]Semënov, in ibid., No. 2, 1984, pp. 134ff.

[78]Ibid., pp. 130ff.

[79]*Pravda,* Apr. 23, 1982.

[80]Fedoseyev, loc. cit., pp. 28ff.

[81]Semënov, in *Voprosy Filosofii,* No. 9, 1982, pp. 13ff.

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different from the antagonisms of bourgeois society and are soluble."[82] This does not answer the fundamental question rhetorically asked by Kosolapov: "But does the new society not experience acute conflicts and open clashes? Why?"[83]

All ideologists agree that one of the most important sources of contradictions within socialist societies is "the main antagonism in today's world between socialism and capitalism," and the struggle between them. This "antagonism" affects the development of socialist countries as an "external factor," either as the source of their problems (produced by "external influences from imperialism, which strives to undermine the foundation of socialism, to turn nonantagonistic contradictions present within socialist society into antagonistic ones, and to provoke crisis situations or even 'deformations' in its economic base and superstructure"[84]) or as a "stimulus for the growth of socialism's productive forces through economic competition with the capitalist countries" in connection with "the necessity to safeguard the security of the Soviet Union."[85] Some theorists, however, locate in the "fundamental contradiction," i.e., "the correlation between productive forces and production relations" the "source of all economic, social, political and ideological problems of socialism."[86] To prevent or resolve these problems, according to Butenko, "each essential step in the development of the productive forces of socialism requires corrections, an improvement of the whole real system of socialist production relations," because "when adequate changes in this sphere do not take place, it will without fail brake the development of the productive forces and slow down the tempo of economic growth." In his opinion, the "dynamic character of needs and interests of men, and the growth of their education, culture, and political consciousness" necessitate improvement in the political organization and economic system of society. Otherwise the "conservation of obsolete mechanisms" produces "a growth of the disproportion of the two sides of the fundamental contradiction" and leads, as happened frequently in recent years in some socialist countries, to a "muddling through" (*probuksovka*) of the administrative machines" and to increasing "political tensions."



Anatoliy Yegorov, director of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism.

***—Deputy verkhovnogo soveta SSSR: Desyatyy sosyv* (Deputies of the USSR Supreme Soviet: 10th Convocation), Moscow, 1974, p. 152.**

The contention that "contradictions in socialism" are different from those in all other societies is more difficult to prove. Soviet ideologists perform amazing intellectual gyrations to explain that the existing problems and difficulties are "alien to socialism" and to evade the possibility that they are the product of the socialist system itself. They invoke the old bugbears of "objective" and "subjective" factors and "external" and "internal" influences. The ills in Soviet society are due to "violations of the objective laws of socialist development," "great subjective mistakes in the leadership," "temporary confusion and wavering, ambivalent attitudes by certain segments of the socialist workers, their growing passivity, isolation and deviating activity," or "disruptive tendencies in the ranks of a communist party."[87] However, what brings on these "external factors" remains obscure. For example, Vadim Semënov distinguishes between "substantial contradictions," which are "the inner source of progressive social development," and "nonsubstantial contradictions," which are "incidental, nonessential and avoidable." Anatoliy Yegorov, director of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism, identifies "dialectical con-

[82] Chernenko, in *Kommunist*, No. 6, 1982, p. 30.

[83] Kosolapov, in *Pravda*, Mar. 4, 1982.

[84] A.G. Yegorov, "Leninism—Marxism of Our Era, the Great Science of Winning," *Voprosy Istorii KPSS* (Moscow), No. 4, 1984, pp. 147ff.

[85] M. N. Gretskiy, "The Logical and the Historical in Marx's Teaching about Social Development," *Filosofskiye nauki* (Moscow), No. 2, 1983, p. 17.

[86] Butenko, in *Voprosy Filosofii*, No. 10, 1982, pp. 21ff.

[87] Semënov, in ibid., No. 9, 1982, pp. 13ff.

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tradictions" as "inherently characteristic of socialist society," but calls it a mistake "to pass off all shortcomings as being dialectical contradictions."[88]

Richard Kosolapov's slightly different approach consists of asking "what actual contradictions are alien to or, conversely, inherent in socialism as an organic entity"—an important theoretical question.[89] He criticizes the view that "social antagonism" should be considered possible even in "socialism" and denounces it as a "poor assessment of Marxism-Leninism" that has "little connection with reality." He is convinced that "after the complete victory of socialism," class and national antagonisms become obsolete and "contradictions" acquire a "nonantagonistic nature" because "now they are not the expression of the struggle of one class against another or of hostility between nations." Nonetheless, these "nonantagonistic contradictions" are, according to Kosolapov, "evidence either of differences *between individuals* or the counterposition of the selfish interests of an *individual or group of individuals* to the interests of society as a whole," and he distinguishes between *"social antagonism,* which has no place under socialism," and "*individual antagonism,* which will still occur for a long time to come." Kosolapov does not deny that in a "developed socialist society . . . phenomena diametrically opposed to communist morality" may grow spontaneously, for example, "pilferers and bribetakers, speculators and scroungers, drifters and parasites." These "social spongers" are for him as dangerous as "class enemies," because "wherever they are able to install themselves they make holes, like moths, in the fabric of socialist social relations and try to weave a web of anticollectivist ties and draw other people into their web"—these are "the individual carriers of the germ of antagonism."

Butenko challenged Kosolapov's explanation of these "complex processes" as being a "residual antagonism" and instead searched for "contradictions generated by the development of the new system itself," what Lenin called "contradictions in the very essence of subjects."[90] In this analysis Butenko went further than other party theorists by pointing to *"the interconnections between contradictions and interests."* It is obvious to him that "contradictions in socialist life" can only mean "the interaction between living individuals and social groups with specific interests." Speaking about "bureaucratism, formalism, conservatism, localist trends, nationalism" and other "ugly, negative phenomena in society" and their "opposition to socialist development," he said: "We are dealing not with some featureless excrescences on the social organism but with entirely real people who are the bearers of a particular social evil and with their actions that are harmful to socialism. Who are they, these bearers of evil, where do they come from? Which people and which interests?" Butenko agreed with Andropov's dictum that under "socialism" there is not and cannot be "antagonism," but he qualified it in the sense that this is true only "when there is no possibility of nonantagonistic contradictions developing in such a way that the interests of the social groups and social forces behind these contradictions deviate increasingly from the original situation."

To illustrate this point and to prove that in "real socialism" a development is possible "where there is a very profound change in the initial interests of social forces," Butenko used the supposedly hypothetical scenario—is it only a hypothetical one?—about "the problems of *managers and managed* under socialism." Their interests are in "nonantagonistic contradiction" as long as the interests of both sides "remain within the framework of broadly coinciding fundamental interests." But this is not the only kind of development possible. If managers "lose contact with the managed, if they begin to use their position to implement their own selfish group interests at the expense of public interests and the working people's interests," then these interests become "mutually exclusive interests that acquire in this regard the nature of an antagonistic contradiction." This is neither a "vestige of capitalism" nor "residual antagonism." To show that this scenario is not pure speculation, he recalls that "the experience of real socialism confirms not only the possibility but also the reality of this backward, regressive evolution."[91] Diagnosing a "change in the nature of the contradiction itself," in the relationship between "managers" and "managed," Butenko understandably evades the logical consequences of such a "very profound change," that, of course, would affect not

[88]A. G. Yegorov, "About Socialist, Communist Progress in the Present Stage of Development of Soviet Society," *Voprosy Istorii KPSS,* No. 1, 1984, p. 20.

[89]Kosolapov, in *Pravda,* Mar. 4, 1983, p. 20.

[90]Butenko, in *Voprosy Filosofii,* No. 2, 1984, pp. 124ff.

[91]Butenko covered himself against attacks by declaring that he does not like to speak about a "direct transformation, under socialism, of certain nonantagonistic contradictions into antagonisms" because of the inadequate studies of these problems. Therefore, "if we are talking about the type of contradictions possible under socialism, it is essential also to analyze processes where there is not only an aggravation of a contradiction, but also a change in the essence of the interests of the forces on either side of the contradiction and therefore a *change in the nature of the contradiction itself.*" In any case, with his scenario of a real qualitative "change" in the nature of a contradiction, Butenko goes further than Fedoseyev, who had conceded that "nonantagonistic contradictions may acquire the features of antagonistic contradictions," or Semënov, who had spoken about their "growing into" one another.

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

Production work in 1980 at a textile mill in Frunze, Kirghizia.

—Martine Franck/MAGNUM.

only the pretension of a "leading role of the working class in the socialist society." It would also signify in classical Marxist terms the "exploitation of the managed," the reemergence of class struggle, and the possibility of a "revolutionary situation" within developed socialism.

It is not surprising that Butenko's scenario of the "objective possibility" of Burnham's "managerial revolution"[92] in the Soviet Union was vehemently attacked in a subsequent editorial of *Kommunist,* which summarized the debate among Soviet social scientists, but did not mention individual participants.[93] The editorial refuted "irresponsible assertions that it was supposedly possible for the working class to lose its role as the vanguard of revolution during periods when reactionaries temporarily gained the offensive." In it, "snobbish reasonings that the contemporary working class in the USSR was 'unprepared' to fulfill its leading role in developed socialist society" were criticized. In this context the party journal also attacked "attempts by Marxist renegades at falsely invoking the social consequences of the scientific-technical revolution and thereby presenting not the working class but rather the intelligentsia of the contemporary capitalist world as the era's dominant social factor disregarding this intelligentsia's deep internal differentiation and, what is more, emphasizing the upper stratum of the ruling monopoly that was bourgeois by its social function as well as by its position and its views."

Here, no doubt, some of the hidden background of the theoretical discussion comes out, namely, the apprehension that with the progress of the scientific-technical revolution new "contradictions" in "developed socialism" may appear, and the "intelligentsia" may become the "dominant social factor" and realize its interests. No wonder that Chernenko complained that "the scientific-technical revolution is constantly giving rise to new, far from simple problems and frequently complicates the control of social processes."[94]

Behind this theoretical dispute about "contradictions," which is evolving into the most important ideological contest in years, there are apparently hidden basic power interests. It was probably not primarily the Polish crisis, but the internal situation in the Soviet

[92] James Burnham, *The Managerial Revolution,* Westport, CT, Greenwood Press, 1972.

[93] Editorial: "More Alive than All the Living," *Kommunist,* No. 6, 1984, p. 6.

[94] Chernenko, "Leninist Strategy of Leadership: On Certain Questions of the Party's Activity Under Conditions of Developed Socialism," *Kommunist,* No. 13, 1983, p. 8.

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Union and the beginning of the power struggle for Brezhnev's succession that gave the question of "contradictions" in 1981 and 1982 topicality and urgency.[95] The debate seems to mirror different views in the party elite about the nature of the existing problems, about the necessity for change and innovations, about the scope of economic and administrative reforms, and about the need to make concessions to the population. This dispute became muted during the rule of Andropov and was revived around the time of Chernenko's succession at the beginning of 1984. At the bottom of this abstract contention is the vital question about the future of the Soviet system. The different interpretations of "contradictions" offer different ways and means to resolve problems.

The Soviet leaders have tried to keep this debate under control and to direct attention toward "the correct use of contradictions in socialism as a source and stimulus for its forward development."[96] They want to defuse the "dialectical dynamite" contained in the revelations of all the "negative phenomena" within "developed socialism"; in the conclusion that "mistakes in the leadership" and "alienation" between the party and the masses are the source of "contradictions"; in the realization that different groups and interests have appeared in Soviet society; and in the scenario of a possible "managerial revolution" in the Soviet Union. They have immense difficulty in understanding a totally new situation (in essence, "standing Marxism on its head"), judiciously explained by Seweryn Bialer: "For many decades the political 'superstructure' has shaped the socio-economic 'base' in the Soviet Union. Now the time has come for the 'base' to take its revenge on the 'superstructure'!"[97]

Talk about the "contradiction between the old and the new" cannot obscure the fact that the "superstructure" of the Soviet system no longer matches the socioeconomic "base," and that both are growing farther apart. The refusal even to entertain the notion of "antagonism" regarding the fundamental "contradiction between productive forces and production relations" reveals the insecurity of present Soviet leaders and their hidden fears that "developed socialism" may contain or produce forces they will not be able to control.

The crux of the discussion about "contradictions" lies in the evasion or negation of the ultimate consequence of the "fundamental contradiction," namely, that it may produce also in a "socialist society," as in bourgeois society, antagonism, crises, a new class struggle, or even a "revolutionary situation." According to the Marxist dialectic of history the contradiction between the "base" and the "superstructure" is the fundamental antagonism and the motive force of all social change, as Marx had stated again and again:

All collisions in history have in our opinion their origin in the contradiction between the productive forces and the forms of intercourse.... This contradiction between the productive forces and the form of intercourse ... everytime had to explode in a revolution.[98]

Marx also offered the following prognosis: "Only in an order of things in which there are no classes and class antagonisms will social evolutions cease to be political revolutions."[99] Nobody maintains that the Soviet Union has already reached the state of "classless society" or that there are no contradictions, problems,

[95]See Elizabeth Teague, "Signs of Rivalry between Andropov and Chernenko," *Radio Liberty Research* (Munich), RL 214/82, May 25, 1982; Ernst Kux, "Movement around Brezhnev," *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* (hereafter *NZZ*), Mar. 12, 1982; idem, "Chernenko—Brezhnev's Crown Prince," *NZZ*, Apr. 10/11, 1982; idem, "Andropov on Socialism and Peace," *NZZ*, Apr. 29, 1982; idem, "Andropov's Rise," *NZZ*, May 26, 1982; and idem, "Shifts in Soviet Leadership," *Swiss Review of World Affairs* (Zurich), July 1982.

[96]Andropov, in *Kommunist*, No. 3, 1983, p. 21. Such a "positive" evaluation and utilization of "contradictions" was demanded by Fedoseyev, and by L. F. Il'ichëv, "Some Methodological Problems of Historical Materialism," *Voprosy Filosofii*, No. 6, 1984, pp. 11 and 21; Fëdor Burlatskiy, "Improvement of Developed Socialism—An Important Stage on the Way to Communism," *Voprosy Filosofii*, No. 6, 1984, pp. 23–39, 33.

[97]Seweryn Bialer and Joan Afferica, "Andropov's Burden: Socialist Stagnation and Communist Encirclement," *Adelphi Papers* (London), No. 189, IISS Annual Conference Papers, p. 13. This relationship, pointed out by Bialer, poses great problems for Soviet theorists. Anatoliy Butenko, for instance, in *Voprosy Filosofii*, No. 10, 1982, pp. 20ff., argued against the view, prevalent in popular publications, "that socialist production relations were running ahead of the development of productive forces, and this excludes their contradiction." He calls such "an idea about socialist production relations something like 'buying a suit so as to allow for growing,' a kind of incubator for the development of productive forces," totally unsustainable. He quotes as proof Marx's "Preface" to *A Critique of Political Economy*: "new, higher relations of production never appear before the material conditions of their existence have matured"—but he omits the ending of Marx's sentence that went as follows "...matured in the womb of the old society itself."

[98]Marx and Engels, "German Ideology," *MEGA*, Vol. 5, Part 1, p. 63. Marx repeated this central thesis of his dialectic of history and theory of revolution later in "Preface" to *A Critique of Political Economy*: "At a certain stage of their development, the material productive forces of society come in conflict with the existing relations of production.... From forms of development of the productive forces these relations turn into fetters. This begins an epoch of social revolution." *MEGA*, Vol. 2, Part 2, pp. 100ff; compare also "The Class Struggles in France, 1848 to 1850," pp. 466ff, and *Das Kapital*, Vol. 1, pp. 514 and 529.

In Marx's view, crises and revolutions were produced by the "universal development of the productive forces" (which today would include communications and science) as the "precondition for new production forms," and accordingly "all hitherto existing societies perished through the development of wealth, or, what is the same, of the social productive forces." See "Outline of a Critique of Political Economy," *MEGA*, Vol. 1, Part 2, p. 438. Crises were always produced by "overproduction" and an "abundance of wealth." On the other hand, according to Marx, improvement of the economy and increase of production can prevent the exacerbation of crises and the outbreak of revolution. For an interpretation of Marx's revolutionary theory see Ernst Kux, *Karl Marx—Die revolutionäre Konfession* [Karl Marx—A Revolutionary Credo], Zurich, Eugen Rentsch Verlag, 1967.

[99]Karl Marx, "The Poverty of Philosophy," *MEGA*, Vol. 6, Part 1, p. 228.

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or tensions. The recent discussions have at least clarified the alternatives for the Soviet leaders—either to find solutions for the existing "contradictions" or to be confronted by crisis and conflicts.

Danger of a "Revolutionary Situation"

The belief of Soviet Marxist-Leninists that "socialism contains the possibility of a crisisless and progressive development in an ascending line"[100] was shaken most by the recent events in Poland. It was obvious to students of history, sociology, and politics that the Polish developments of 1980 represented a genuine revolution. They had all the elements and characteristics ascribed in Marxist-Leninist texts to a "proletarian revolution." The workers in Gdansk acted exactly like the Paris Commune, as reported by Karl Marx in *The Civil War in France.* There are striking similarities between the decadence of the French Republic in 1871 and the rottenness of the Polish People's Republic in 1980; between the "Commune" and "Solidarity" as organizations of "free and associated labor"; and between the crushing of both. The spontaneous rising of Solidarity is labelled by orthodox party leaders and ideologists as a "counterrevolution" supported by "international imperialism" able to utilize the "mistakes of the former party leadership"—the same explanation that had been used for the revolutions in Hungary and Czechoslovakia. The only difference is that the Polish workers were not crushed by Soviet tanks, but by a coup d'état of Polish "Bonapartists" under the leadership of General Jaruzelski who, by the introduction of martial law, not only outlawed Solidarity but also usurped the power of the Polish party. The perversion of the revolution by "Bonapartism"—defined by Lenin as "acquiring power by *formally* legal means, but *actually* in defiance of the will of the people (or of the party)," and as "state power which leans on the military clique (on the worst elements of the army) for support"[101]—became a reality in Poland. The impact of both revolution and "Bonapartism" on the "socialist world," the international communist movement, and, last but not least, on Marxist-Leninist theory was tremendous. The Polish crisis developed into "one of the sharpest ideological conflicts in the world arena,"[102] intensified the East-West confrontation, led to a new quarrel between the Italian and other communist parties with the CPSU, and started the ideological discussion about "contradictions" in the Soviet Union.

The unexpected outbreak of the Polish crisis in 1980 and the continuing failure to resolve it raised questions both about its causes and whether similar developments could occur in other "socialist countries," or even in the Soviet Union itself. In any case, if "socialist society is a society that knows ... more or less easily soluble nonantagonistic contradictions," it can no longer be denied that it is also "a society that still has not rid itself of acute conflicts and clashes, a society which can encounter serious collisions."[103]

How a "deformation of socialism" can develop was illustrated by Anatoliy Butenko in early 1982 with the "sorry experiences of Maoist China."[104] He took great trouble to distinguish the "military-bureaucratic degeneration of power" in China from the "distortions of socialism" in Hungary, Czechoslovakia and, recently, in Poland. His analysis concluded that a "deformation of socialism" is a "phenomenon alien to its essence" and a product of the "substitution of the foundation of socialism and the socialist mechanisms of social development with other foundations and mechanisms." Such a "deformation" happens when, for instance, "the ownership of the means of production by all the people is replaced either by state-bureaucratic property alienated from the workers or by group property ownership; planning by spontaneity; and democratic centralism by a bureaucratic centralism or anarchic decentralization." Another "deformation" appears "when the mutual relations of managers and managed, that is, the relations downwards and upwards, are reduced to commanding from above." A similar damage and "social evil" is produced by attempts "to replace the workers' own power by the activity of the state apparatus, in the name of the working people, but not in their interest." Is not Butenko's "deformation of socialism" descriptive of the Soviet system, where in reality state-bureaucratic property exists, bureaucratic centralism holds sway, commands come from above "in the name of the workers, but not in their interests," as communist critics of this state of affairs, including Deng Xiaoping in China, Adam Schaff in Poland, Aleksander Grlickov in Yugoslavia, and Guiseppe Boffa in Italy have pointed out? Is it not reasonable to assume that such conditions will inevitably produce some day a political crisis or develop into a "revolutionary situation" in the Soviet Union?

[100] Semënov, in *Voprosy Filosofii*, No. 9, 1982, p. 8.

[101] Lenin, *Sochineniya*, Vol. 6, p. 298, and Vol. 21, pp. 60ff. "Bonapartism" expresses the fears and obsessions of communist leaders that in a revolution not the proletariat and its avant-garde but the military will gain power or, in established communist regimes, the party will lose its power to the army.

[102] Rusakov, in *Kommunist*, No. 16, 1982, p. 91.

[103] Butenko, in *Voprosy Filosofii*, No. 2, 1984, p. 126.

[104] Butenko, "Socialism: Forms and Deformations," *Novoye vremya*, No. 6, February 1982, p. 6.

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Richard Kosolapov, editor-in-chief of Kommunist.

—***Zhurnalist*** **(Moscow), April 1984, p. 2.**

The standard answer of Soviet ideologists is "it cannot happen here." To prove this point, Richard Kosolapov emphasized, at an ideological conference in Prague in January 1982, the "great difference that existed between the Polish socioeconomic and political 'model', which was practiced until 1980, and the Soviet experience," a difference that, in his opinion, is not only related to different national levels of economic development, "but to the principles themselves."[105] With this differentiation Kosolapov tried also to refute the argument of Polish social scientists that Poland was going through a series of "unfinished crises" since 1948 and that these were produced by the imposition of the "Soviet model of socialism" on the country.[106] According to Kosolapov, the developments in Poland were a special, singular affair and the "fatal consequence" of the "dominant nature of private small-scale farming, the growing indebtedness to the West, and a growth of consumerist moods." They were "the result of aggravated contradictions," which had as one source "the quite unfinished class struggle," and as another "the lack of real prerequisites for resolving the problem of 'who-whom' (kto-kogo)." The Polish leaders, in his view, made a fundamental error "when they proclaimed the slogan of building developed socialism in the 1970's even though Poland was far from having completed the transitional period." Kosolapov overlooked the fact that the Polish leaders had proclaimed "developed socialism" in their country on the example and orders of the Soviet Union, and he did not explain why Moscow had not warned its Polish comrades in time against this "error."[107]

Different conclusions from the Polish crisis were drawn by Butenko later in 1982 in his analysis of deformations of socialism as well as in his discussion of contradictions.[108] He did agree with the conclusions of the Polish United Workers' Party Congress of 1981 about the "structural causes" of the crisis, according to which "the lack of a clear concept for the solution of contradictions" resulted in "the formation of pressure groups and the deepening of the discrepancies between the level of productive forces and the economic, social, and political structures." Butenko quoted the resolution of the congress that said that repeated and unresolved "deformations of the system" since 1948 arose primarily through "a deficient development of intraparty and general democracy, the excesses of bureaucratic centralism in party, state, and economy, and the lack of party institutions able to control the party leadership." Butenko saw this as proof that "defects in the structures, torpid links, and non-functioning forms" can appear within "socialism" and produce a "growing alienation of the working people from these structures." In connection with the latter, Butenko urged that "the demarcation of a justified protest by the masses from counterrevolution" is of "principal importance." To do this, he made an interesting distinction between a "political crisis" and a "socio-political conflict": A *"political crisis"* manifests itself "when an important segment of the workers withdraws its support for the ruling political organizations (party and state), rejects in one form or another

[105]Kosolapov, in *Kommunist*, No. 5, 1982, p. 64. A report about the scientific conference on the theoretical and methodological problems of developed socialism in Prague, Jan. 27–28, 1982, was published in ibid., pp. 37ff.

[106]A.V. Kuznetsov, "On the Theoretical Concepts of a Polish Political Scientist," *Voprosy Filosofii*, No. 12, 1983, p. 26ff., revealed that Jerzy Wiatr was the author of this argumentation and extended the attack against him, which had been initiated by Kosolapov.

[107]E.g., Burlatskiy stated as a fact that in all East European socialist countries, "the period of the transition from capitalism to socialism either is coming to an end or has been completed." Accordingly, the CP's of these countries "set forth the aim of the construction of a developed socialist society," which in Eastern Europe as well as in the Soviet Union will follow the same "general tendencies." *Pravda*, Dec. 21, 1967.

[108]Butenko, in *Voprosy Filosofii*, No. 10, 1982, pp. 16–19.

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Poland's independent trade union Solidarity stages a one-hour strike in October 1980 protesting the government's failure to adhere to conditions of the August 1980 Gdansk Agreement; the signs bear the following messages: "United We Shall Win," "We Are United," "Solidarity Today, Success Tomorrow," and "We Demand Punishment for Economic Criminals."

—Alain Keler/SYGMA.

the existing policy, and expresses its disaffection from it." As a consequence, the political system cannot fulfill its formal function. To a certain degree the discontent of the masses is justified insofar as it is directed against "errors of policy and deviations from socialist principles and social justice." One of the forms of such a crisis is the *"socio-political conflict"* when the masses "act openly against the political organization and its policy." The character of such a conflict depends on its origins, the composition of the participants, and the aims of those "who rise against the existing power." Butenko avoided a more concrete characterization of such a conflict, but everyone who has studied Marx and Lenin knows that such an activity by the masses against the existing power creates a "revolutionary situation."

In response, Kosolapov not only denied again the possibility of "social antagonisms" in conditions of "socialism," but also repeated his interpretation "that in contemporary Poland it is not possible to regard the tasks of the transition period as being completely resolved or Polish society as having fully coped with the tasks of building socialism."[109] Implicit in Kosolapov's statement was the judgment that the Polish situation could not occur in the Soviet Union and other socialist countries that have a nationalized large-scale industry and a highly mechanized agriculture. The achieved extent of "integration of the socialist system" serves, according to the editor-in-chief of *Kommunist,* as a "weighty guarantee against the emergence of negative trends of a critical nature, provided of course that the machinery of planned management of economic and social development is functioning normally and the whipping up of problems long since solved is not permitted." This qualification of the "guarantee" was quite remarkable.

Kosolapov's interpretation, which became the standard one during Andropov's tenure, did not satisfy Butenko who, at the beginning of 1984, raised the fol-

[109] *Pravda,* Mar. 4, 1983.

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lowing question: "Why in Poland now and why only in Poland?" If "residual social antagonism" and "vestiges of capitalism" are to be regarded as the prime causes of the crisis, these "objective reasons for antagonistic contradictions" existed in Poland throughout the postwar period and are present in other "socialist countries" as well.[110] Butenko defended his conclusions about the Polish crisis against Kosolapov's criticism and repeated "that under conditions of socialism *ever new contradictions* arose and were aggravated." He again called attention to the "Program Tenets of the Ninth Extraordinary PZPR Congress" in which the following "contradictions" were detailed:

- *between the moral fundamentals of socialism and their frequent violation in practice at various levels of power and in many social spheres;*
- *between the persistently proclaimed thesis of the leading role of the working class and the actual weakening of its influence in social and economic life;*
- *between the officially proclaimed ideology of social justice and the rapidly increasing discrepancy in wages and incomes, with a privileged position for leading cadres of the national economy;*
- *between word and deed, between the depicting of reality in the mass media and its real state and public interpretation, which undermined the importance of basic values and reduced the authority of the party in the eyes of the public.*[111]

Talk about "vestiges of capitalism," according to Butenko, "distracts attention from socialist society's own contradictions and their prompt solutions," misguides practical workers, and is precisely the approach "that could lead to grave social collisions." Kosolapov's rebuttal came promptly in a lengthy interview in *Literaturnaya gazeta*.[112] For him a greater danger is "an opinion that distorts reality"—which he sees the concept of "antagonism within socialism" as doing—and that also "lacks a firm class approach." The "distortions" by the Polish leaders confirm that "contradictions" look different in a "society during its transitional period" than in "an already developed socialist society." Kosolapov agrees with the view that "obsolete, decrepit social forms" have been generated by the "new system," insofar as this view guards against "hasty action, ill-considered abolitions and reorganizations, and intuitive rather than scientific decisions."

The dramatic dispute between Butenko and Kosolapov about the origins of the Polish crisis, the possibility of its happening in other socialist countries, and the role of "contradictions," in which other theorists joined, revealed the growing concern about the present situation and future developments in the Soviet Union and its satellites. It revealed also a basic quarrel about prevention and resolution of new crises and about the necessity for reform. If the Polish crisis was the consequence of a "perpetuation of the private producer in the socialist system" and that producer's opposition to the "historically inevitable progressive advance of large-scale production in general and socialist production in particular"—the orthodox interpretation presented by Kosolapov and others—then it will remain a unique event. The correct way for solving or preventing such a crisis is the classical Marxist-Leninist method of "a high-level of actual socialization of labor and production" and the overcoming of existing class distinctions.[113] If, on the other hand, the causes of the Polish crisis were different—if they were rooted in "the permanent deformation of certain links of the system" and the "inept solution of the contradictions inherent in socialism"[114]—then these "negative phenomena" might appear elsewhere and could produce similar crisis-situations. In that case, an intensive analysis, a "flexible approach," and a careful handling of "contradictions" would be necessary.

As the "most important method to solve contradictions," Soviet social scientists and economists advocate "reforms carried out by the party in the interests of society."[115] It is not accidental that Lenin's policy during the Kronstadt Uprising in 1921 is presented as a historical precedent and model for correct crisis solution, and that his combining of the "crushing of the counterrevolutionary forces" with the introduction of the New Economic Policy is praised for its effectiveness.[116] For Professor E. A. Ambartsumov, a leading proponent of economic reforms, the lessons of 1921 "retain their significance until today." He laments that

[110]Butenko, in *Voprosy Filosofii*, No. 2, 1984, p. 127.

[111]Ibid.

[112]Kosolapov, "By Strength of Reason and Feeling—A Topical Interview," *Literaturnaya gazeta* (Moscow), No. 5, Feb. 1, 1984.

[113]Kosolapov, in *Kommunist*, No. 5, 1982, pp. 56ff. Kosolapov stressed again in his interview in *Literaturnaya gazeta* that "boosting productive forces and bringing them into line with these production relations are the most important thing, . . . the universal condition for any major social changes, including changes in the way of life." He argues against other theorists who regard "changes in the way of life" as most important for historical development. Kosolapov dismisses proposals for reforms, e.g., "abstract calls for all-around expansion of commodity and monetary relations" as an "uncautious commodity-money 'romanticism' devoid of the spirit of dialectics."

[114]Butenko, in *Voprosy Filosofii*, No. 2, 1984, p. 127.

[115]Semënov, in ibid., No. 9, 1982, p. 8.

[116]Butenko, in *Novoye vremya*, No. 6, 1982, p. 7.

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no general theory of the causes and solutions of crises under socialism has yet been developed. In an attempt to do so, he draws parallels between the "socio-political crisis" in the Soviet Russia of 1921 and in Eastern Europe today. He describes crisis as a "process of accumulation and exacerbation of contradictions in all important spheres of the functioning of society," during which "interrelationships among the improvement of the situation, the raising of hopes, the sudden change for the worse, the exacerbation of discontent and crisis" occur. As the main causes of crises, whether in 1921 or in 1980, he identifies "the increase in the contrast between the growing demands of people and a much too slow improvement of living standards," as well as the "violation of the workers' interests." Ambartsumov advocates an "anticrisis strategy" and a "radical change of the political line, of slogans, work-methods and selection of cadres," similar to what Lenin had introduced with NEP.[117]

Unfortunately, it is difficult for an outsider to identify different positions on contradictions and crisis-solution with rivaling power interests or specific top leaders, but such connections certainly exist. It is not difficult to see that Soviet leaders themselves are becoming more concerned with preventing crises than with building communism. Chernenko was the first to sound the alarm at the end of 1981, when he began to stress that without strengthening the leading role of the party, on the one hand, and without greater regard for the "unique interests of every class and every stratum in Soviet society" on the other, the Soviet Union and other "socialist countries" will be fraught with "the danger of social tension and of political and socioeconomic crisis"[118] and may risk a Polish-style crisis. For him the "harsh lessons" of the events in Poland "have shown incontrovertibly that the political

[117]E. A. Ambartsumov, "V. I. Lenin's Analysis of the Origins of the Crisis in the Year 1921 and of Ways To Solve It," *Voprosy Istorii*, No. 4, 1984, pp. 15–29. Ambartsumov, by the way, attacks Kosolapov and others, who see the cause of the Polish crisis in the small owners' structure of the Polish village and points to the fact that the collectivization of agriculture in Czechoslovakia did not prevent the crisis in 1968. This argument seems to be important for Ambartsumov, because in earlier writings he had proposed an extension of the private sector in Soviet agriculture, trade, and supply similar to NEP. The great importance of Lenin's works at the end of his life in 1922–1923 and the change to NEP was stressed also by Burlatskiy, in *Voprosy Filosofii*, No. 6, 1984, p. 25.

[118]Chernenko, in *Kommunist*, No. 13, 1981, p. 11. See Marc D. Zlotnik, "Chernenko's Platform," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), November–December 1982, pp. 72ff.



Konstantin Chernenko affixes the Order of Friendship Among Peoples to the banner of the Soviet Writers' Union during a September 25, 1984, commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the organization, at which the party leader reaffirmed the principles of "socialist realism" in literature.

—TASS via UPI.

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situation could take on a crisis nature."[119] Not without reason did Chernenko note "that the biggest and most formidable danger for the party is that of being divorced from the worker and peasant masses." The communist party's vanguard role, he warned, is not something "given once for all and guaranteed in advance." Lacking ties to the masses and "deprived of a nutrient medium," political parties can perish. He even conjured up the old specter for communist regimes, the "danger of a restoration of capitalism." Perhaps less alarmist though no less concerned and frank, Andropov admitted that the USSR has both difficulties and contradictions and warned that if they are ignored "as a result of such disregard, these contradictions, which are not antagonistic by their nature, also provoke serious collisions."[120] Andropov's statement at the CC plenum in June 1983 was not only a retrospective evaluation of the Polish crisis, but also a general warning to avoid "errors" in the future:

In politics one has to pay for one's errors. When the guiding role of a communist party weakens, there arises the danger of returning to a bourgeois-reformist way of development. If a party loses touch with the people, self-proclaimed contenders for the role of those who express the interests of the working people emerge in the ensuing vacuum. If there is no rebuff to nationalistic sentiments, there arise interstate conflicts, for which, it would seem, there is not even a basis in the socialist world.[121]

In his last address as general secretary, in December 1983, Andropov warned that "the incomplete satisfaction of the population with goods is a source of negative phenomena" and will entail "discontent among the population."[122] To overcome the existing difficulties and prevent the emergence of new ones, Andropov called for "deep qualitative changes in productive forces, and corresponding perfection of production relations, ... and changes in the consciousness of the people, in all forms of social life that we call the superstructure," which, according to Andropov, are now inevitable, and "there is no way of avoiding it."[123]

Andropov apparently wanted to start with the "base" by pushing production, as well as streamlining political and economic structures, strengthening law and order, and rejuvenating the cadres. Chernenko, on the other hand, seems to accord greater attention to the "superstructure," that is, to the intensification of ideological work and the "populist" appeal to the masses, as well as to the improvement of the "socialist way of life." Neither approach is yielding satisfactory results. Year after year, the Soviet leaders complain about the "unsatisfactory plan fulfillment," point to this or that existing bottleneck, and repeat the formula "much is still to be done," but the Soviet economy remains an "illusory economy."[124] All the efforts to educate and form a "new man" are not able to eradicate "drunkenness, hooliganism and sponging, speculation and theft of socialist property, bribe-taking and money-grubbing."[125] Chernenko is not alone in worrying about the "belated civic maturity, political naiveté, and sponging attitudes of certain

Soviet youths have developed a taste for Western-style dancing and clothing.

—Gamma-Liaison.

[119]Chernenko, in *Voprosy Istorii KPSS*, No. 2, 1982, p. 5.
[120]Andropov, in *Kommunist*, No. 3, 1983, p. 21.
[121]*Pravda*, June 16, 1983.
[122]Ibid., Dec. 27, 1983.
[123]Ibid., June 16, 1983.
[124]Ibid., Dec. 27, 1983.
[125]Chernenko's report to the June 1983 CC plenum, in *Pravda*, June 15, 1983.

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young people, their unwillingness to work where society needs them today"—reasons for alarm because today's young generation will have to tackle "the most complex tasks of the approaching 21st century." Soviet leaders are also confronted with a "new problem" because "the makeup of social strata and social patterns are changing before our very eyes." This requires them to take into account "the diverse interests of different groups of the population" in political, economic, and ideological decisions. This development, together with the unresolved question of nationalism, disproves the claim of a "progressive homogenization of society" and the emergence of a "classless society" in the stage of "developed socialism." In fact, new social strata of better trained workers, specialists, technocrats, sophisticated party intellectuals, and military elite seem to be articulating their particular group interests even inside the CPSU. Butenko's scenario of a possible "antagonism" between "managers and managed" might not remain theoretical.

Confronted with "problems from yesterday" and "new problems" as well, the Soviet leaders are realizing that changes will be necessary. Yet, they also fear that such changes may produce greater dangers for their rule than the ones they want to prevent. What "guarantee" is there that the CPSU leaders will not repeat the same "errors" they ascribed to Stalin or Khrushchev, or that they will not misjudge the stage of "transformation" toward communism and take false measures? This dilemma becomes even more pressing in view of the present state of the Kremlin leadership. Apart from the inherent weakness of communist rule in not providing for a legitimate and institutionalized change of leaders, the deaths of two old party leaders within a short time and the election of another gerontocrat have produced an acute crisis of leadership. The two recent successions revealed the limitations of the selection process, the deadlock in decision-making, the misapprehension of the realities in the system and in the world at large. There is mounting evidence that at least since the beginning of 1982 the members of the Politburo have not seen eye to eye about the country's situation, about the necessity, the means, and the speed of change, and about the dangers of a sharpening crisis. At the same time a change of generations in the party and government is becoming inevitable. The "contradictions between the old and the new," which Soviet leaders see and accept as the motive force for the development of socialism, are now working in their midst. The Politburo in its present composition reminds one of Marx's description of the French "party of order" during the revolution of 1848 as a "collection of old superstitious invalids and young unbelieving soldiers of fortune."[126]

In 1923, at the end of his life, Lenin complained about "our dear bureaucrats'," their "observance of the forms and ceremonies of administration," and their "tremendous resistance to the smallest changes," and came to the conclusion that "all really great revolutions are born out of the contradictions between the old, and that which is oriented toward the consummation of the old, and the totally abstract striving for the new, which must be so new as not to contain even a grain of old times."[127] As Lenin remarked, to create a "revolutionary situation" it is not enough "that the lower strata will not," it is necessary "that the upper strata cannot,"[128] or, in other words, "that the ruling classes pass through a crisis of government."[129] Lenin did not exempt his own party and regime from the rule that a crisis begins "when it is impossible for the ruling classes to maintain their rule without any change."[130]

Analyzing the great crisis for the Bolsheviks in 1921, which nowadays gets so much topical attention from Soviet theorists, Lenin saw its main source in the "crisis of the party." "The party is sick" and has grown "feverish heads," is torn by "differences of opinion and by budding factionalism.... Our state is a state with bureaucratic excrescences.... The mutual confidence between the vanguard of the working class and the masses" is disturbed—and thus threatened by a "political breakdown."[131]

Of course, the situation in 1921 was exceptional and much different from the present one in the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, this historical lesson puts the confident assertion of today's Soviet leaders that "it cannot happen here" into some doubt. From his own experience Lenin knew how difficult it is to foresee "the course of development of a political crisis."[132] It would be arrogant to predict outright a degeneration of the Soviet system, even though there are clear signs of a growing crisis of leadership, and the "contradictions between promises, words, and scraps of paper, on the one hand, and acts of reality on the other"[133]—for Lenin the manifestation of a "revolutionary situation"—are becoming more evident. No one has as yet glimpsed in the Soviet Union "the mole that can work in the earth so fast, that worthy

[126] Marx, "Class Struggles in France, 1848 to 1850," p. 164.
[127] Lenin, *Sochineniya*, Vol. 27, p. 414.
[128] Ibid., Vol. 30, p. 227.
[129] Ibid., Vol. 25, p. 223.
[130] Ibid., Vol. 18, p. 244.
[131] Ibid., Vol. 26, pp. 87, 235, and 260.
[132] Ibid., Vol. 12, p. 384.
[133] Ibid., Vol. 8, p. 367.

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pioneer—the Revolution."[134] In spite of all the "social evils," "negative phenomena," and "contradictions" that are admitted by the Soviet leaders, there are no signs of an actual "socio-political conflict" in which the masses begin to express their discontent, much less any indication of open action against the existing order. There appears to be no active "revolutionary organization" that would be able to prepare and take advantage of a "revolutionary situation." No "revolutionary theory" has been formulated that analyzes comprehensively the defects of the Soviet system and offers a convincing alternative to it, although some dissidents have proposed rational reforms in their writings, as Andrey Sakharov has, or predicted, like Andrey Amalrik, the disintegration of the Soviet empire.[135] Nevertheless, there exists inside the Soviet system much potentially explosive material that is officially condoned and even promoted. The writings of Marx and Lenin can be used as a standard for measuring "real existing socialism" and its "deformations," as well as a manual on the strategy and tactics for making revolution.

We do not know which of the agonizing choices the Soviet leaders will make at this crucial juncture, whether they will decide on the introduction of reforms that may weaken party rule, on a stupid muddling through by failing to adjust to changing conditions, or on a return to the once efficacious Stalinist order that could now lead to resistance within the party as well as among the people. But we do know that history does not follow a predetermined course, that "real history includes both slow evolution and rapid leaps, breaks in continuity."[136] Despite claims by successive Soviet leaders that their system is immune to the cycles of class struggle and revolution, nevertheless, it appears that developed Soviet socialism has not escaped the logic of history presented in a dialogue between the rocket builder D–503 and his seductress I–330 in Zamiatin's *WE:*

"It is inconceivable! It is absurd! Is it not clear to you that what you are planning is a revolution? Absurd, because a revolution is impossible! Because our—I speak for myself and for you—our revolution was the last one. No other revolutions may occur. Everybody knows that."

A mocking, sharp triangle of brows.

"My dear, you are a mathematician, are you not? More than that, a philosopher-mathematician? Well, then, name the last number."

"What is . . . I . . . I cannot understand, which last?" "The last one, the highest, the largest."

"But I–330, that's absurd! Since the number of numbers is infinite, how can there be a last one?"

"And why then do you think there is a last revolution . . . their number is infinite . . . . The 'last one' is a child's story . . . ."[137]

[134]Marx, "Speech on the Anniversary of the *People's Paper*, 14 April 1856," *Selected Writings*, David McLellan, Ed., London, Oxford University Press, 1977, p. 339.

[135]Attempts at a "revolutionary theory" in East European countries were reported by Helmut Dahm, loc. cit., pp. 7ff. Attacks in Soviet journals against Polish social scientists demonstrated Soviet anxiety and alarm about independent evaluations of the crisis situation and East European criticism of the "Soviet model." See, e.g., A. V. Kuznetsov's attack on Jerzy Wiatr, in *Voprosy Filosofii*, No. 12, 1983, pp. 26–39; and V. D. Granov's critique of Adam Schaff, "The 'Civilized Alternative' of A. Schaff," ibid., No. 4, 1984, pp. 126–34.

[136]Lenin, *Sochineniya*, Vol. 15, p. 7.

[137]Eugene Zamiatin, *WE*, trans. by Gregory Zilboorg, New York, E. P. Dutton, 1959, p. 162.

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Mullahs, Mujahidin and Soviet Muslims

Alexandre Bennigsen

The impact on Soviet Muslims of the war in Afghanistan and the Islamic Revolution in Iran has been the subject of considerable debate over the last few years. Soviet sources, as usual, provide only incomplete information. Some Western observers have taken the position that a destabilized Muslim world on the immediate borders of the USSR has had virtually no impact on Soviet Muslims, such is the advanced state of Soviet Central Asia's "modernization," secularization, and "social mobilization." By this reckoning, Soviet efforts to purge the Muslim Central Asian population of its Islamic consciousness have been broadly successful, and consequently Islam is no longer important in the makeup of the identity of Soviet Muslim elites (although it has greater influence among the more conservative masses).[1] Other observers insist that Islam remains a common denominator among the Turco-Iranian peoples of Soviet Central Asia and the Caucasus.[2] This being the case, it is inconceivable that Soviet Muslims can remain unaffected by the turmoil just across their borders, and it is probable that information and ideas, particularly fundamentalist ones from Iran and Afghanistan, will continue to penetrate the borders of the USSR.

The debate often centers on the idea of "spillover." This idea illuminates less than it obscures for two reasons. First, it is not necessary for ideas to "spill" from Iran and Afghanistan into the USSR to have an effect; given the closed nature of Soviet society the merest drop can have an impact well in excess of its volume. Second, "spillover" implies that Soviet Central Asia is somehow an empty vessel; in fact, Soviet Muslim territories—with their long Islamic tradition—are similar to the other parts of the Muslim world where a new upsurge of Islamic awareness is evident. This awareness among Soviet Muslims did not begin with the events in Iran but was in fact visible considerably earlier, being the result of local factors in Turkestan and the Caucasus. An Islamic religious revival (particularly noticeable in the activities of underground, or "parallel," Islamic organizations), a new pride in past glories, cautious manifestations of cultural nationalism, and a growing xenophobia all began to surface after Stalin's death. It would be a mistake to believe that events in Afghanistan and Iran are contributing to the closed society of Soviet Central Asia something that was not already there in substance. Their importance is that they have imparted additional energy and self-awareness to an Islamic milieu already characterized by considerable political dynamism and religious activity.

There can be little doubt that Soviet authorities are worried about the "Islamic problem." They understand that Islam is becoming more difficult to control in Central Asia and the Caucasus, that events in Afghanistan and Iran have made this situation worse, and that the worsening situation could be exploited by foreign powers. In a recent article about Soviet reactions to events in Iran during 1981, Yaacov Ro'i summarizes this concern:

The fact that the republican party press has spelt out its anxieties so plainly clearly demonstrates a serious problem. That the central, all-Soviet media have not

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[1] See, e.g., Martha Brill Olcott, "Soviet Islam and World Revolution," *World Politics* (Princeton, NJ), July 1982, pp. 487–505.

[2] This opinion, which happens to be that of the present author, is shared with other scholars, e.g., Michael Rywkin, *Moscow's Muslim Challenge*, New York, M. E. Sharpe, 1982.

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yet addressed themselves directly to this question, and even deny the existence of any Muslim problem in the USSR, can hardly convince the analyst either of its non-existence or of official Soviet indifference to it.[3]

Moreover, since 1981 the volume of material in the Soviet Central Asian news media that has been devoted to the "Islamic problem" has grown enormously, strongly suggesting a stimulus provided by occurrences in Afghanistan and Iran. This literature not only confirms the problem's existence, but also describes some of its aspects in detail. The analysis that follows is based primarily on such Soviet sources, mainly Caucasian and Central Asian periodicals.[4] It also draws on personal contacts with Soviet Muslims abroad; on the testimony of numerous foreign visitors to Central Asia in the period from 1982 to the present (these include Europeans, Americans, Muslims from different countries, and even a number of Afghans who have recently been in the USSR and have since defected); and on increasing evidence in Central Asian and Caucasian samizdat.

[3]Yaacov Ro'i, "The Impact of the Islamic Fundamentalist Revival of the Late 1970s on the Soviet View of Islam," in Yaacov Ro'i, Ed., *The USSR and the Muslim World*, London, George Allen & Unwin, 1984, p. 168.

[4]There are now a number of good sources of translations of the Central Asian press. For this study, in addition to my own reading of the primary sources, I have used three in particular: Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *USSR Report, Political and Sociological Affairs, Central Asian Press Survey* (Washington, DC—hereafter *FBIS*); *The Central Asian Newsletter* of the Society for Central Asian Studies, Oxford; and Radio Liberty, *Digest of the Native Language Press in the USSR: Caucasian, Central Asian and Turkic* (Munich). The *FBIS* reports unfortunately do not give transliterations of the original titles of articles, which makes it somewhat more difficult to use for those who read the languages of Central Asia and wish to examine the original material.

New "Enemies"

Until 1980, Soviet authorities for the most part publicly dismissed the possibility of Central Asia's becoming contaminated from abroad. Moreover, when the Soviet media occasionally did allude to an external threat, the anti-Soviet influences were always identified as "Western imperialism" or "Zionism." Beginning in about 1982, however, the tendency to see only the West as the perpetrator and beneficiary of destabilization in Soviet Muslim territories changed significantly. Today Soviet observers frequently cite Middle Eastern influences as the most dangerous.

This new emphasis on the Middle East as a source of subversive ideas is exemplified in the works of Professor A. Doyev, holder of the chair of Scientific Atheism at Frunze University in Kirghizia. Doyev singles out such Islamic organizations as the Afghani Hezb-i Islami and Jamiat-i Islami, the Rabitat ul-Alam al-Islami of Mecca (which he denounces as a "terrorist organization"), the Syrian and Egyptian Ikhwan al-Muslimin ("Muslim Brothers"), and several Turkestani and Caucasian émigré groups in Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Indonesia, the United States, and West Germany as ones seeking to spread their influence in Soviet Central Asia. He also points an accusing finger at radio broadcasts to Central Asia from Iran (Radio

Afghan freedom fighters of the Jamiat Islami group exult over capture of a Soviet armored vehicle in early 1980 in the Kunar-Nuristan area near the Pakistani border; at right, Afghan mujahidin leader Eng Gulbiddin Hekmatyar of the Hezbi-i Islami Party speaks at a Peshawar rally on April 28, 1984.

—Alain Dejean/SYGMA and Ed Garzda/MAGNUM.

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Gorgan) and Urumqi in the People's Republic of China.[5]

Soviet sources have focused on three main themes in discussing the Islamic threat. First, they argue, Islam is being used as an offensive instrument by foreign powers to incite Soviet Muslims against the Soviet system and against their Russian "elder brothers." For example, we read:

Foreign circles preach pan-Islamic ideas and ideological subversion disguised as dogma; they interfere in the life of our society and spread hostility among Soviet nations.[6]

Also:

The number of foreign radio stations broadcasting religious lectures in the different languages of the Soviet nations has significantly increased during the last years. Imperialist forces exploiting events in Poland, in Afghanistan, and in Iran are working hard to reinforce religious propaganda.[7]

Second, Soviet sources accuse foreign propaganda organs of attempting to show—implicitly in the case of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeyni's destruction of the Iranian communist left and explicitly in the case of Soviet attempts to eliminate Islamic resistance forces in Afghanistan—that Islam and Marxism are inherently incompatible. This is not a message the Soviet authorities want their Muslim population to accept, and consequently they have spent a good deal of time and effort to refute it. A recent statement by a Professor A. Ortiqov of Tashkent University is typical:

[Our] enemies and adversaries in the Near and Middle East distort the facts in order to negate Uzbekistan's achievements. They spread the lie that Leninism is unacceptable to Muslims and is incompatible with Islam. They attempt to arouse religious sensibilities and to imbue them with anti-Soviet feelings.... They are unscrupulously falsifying the present situation of Islam in the USSR.[8]

[5]A. Doyev, "Islam and Atheistic Work," *Kommunist* (Frunze), No. 2, 1984, pp. 68–74.

[6]Major General N. Ovezov, deputy chairman of the KGB of the Turkmen SSR on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the CHEKA, *Sovet Türkmenistany* (Ashkhabad), Dec. 19, 1982.

[7]Editorial in *Kommunist* (Baku), Jan. 28, 1983.

[8]A. Ortiqov, "The Leninist Friendship of Peoples," *Sovet Özbekistoni* (Tashkent), Feb. 15, 1983, in *FBIS*, July 20, 1983, p. 37. This item was a report at a conference held in Tashkent on Feb. 16–17, 1983, on the theme of "Brotherhood and Cooperation Between Soviet Peoples." Both the Ortiqov article and that of Doyev (fn 5 above) were cited in an excellent analysis, "Soviets Step Up the Propaganda War," *Arabia* (London), No. 36, July 1984, p. 37.



Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeyni and his Islamic Revolution have suppressed Iran's communist movement and also pose a threat of revolutionary contagion to Moscow's Muslim subjects in Central Asia.

—Ledru/SYGMA.

Third, with respect to current events in Iran and Afghanistan, Soviet sources insist that Islam there is primarily the refuge of "fanatics" and other anti-Soviet elements, and that these extremists are encouraged by foreign agents. Explicit in this line of argument is the fear that the Afghan example might inspire similar "fanatics" within the USSR. Professor Anvar Qasimov of Tashkent University spoke to this danger:

... the Afghan counterrevolutionaries' goal is the overthrow of the [Afghan] government and the establishment of either a monarchy or a conservative Islamic republic. [Afghan] clerics ... back the counterrevolutionaries and attempt to promote a "holy war" under the green banner of Islam.... Counterrevolutionary ideologists accuse the Afghanistan People's Democratic Party of planning to eradicate Islam, of burning mosques and holy books, of banning religious rites, and of teaching atheism in the schools.... Enemy propaganda claims the USSR invaded Afghanistan in order to establish its own institutions in that country. These lies have an effect on backward and

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politically unenlightened segments of the [Soviet] population.... Bourgeois propaganda maligns Soviet policy towards the nationalities in Central Asia. It claims that religious rites are being banned ... and talks about the russification of Muslim peoples.... Although all Soviet nationalities ... are united in a single family, it must never be forgotten that anticommunism, operating in the shadow of reactionary forces and conspiring with the vilest traitors of various religious organizations, will never surrender voluntarily.[9]

Adverse Domestic Trends

These themes, emphasizing that the USSR's "Muslim problem" is being exacerbated by outside forces, are supplemented by an abundant literature, mostly from the last three or four years, that locates the causes of the problem mainly at home. Three phenomena, all predating the recent events in Afghanistan and Iran, have drawn special attention: the conjunction of Islamic beliefs and practices, on the one hand, and heightened nationalism, on the other; the related activity of underground ("parallel") Islamic organizations in the USSR; and the growing interest in Islam and the Muslim world abroad on the part of Soviet Muslim intellectuals.

"It is well known," wrote a Daghestani anti-religious specialist in 1983, "that religious survivals are tightly tied to nationalistic trends. The nationalistic survivals often take on a religious appearance (*obolochiki*), while religious survivals are propagandized under the flag of the defense of national traditions."[10] Thus, it is acknowledged, it is not easy to combat Islam without offending the national traditions of Soviet Muslims.[11] In a recent article, O. Redzhepova, senior scientific colleague of the Department of Philosophy and Law of the Turkmen Academy of Sciences and a frequent commentator on nationality and religious affairs in her republic, explicitly acknowledged that the overlapping of religious and nationalist trends has its domestic sources:

We believe that nationalistic propaganda of imperialism helps to sustain and to stimulate the negative phenomena in the national relationships in the USSR. But we do not consider it the only reason.... Besides this external factor, there are also domestic contradictions and miscalculations (proshchëty) *that result in deviations* (otstupleniya) *from internationalism—which is the norm of the socialist way of life.*[12]

The confusion between the national and the religious is, of course, not a new problem in Islam, but the intensely national/religious experience of both the Iranians and the Afghanis has forced Soviet authorities to see that Islam and nationality are often inextricably tied. At the same time, Iranian and Afghan nationalism—as well as the "domestic contradictions" noted by Redzhepova—have prompted Central Asian and Caucasian Muslims to realize that religion and nationality need not be separated.

Indeed, the tendency of Soviet Central Asian and Caucasian literary figures to use themes that are implicitly, and on occasion openly, Islamic or nationalistic in flavor has accelerated since the beginning of the Islamic Revolution in Iran and the war in Afghanistan.[13] Also more evident is a move to purge foreign—especially Russian—words from native vocabularies.[14] These and other indications of a reexamination of their roots (*mirasism)* were discernible among Central Asia's Muslims long before either Iran or Afghanistan erupted, but events in those two countries have certainly further stimulated such a reexamination.

Similarly, if we are to judge by the increase in Soviet denunciations over the last three years, the activities of "parallel" Islamic organizations in the USSR have increased remarkably, an expansion that may well be related to events in Iran and Afghanistan. Singled out for attacks are the activities of "self-appointed" (or

[9]Anvar Qasimov, "Crocodile Tears," *Sovet Özbekistoni,* Feb. 22, 1983, in *FBIS,* July 20, 1983, p. 42.

[10]S. Muslimov, "In Search of Persuasiveness—Some Pressing Problems of Atheistic Propaganda," *Sovetskiy Dagestan* (Makhach-Qala), No. 6, 1983, pp. 38–39. See also A. Aliyev, "Traditions, Society, the Times," *ibid.*, No. 4, 1982.

[11]Allaberdi Khayyidov and Amannazar Ashyrov, "The Writer, Islam, and Atheism," *Adäbiyät vä Süngät* (Ashkhabad), Apr. 22, 1983, in *FBIS,* Aug. 23, 1983, p. 33.

[12]See O. Redzhepova, "When the Arguments Are Missing," *Turkmenskaya Iskra* (Ashkhabad), June 30, 1984. Redzhepova's article sought to refute the argument in my article, "Soviet Islam since the Invasion of Afghanistan," *Central Asian Survey* (London), July 1982, pp. 65–78, which had suggested a connection between the Iranian and Afghan events and the increased Islamic activity in the USSR.

[13]For discussion of this trend, see Daniel C. Matuszewski, "The Turkic Past and the Soviet Future," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), July–August 1982; William Fierman, "Two Young Uzbek Writers' Perspectives on Assimilation," *Central Asian Survey,* November 1983, pp. 63–78; and Tölegen Toqbergenov's review of Absattar Derbisaliev's book, *Shyngyrau Bulaqtar* (Deeply-rooted Sources) in *Qazaq Adabiyaty* (Alma-Ata), Nov. 26, 1982.

[14]On this subject, see Marie Broxup, "The Soviets in Afghanistan: The Anatomy of a Takeover," *Central Asian Survey,* April 1983, p. 84. Baku periodicals, especially the literary paper in Azeri, *Adäbiyät vä Injäsänät,* regularly publish information on the cultural life of Iranian Azerbaijan, works of southern Azerbaijani writers, and also poems by Soviet Azerbaijanis proclaiming their faith in the future unification of the two Azerbaijans. See, for example, the article by Azeroglu in *Adabiyät vä Injäsänät,* Dec. 3, 1982; the poem by Esmira Mirzaeva, ibid., Mar. 4, 1983; and the article by Yashar Garaiev, ibid., Jan. 1, 1983, in which he exalts the "common Eastern heritage" of northern and southern Azerbaijani literature. During Stalin's time, any mention of a "common heritage" in this regard was considered a dangerous heresy.

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

The tomb—near Bukhara—of Bahautdin Naqshband, founder of the Naqshbandi Sufi brotherhood, is one of the most revered "holy places" of Soviet Central Asia.

—Courtesy of the author.

"nonregistered") mullahs,[15] clandestine religious schools and illegal mosques run by adepts of the Sufi orders,[16] and the activity surrounding "holy places." The "holy places," usually associated with the memory of a Sufi saint, are centers of pilgrimages for thousands of Soviet Muslims.

"The danger of ideological subversion," writes an Uzbek agitprop expert in a discussion of the activities of unofficial Muslim clerics, "must not be underestimated."[17] Writing in 1983, a Kazakh anti-religious expert notes that unsanctioned Muslim religious organizations are "much more sophisticated than before. This is due to the fact that among believers today we find not only culturally backward people but also people with secondary and even higher education."[18] Regarding "holy places," there has been a veritable flood of critical articles in the Soviet press over the last three years.[19] This is particularly true in Turkmenistan, which shares common borders with Afghanistan and Iran.[20]

The third trend emerging in the post-1980 period is an increased interest among educated Soviet Muslims (especially the younger generation) regarding Islam and the Muslim world abroad. Particularly worrisome to the authorities must be the increase in the number of youths and intellectuals showing political interest in the various revolutionary "neo-Islamic" movements of Iran, Algeria, and Libya. Although the last two movements are frequent recipients of Soviet largesse, Soviet Muslim readers are warned that the ideology of these movements is reactionary and opposed to the ideas of scientific socialism, in spite of their "temporary anti-imperialistic character."[21] The connection between Iran and Afghanistan and this new interest in Islam abroad was made explicit as early as 1980 by the head of the Azerbaijan KGB, Major-General Zia Yusif Zade, who denounced the "harmful influence of *imperialist propaganda,* of the 'sectarian underground'" (a synonym for the Sufi brotherhoods), and of the "reactionary Muslim clergy" (another synonym for the Sufi adepts) on "certain representatives of our intelligentsia and young people."[22]

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[15]Bess Brown, "The Phenomenon of Self-Appointed Mullahs," *Radio Liberty Research Bulletin* (Munich), RL 220/81, May 29, 1981. See also Muslimov, loc. cit., p. 37.

[16]See, e.g., *Sovet Özbekistoni,* Sept. 26, 1982; and B. Yalkabov and Yu. Yulin, "Charlatans," *Turkmenskaya Iskra,* Apr. 3, 1982.

[17]M. A. Usmanov, "Greater Effectiveness for Atheistic Education," *Pravda Vostoka* (Tashkent), June 12, 1984.

[18]*Komsomol'skaya Pravda* (Moscow), June 11, 1983.

[19]See, e.g., V. A. Kuroyevod, *Religiya i tserkov' v Sovetskom gosudarstve* (Religion and Church in the Soviet State), Moscow, Izdatel'stvo Politicheskoy Literatury, 1981, pp. 199–200; *Muslims of the Soviet East* (Tashkent), No. 2, 1981, and No. 1, 1983.

[20]In particular, see M. G. Gapurov, first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Turkmenistan, "Forever in One Family," *Turkmenskaya Iskra,* Jan. 25, 1983; and S. Saparov, "The Real Face of the Ishan—the Truth about the Holy Places," ibid., Jan. 9, 1982.

[21]See T. Khydyrov and K. Bagdasarov, "Islam in the Plans of Anticommunism," ibid., Sept. 11, 1982.

[22]Major General Zia Yusif Zade, "Protecting the Country and the People," *Bakinskiy Rabochiy* (Baku), Dec. 19, 1980, emphasis added.

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Channels of Information

Soviet sources identify a variety of channels, old and new, through which ideas and information about events in Iran and Afghanistan are transmitted to Soviet Muslims. In the case of Iran, the most important conduit, judging from the amount of attention Soviet sources pay to attacking it, is foreign radio broadcasts, especially those from Iran itself. Most often mentioned are Radio Gorgan and Radio Tabriz. The former, located in Gorgan, an Iranian city near the Soviet Turkmen border, broadcasts in Persian and Turkmen; the latter broadcasts in Persian and Azeri. Also cited are broadcasts from the Gulf States and Saudi Arabia, which Soviet agitprop specialists link to the "pan-Islamic propaganda of the imperialists." The foreign broadcasts are condemned mainly for their religious rather than for their political content, although Soviet commentators are quick to point out that it is impossible to distinguish the purely spiritual from the political and that "there is a general unity between imperialism and clericalism."[23]

In addition to purely religious broadcasts, Iranian radio stations have taken a consistently anticommunist line since the downfall of the Shah. The liquidation of the Iranian Tudeh (communist) Party is described in Iranian broadcasts as a victory of Islam over Marxism. Moreover, Iranian leaders have condemned Soviet policies toward Islam in the Caucasus and Central Asia and proclaimed that Soviet verbal support for Muslims abroad is pure hypocrisy. They have professed considerable sympathy for the mujahidin freedom fighters in Afghanistan and have condemned the Soviet invasion of that country as an act of "imperialist aggression."[24]

It is, of course, difficult to assess how Soviet Muslims react to these Iranian broadcasts. At the very least, broadcasts by Iran and by stations in the Middle East and Western Europe must have conveyed some sense of the enormous dynamism and excitement of the Iranian revolution, whatever its direction—in sharp contrast to a more static Soviet society. It is highly likely that many Soviet Muslims interpret the Iranian events, among other things, as an increase of local authority against outside influences—and it is not much of a leap to transfer the lesson to the context of the multinational empire that is the Soviet Union. Some Soviet Muslims, in fact, saw the repression of the Tudeh Party, one of the oldest communist parties in the Muslim world, as evidence that communism could be defeated by militant Islam.[25] Several foreign Muslim travelers to Azerbaijan and Central Asia told me that the Iranian revolution's populist dimension had particular appeal to the younger intellectual Muslims of the USSR, who are tired of the corruption and oppressive bureaucracy of the Russian-dominated Communist Party.

Foreign broadcasts are also blamed for advertising to Central Asians the Afghan resistance to the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Only one station, Radio Free Afghanistan, actually broadcasts from Afghanistan proper,[26] but the information is relayed by a multitude of Western stations: Radio Liberty in all Turkic languages of the USSR and in Tajik; BBC and the Voice of America (in Russian, Uzbek, and Azeri); Deutsche Welle; Radio Urumqi; Radios Gorgan and Tabriz; and Saudi Arabian Radio.[27] Perhaps the most significant of these is Radio Urumqi, whose expanded broadcasting to Soviet Central Asia was noted by some Western observers as early as 1980.[28]

There can be little question that these broadcasts are listened to with considerable interest. In August 1983, a Western visitor to Samarkand conversant in Uzbek and Tajik inquired of her hosts what they knew of the war in Afghanistan. She was taken by them to a local teahouse and invited to listen to a regular broadcast of Radio Liberty in Uzbek, which gave extensive coverage of the Afghanistan situation.[29]

The responses of Soviet Muslims interviewed about their knowledge of events in Iran and Afghanistan strengthen the case for the radios' impact. One Turkmen listener to Radio Liberty (RL) said:

I am convinced of the truth of RL's broadcasts because they bear out what people are saying among themselves. For example, as regards the war in Af-

[23]Isa Dzhabbarov (Jabbarov), "The Life of Slander Is Short," *Özbekiston Adabiyati va San'ati* (Tashkent), Jan. 27, 1984, in *FBIS*, May 25, 1984, pp. 76–77.

[24]E.g., Tehran Radio, Dec. 26, 1982, Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: South Asia* (Washington, DC), Dec. 27, 1982, p. 11.

[25]An Azeri blue-collar worker from Baku who was interviewed in summer 1983 declared: "People in Baku are very sympathetic to events in Iran. I heard that their private feeling is: 'We should deal with (our) Communists like the Iranians did with theirs. . . .'" See RFE-RL, Soviet Area Audience and Opinion Research, *Soviet Background Notes* (Paris), SBN 6–83, August 1983.

[26]The transmitter was established with the help of French technicians and could be heard in some parts of Soviet Central Asia. It broadcast in Pashto and Dari and had a weekly 15-minute Uzbek-language program that treated, among other things, the history of Central Asia, including events like the Basmachi uprising. It is not clear if this transmitter is still operating.

[27]RFE-RL, Soviet Area Audience and Opinion Research, "Listening to Foreign Radio Among Soviet Nationality Groups," *Research Memorandum* (Paris), RM 6-84, May 1984.

[28]S. Enders Wimbush, *Nationality Research in the People's Republic of China: A Trip Report*, Santa Monica, CA, The Rand Corporation, N-1713-NA, August 1981.

[29]Personal communication to the author.

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Soviet soldiers photographed in Kabul, Afghanistan, in early 1984.

—Andre Spolvint/EPD Bild via Gamma-Liaison.

ghanistan, RL reports the same things people hear from soldiers and the wounded who have returned to the USSR. This differs, of course, from official propaganda, and everyone can see the flimsiness of the Soviet reports. Far more people listen to RL now than was the case a few years ago. This is partly due to the war in Afghanistan and events in Iran, and partly to the fact that other Western stations are jammed.[30]

Others complain that even with the radio broadcasts, more information is wanted. "Our own media talk only of 'Afghan rebels,' but we have relatives there and they are certainly not rebels," notes one Uzbek, who listens to Radio Liberty and Radio Iran to follow events in Afghanistan and Iran.[31] "But I don't understand," complains a Soviet Tajik by way of underlining the radios' importance, "why RL's information on Afghanistan has become briefer and less frequent. It's very important for us to know exactly what is going on there."[32] Some Soviet Muslims who are not reached by foreign broadcasts have taken advantage of another electronic development, the cassette tape recorder, to pass broadcast information from place to place.[33]

Direct contact between Soviet Central Asians and Afghans has also contributed to the transfer of information and ideas into the USSR. These contacts were established long before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan when the first Soviet-Afghan cooperative projects began in the early 1960's. Soviet advisers and technicians arriving in Afghanistan at that time made extensive use of Soviet Tajiks as interpreters and liaison personnel. Another fairly large group of Central Asians, again mainly Tajiks, arrived in the 1970's, especially after Nur Mohammad Taraki's ascent to power in Kabul in 1978.[34] More significant, Soviet Central Asians constituted a relatively important percentage of the Soviet force that invaded and occupied Afghanistan in 1979, although most of them were withdrawn in early 1980.[35] An important, perhaps the most important, consideration in this withdrawal of Soviet Central Asians was the all too brotherly spirit in which Soviet Muslims met their Afghan "enemies." An Afghani defector described the following scene to the author:

I was waiting in front of the Pul-i Charkhi prison in early 1980 for information about several family members who were being held by the revolutionary government. Along came six Soviet armored personnel carriers full of Soviet Tajiks and Uzbeks. When the APC's stopped in front of the prison, these Soviet Muslims swarmed out and began buying Korans, swapping weapons, and generally fraternizing with the local Afghans. This was soon stopped by the Russian officers, who forced the Soviet Muslim soldiers back into the APC's at gunpoint and then shut and locked the lids.

There is now a substantial literature attesting to this kind of behavior by Soviet Muslim soldiers.

Soviet attempts to limit contacts between Afghans and Soviet Muslims have been only partially successful. Afghan resistance fighters claim to have been

[30]RFE-RL, Soviet Area Audience and Opinion Research, "Turkic Language and Tajik Services (1983 Data)," *Nationality Listener Report* (Paris), NLR 4-84, July 1984, p. 19

[31]Ibid., pp. 23, 24.

[32]Ibid., p. 14.

[33]N. Bayramsakhatov, *Novyi byt i religiya* (New Customs and Religion), Moscow, Zananiye, 1979, p. 38, cited in Allen Hetmanek, "Spillover Effects of Religious Broadcasts in Iran on Soviet Muslims," *Radio Liberty Research Bulletin*, RL 142/80, Apr. 14, 1980.

[34]For an excellent analysis of the Soviet use of Central Asian cadres in Afghanistan before the invasion, see Eden Naby, "The Ethnic Factor in Soviet-Afghan Relations," *Asian Survey* (Berkeley, CA), March 1980.

[35]S. Enders Wimbush and Alex Alexiev, *Soviet Central Asian Soldiers in Afghanistan*, Santa Monica, CA, The Rand Corporation, N-1634/1, January 1981.

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helped on a number of occasions by Soviet Muslims who warned them of forthcoming attacks and who smuggled them arms and ammunition.[36] Many Afghan defectors and several foreign visitors to Kabul have observed Soviet Muslims in the bazaars exhorting Afghans to continue fighting the Soviet invaders, otherwise "your fate will be the same as ours."[37]

Contacts also take place between Afghans and Soviet Muslims in the USSR itself. Afghan students, young officers, technicians, and engineers have been coming to train in Soviet Central Asia since the late 1950's. In 1980 in Tashkent alone there were approximately 600 Afghan students—admittedly mostly members of the communist Afghan People's Democratic Party or recruits of the Afghan security agency KHAD; since then the number of students in Tashkent has risen to about 5,000, and the number in Dushanbe, to several hundred. By the end of 1982, there were approximately 25,000 Afghan students throughout the Soviet Union.[38] Persistent but unverifiable secondhand reports and several verified firsthand reports about the intense nationalism and anti-Sovietism of these Afghan students have reached me. From these students, as well as from numerous other foreign Muslim students from Algeria, Syria, Iraq, South Yemen, India, Jordan, and elsewhere (not all of them admirers of the Soviet regime), Soviet Muslims can and are learning a great deal about the real situation in both Iran and Afghanistan.

Another channel of information may be via persons directly infiltrating the USSR from Afghanistan and Iran. The Central Asian and Caucasian press alludes to crossings into the USSR by "spies," "saboteurs," and "agitators." Although the specific points of entry are never mentioned, the fact that such articles usually appear in the Turkmen and Tajik press strongly suggests that the foreign interlopers are coming from Afghanistan or Iran. A simultaneous campaign in all Soviet media glorifying the role of the KGB Border Guards, particularly in Central Asia, lends credence to

[36]On this subject, see Marie Broxup, "The Soviets in Afghanistan...," pp. 83–109; see also "Panjshir—The Seventh Offensive," *Central Asian Survey Incidental Series* (Oxford), No. 1, August 1984.

[37]Marie Broxup, "Afghanistan Update," *Central Asian Survey*, September 1983, p. 141.

[38]Marie Broxup, "The Soviets in Aghanistan...," pp. 99–100.

A group of Afghan youths studying at the Tajik Agricultural Institute in November 1980.

—TASS from SOVFOTO.

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







Covers of materials on Islamic themes produced in Russian-language translation by Afghani groups, from left to right: The Life of the Great Muhammad; Prayer; *and* Is There Really No More Need for Religion? *(Mukhamed Kutab, author and Ibadi, translator).*

—Photoreproductions by the author.

the claim by Afghan resistance groups to having extended their activities to Soviet territories themselves. Major General V. F. Zaporozhenko, chief of the Political Department of the Central Asian Border Region, even admitted: "Our troops protecting the southern borders are facing extreme difficulties in carrying out their duty."[39] Articles describing fighting by KGB units along the borders are becoming commonplace in the Turkmen press.[40] Moreover, Edward Girardet has reported that Afghan Jamiat-i Islami groups have distributed membership cards to Soviet Muslims on Soviet territory.[41] Other mujahidin groups, particularly Hezb-i Islami, are said to have developed similar networks inside Central Asia.[42]

In addition to making direct contact with Soviet Muslims, Afghan resistance groups, especially Hezb-i Islami, are becoming increasingly successful in smuggling written and other materials into Soviet Central Asia. These include so-called night posters *(shab nameh)*, leaflets, political and religious tracts, and cassette tapes. These activities are confirmed by both Soviet and Western sources. For example M. Abdyldaev, director of the Institute of Philosophy and Law of the Academy of Sciences of the Kirghiz SSR, recently attacked the activities of the Institute of Regional Studies in Peshawar, Pakistan, whose job, he alleged, was "to prepare and publish in Russian translation anti-Soviet falsifications *(falshivki)*." Abdyldaev mentioned several such publications to be found in Peshawar, which seem to have been smuggled to points as distant as Kirghizia. They include "The Life of the Great Mohammad" *(Zhizneopisaniye Velikogo Muhammada)*, 1982; "Prayer" *(Namaz)*, an illustrated guide on how to conduct Islamic prayer, complete with photographs and printed with Russian transliteration and translation, 1983; two works by Arab fundamentalist theologian Muhammad Kutab translated in 1983 from Arabic into Russian—"Is Religion Really No Longer Necessary?" *(Razve bol'she net neobkhodimosti v religii?)* and "Is Islam Really an Opium of the People?" *(Razve Islam yavlyayetsya opiumom naroda?)*; and one work by Pakistani theologian Sayed Abdul Ala al-Mawdudi, "Islam and Social Justice" *(Islam i obshchestvennaya spravedlivost')*. The last is a hand-written manuscript; the others are typeset.[43]

[39] *Sovet Türkmenistany*, Dec. 5, 1982; see also Major General G. Zgerski, chief of the KGB Border Military Units of the Turkestan Military District, "Guarding the Southern Borders," *Turkmenskaya Iskra*, Dec. 7, 1982.

[40] See, e.g., Major Yu. Zhukov, "Gallantry," *Turkmenskaya Iskra*, Dec. 5, 1983.

[41] *The Christian Science Monitor* (Boston, MA), July 26, 1982. This activity was confirmed by several recent Western visitors to Pakistan and to mujahidin-controlled areas in Afghanistan.

[42] *USSR News Brief* (Munich), No. 10, 1984, p. 8.

[43] M. Abdyldaev, "Behind the Screen of Islam," *Sovetskaya Kirgiziya* (Frunze), June 30, 1984.

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Abdyldaev indicates that he has examined *"Is Islam Really an Opium of the People?"* and the translation of Mawdudi, which he says may "give a favorable impression." But this is "only at first glance," he says, "because the position of the Communists, of the Communist Party of the USSR, regarding Islam and the international brotherly assistance of the Soviet People to Afghanistan is grossly falsified."[44] Soviet dissidents also confirm the smuggling of Afghan mujahidin literature into Soviet Central Asia. For example, they report the arrest in Dushanbe in the second half of 1982 of a group of Tajik nationalists accused of circulating leaflets (smuggled in or produced locally?) against the war in Afghanistan.[45]

Two things are significant about the literature smuggled into Central Asia. First, it invariably focuses primarily on Islam rather than on current political issues, nationality problems, or "Soviet colonialism." Second, it is, to our knowledge, all in Russian. As one Middle East commentator put it, "in an ironic twist of fate, Soviet power has provided Central Asian Muslims with a common language to read these uncommon publications."[46] It should be noted that Islamic samizdat publications are also being produced locally in Central Asia (in local languages and in Russian). These have received extensive coverage recently in the Soviet press.[47]

Finally, the Afghan mujahidin have made a concerted effort to reawaken awareness of the historical ties and a sense of common purpose among the Tajiks and Uzbeks in northern Afghanistan and their brethren directly across the border on the Soviet side. In 1983, for example, the Islamic Union of the Prov-

[44]Ibid.

[45]*USSR News Brief*, No. 5, 1984, p. 4.

[46]"Soviets Step Up the Propaganda War," loc. cit., p. 37.

[47]On the new and interesting problem of the Muslim samizdat in Central Asia (mainly religious texts of Sufi character), see Timur Kocaoglu, "Muslim Chain Letters in Central Asia," *Radio Liberty Research Bulletin*, RL 313/83, Aug. 18, 1983, quoting several Kirghiz and Kazakh newspapers; and the important anonymous article "The Deceivers," *Sovet Özbekistoni*, Sept. 26, 1982 (analyzed by H. B. Paksoy, in "The Deceivers," *Central Asian Survey*, Vol. 3, No. 1, pp. 113-31).

In the Caucasus, samizdat publications appeared earlier, in the late 1970's. See I. A. Makatov, *Ateisty v nastuplenii* (Atheists on the Offensive), Moscow, Sovetskaya Rossiya, 1978, pp. 116–17; S. Murtazalieva, "Taking into Account Local Conditions," *Sovetskiy Dagestan*, No. 5, 1982, p. 47; and M. A. Abdullaev, *Nekotoryye voprosy teologii islama* (Some Problems Concerning the Theology of Islam), Makhach-Qala, Dagestanskoye Knizhnoye Izdatel'stvo, 1973, p. 105.

A group of armed Naqshbandi mürids of Tajik and Uzbek background study shari'yat law at a madrassah in the Maimana region of northwestern Afghanistan in August 1983.

—Olivier Roy.

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inces of Northern Afghanistan *(Ittihadiy-i Islami Vilayat-i Shimal-i Afghanistan)* began to publish in Peshawar a bilingual (Uzbek and Dari) newspaper *Vatan* (Fatherland), which devotes considerable attention to Soviet Central Asia and the Caucasus. The issue of April 4, 1983, is typical: it contains among other things a front-page article on Imam Shamil and his portrait, which is captioned "The First to Lead a Guerrilla Holy War Against the Infidels," and a long article, in Uzbek, entitled "The Tragedy of Great Turkistan," by Musa Türkistani, a historian of Central Asian origin now living in Saudi Arabia. There is no doubt as to the target of publications of this kind—Shamil, for example, is of singular significance only for Soviet Muslims (see below). We should not be surprised if this material eventually turns up in Soviet Central Asia.

Themes of Soviet Historiography

One can trace a variety of Soviet responses to the perceived heightening of Islamic awareness in the Central Asian republics in recent years. Moscow has evidently not seen the problem as sufficiently severe to undertake any drastic institutional or cadre measures. Russians and others of Slavic background continue to retain the same positions of authority in the Central Asian republics that they held before the invasion of Afghanistan or the revolutionary developments in Iran. All second secretaries of republic party central committees in the region and the majority of second secretaries of oblast, district, and city party committees continue to be non-Muslim. Similarly, with few exceptions, the chairmen of republican KGB's, the high command of the Border Guards, and other senior military officers in the region are non-natives.[48]

If there has been no upgrading or tightening of institutional control arrangements, Moscow's increased rewriting of Central Asian history clearly suggests an effort to counter the impact of events in both Iran and Afghanistan. Two examples stand out: (1) revised interpretations of the resistance of the North Caucasian mountaineers (the Mürid movement led by Imam Shamil) to Russian conquest in the 19th century; and

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A copy of the front page of the April 4, 1983, issue of Vatan, *a newspaper in Uzbek and Dari published by the "Islamic Union of the Northern Province of Afghanistan." This issue features an article on Imam Shamil, a prominent leader of the North Caucasian Mürid guerrillas that resisted Russian domination in the 19th century.*

—Photoreproduction by the author.

(2) the reappearance in recent Soviet historical and political writings of references (all critical) to the Basmachi guerrilla war in Central Asia in the 1920's. Both movements bore a striking resemblance to the current war in Afghanistan: like the Afghan resistance, both had an Islamic dimension and a deeply rooted popular character, and in both, as in the Afghan resistance today, the well-organized Sufi brotherhoods played a primary role.[49]

Soviet historiography has shifted widely in its treatment of Shamil and Müridism over the last 60 years.[50]

[48]This situation has not changed since the ascent of Chernenko. In January 1984 the Russian second secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Tajikistan was replaced by another Russian. See *Kommunist Tadzhikistani* (Dushanbe), January 1984. In 1984, four of six chairmen of the KGB in the USSR's Muslim republics were Russian or Ukrainian; two were Muslims—in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. See Timur Kocaoglu, "The Chairmanship of the State Security Committees of the Soviet Muslim Republics," *Radio Liberty Research Bulletin*, RL 34/84, Jan. 19, 1984.

[49]See Oliver Roy, "Sufism and the Afghan Resistance," *Central Asian Survey*, December 1983; and the July 1983 issue of that journal, which is devoted entirely to "The Russian and Soviet Experience with the Muslim Guerrilla Warfare."

[50]See Ann Sheehy, "Yet Another Rewrite of the History of the Caucasian War?" *Radio Liberty Research Bulletin*, RL 39/84, Jan. 30, 1984.

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For the first 25 years of the Soviet regime, it portrayed Shamil's movement as a "positive phenomenon," a genuine national liberation movement.[51] In the early postwar period (still under Stalin), however, the mountaineers' resistance to the armies of Nicholas I was branded as "wholly reactionary." After Stalin's death, concessions were made to the national pride of the Caucasians, and certain historiographical compromises were reached. Müridism was rehabilitated and again proclaimed to have been an expression of the popular liberation struggle, although its essential Islamic Sufi component (its ideology and "its backbone") was condemned as "clerical," "fanatical," and "reactionary."

As the Afghan war dragged on and the Islamic essence of the Afghan resistance to Soviet occupation became widely understood in Soviet Muslim territories, this last—basically positive—historical interpretation of Müridism was officially rejected. After 1980, Müridism and together with it all other movements in the North Caucasus or elsewhere that had resisted Russian armies in the prerevolutionary period were once again roundly condemned. In particular, Marks Maksimovich Bliyev, head of the Department of History of the USSR at the North Ossetian University, argued in an important 1983 article in *Istoriya SSSR* that müridism had been "an aggressive doctrine calling for holy war against the Infidels."[52] According to Bliyev, tsarist Russia had waged a purely defensive war against Shamil. This "Stalinist" thesis corresponds with what Soviet media are currently telling the Soviet public about the Soviet role in the war in Afghanistan. By a cunning feat of historical sleight of hand, the Russian cause in the North Caucasus is deemed to have been just, and the tsarist armies of Nicholas I and Alexander II are proclaimed to have been its proper instruments. By analogy, the Soviet war in Afghanistan and the role of the Soviet army are justified, and the Afghan resistance is condemned.

Regarding the Basmachis, the official approach of Soviet historiography remains basically the same as before 1980. Opposed to both communism and Russian dominance, the Basmachis harassed and delayed the Soviet takeover of Central Asia in the 1920's, and consequently have always been treated as enemies of Soviet power. However, after Stalin's death, the emphasis in historical writing had shifted toward themes of friendship among Soviet nationalities and cooperation of Central Asians with the "elder brother." References to the Muslim guerrilla rebels, though not officially discouraged, gradually became rarer. After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, however, the Basmachi question suddenly reemerged as a burning topic in historical surveys,[53] memoirs and novels,[54] films,[55] and plays.[56]

What is the motivation for this proliferation of material on a subject Soviet authorities generally had preferred to leave buried? Perhaps a decision was taken at the highest level to remind Central Asians that the Basmachi warriors, despite their gallantry and their romantic appeal, had been beaten decisively by the Red Army of Marshal Mikhail Frunze. To those who might be tempted to sympathize with the Afghan mujahidin, the warning is clear: "In the 1920's, when Soviet power was still weak and unstable, we beat your rebellious grandparents. Today, when our power is strong and our army unconquerable we will beat, sooner or later, the Afghan rebels."

Still it is puzzling why the Soviet leadership would raise this controversial issue, for it is sure to stimulate private debate and interest in the subject by Soviet Muslims, who ultimately might be tempted to reject the official version. Most likely, the recent reopening of the book on the Basmachis is a reaction to audible vibrations emanating from Central Asia itself. The Basmachis remain a living legend among Central Asians on both sides of the Soviet border. Audrey C. Shalinsky concludes on the basis of field work in northern Afghanistan:

In the late 1970's, there were many who remembered life in the Central Asian "homeland." Their experi-

[51] Karl Marx himself was a staunch supporter of Shamil and his mürids.

[52] M. Bliyev, "The Caucasian War—Social Sources, Essence," *Istoriya SSSR* (Moscow), No. 2, 1983, pp. 54–75.

[53] Among the most important recent historical works is Yu. A. Polyakov and A. I. Chugunov, *Bor'ba s Basmachestvom v. Sredne-Aziatskikh Respublikakh SSSR* (The Struggle Against the Basmachis in the Central Asian Republics of the USSR), Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1983.

Recent Soviet sources take considerable liberties with the truth in discussing the ideological struggle against the Basmachi, focusing on the purely military aspect of the war and ignoring its political aspect. In reality in the 1920's, Mikhail Frunze, commander in chief of the Red Army in Turkestan, made important concessions to Islam—such as reopening religious schools and mosques, restoring Shari'at courts, and returning waqf properties—in an attempt to forestall evolution of the revolt into a genuine religious war. Yet, a Professor Inoyatov, writing in *Sovet Özbekistoni* of Dec. 16, 1982, states: "During the early 1920's, Lenin's nationality policy was implemented in Turkestan, and ways were found to overcome *religious* opposition to the Soviet government" (emphasis added).

[54] From 1984 the following are notable: Ivan Bulanov, *Solntse Revolyutsii* (The Sun of the Revolution), part of a heroic novel yet unpublished, which appeared in *Pravda Vostoka*, May 5, 1984, and Rahim Asenov, *Shadows of the Yellow Dominion*, reviewed in *Sovet Türkmenistany*, Jan. 6, 1984, in *FBIS*, May 25, 1984, p. 54.

[55] For example, the new film on the Tajik republic's Chekists and their heroic deeds against the Basmachis, "Do Not Shoot in the Pass," complete with Russian, Uzbek, and Tajik actors. Reviewed in *Madaniyati Tojikiston* (Dushanbe), Oct. 21, 1983, in *FBIS*, May 25, 1984, p. 48.

[56] For example, "Hero of the Border," about the Basmachi war in Eastern Bukhara, *Kommunist Tadzhikistani*, Feb. 5, 1983.

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ences were known to all ethnic groups across northern Afghanistan, and resistance to the Russian presence in Central Asia was widely celebrated in sayings and tales.[57]

It is hard to imagine a Central Asian failing to draw an analogy between the Basmachi resistance to the Russians and that of the Afghan mujahidin, many of whom are in fact the sons and grandsons of the original Basmachis.[58] Where memory of the Basmachi had been fading in Central Asia, contacts with the population of northern Afghanistan (including those between Soviets of Uzbek and Tajik origin and Afghanistan's Uzbeks and Tajiks), together with foreign broadcasts, probably have served to reinforce both an individual and a collective historical consciousness.

We cannot now—and may never—know the precise order of cause and effect, but it is reasonably clear that Soviet authorities are treating the Basmachi issue as something altogether serious and potentially subversive. The current treatment of both the Mürid wars and the Basmachis is strong evidence that Soviet leaders are not yet sufficiently confident that Soviet "social mobilization"—the development of a "new Soviet man" with an "internationalist" mentality—has provided Soviet Muslims with the proper intellectual tools to come up with the "right" interpretation of events in Afghanistan and Iran.

A New Anti-Islamic Campaign

Beyond this shift in historiography, Soviet authorities have since 1980 adopted severe new measures in all Muslim republics of the USSR aimed at countering what we can only assume on the basis of Soviet reporting to be a rising level of Islamic awareness. There was nothing haphazard or coincidental about the new measures: the new offensive against religious "survivals" is linked by local Soviet authorities to the "spread of ideas of the Islamic Revolution, which creates the basis for a nationalistic and anti-Soviet atmosphere."[59] Soviet criminal legislation has been more frequently employed to attack the existence of underground Islamic schools (on the pretext of enforcing the separation of church and state) and to eliminate "social parasites" and "vagabond clerics." For example, the decree of November 30, 1982, of the Presidium of the Turkmen SSR Supreme Soviet provided for imprisonment and corrective labor of up to two years for "social vagabondage,"[60] which, as dozens of articles make clear, amounts to an attack on nonofficial Muslim preaching and teaching.

Another measure of the rising intensity of the anti-Islamic campaign is the upsurge in the number of anti-religious books and pamphlets directed against Islam. In 1980, of 154 anti-religious items published in the USSR, 27 were devoted to Islam; in 1982, 37 of 161 such books and pamphlets were targeted on Islam; and in 1983, 52 of 209 anti-religious books were anti-Islamic.[61]

Moreover, the character of anti-Islamic literature has undergone a noticeable change since 1980. Before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, these publications stressed the antiscientific nature of all religions (including, of course, Islam), the "archaic" nature of Muslim customs, and the contradictions between socialist and religious morals. Today these publications insist on the need to reorganize atheistic propaganda and education of the youth (the majority of anti-Islamic publications are devoted to this particular topic) and on the absolute incompatibility of Islam and Marxism-Leninism.[62] In contrast to the "scientific" discussions of the nature of Islam that characterized most of the anti-Islamic propaganda of Brezhnev's era, today's agitprop resembles that of Stalin's time, with direct attacks on clerics and denunciation of the "class nature" of Islam.[63]

The scope of the anti-Islamic campaign is also revealed by the quite spectacular numbers of atheistic cadres deployed in the Muslim republics. In Azerbaijan (with a total population of approximately 6 million), in 1983 there were 3,761 atheistic "political information groups," 6,911 propaganda collectives, more than 50,000 professional agitator-propagandists, 6,754 "political reporters" (also specializing in anti-religious propaganda), 3,091 lecturers for various party committees (lecturing occasionally on anti-religious themes), 40,000 members of the "Bilik" (Knowledge) Society (the Azeri equivalent of the Russian "Znaniye" Society), and 32,250 instructors spe-

[57]Audrey C. Shalinsky, "Islam and Ethnicity: The Northern Afghanistan Perspective," *Central Asian Survey*, Vol. 1, No. 2/3, p. 76.

[58]Ibid., pp. 76–78.

[59]M. Gapurov, "Forever in One Family."

[60]B. Berdiyev, minister of interior of the Turkmen SSR, "Do Not Just Punish," *Turkmenskaya Iskra*, Jan. 20, 1983; also, *Sovet Türkmenistany*, Jan. 7, 1983.

[61]These figures are based on the weekly *Knizhnaya Letopis'* (Moscow). The fact that the *percentage* of anti-Islamic books dropped in 1983 does not reflect a decline in the volume of anti-Islamic publications; rather there was a huge increase in anti-Catholic books, presumably aimed at Poland and Lithuania.

[62]See among many others, M. A. Usmanov, "Greater Effectiveness for Atheistic Education."

[63]See, e.g., A. Ahmedov, *Sotsial'naya doktrina Islama* (The Social Doctrine of Islam), Moscow, Izdatel'stvo Politicheskoy Literatury, 1982, which had a print run of 100,000 copies.

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cially trained in anti-religious agitprop.[64] In Kirghizia (total population 3.5 million), in September 1982 there were 27,500 anti-religious propagandists.[65] In Uzbekistan, in the summer of 1983 the number of members of the "Bilim" (Knowledge) Society—all trained in anti-religious propaganda—was 150,000, organized into 7,500 primary organizations.[66] In Chardzhou district of the Turkmen SSR alone, in June 1983 there were "more than 360 atheist lecturers of the 'Bilim' Society."[67] Current figures for the other republics and autonomous regions are not available, but we can assume that similarly massive anti-Islamic efforts are under way there. In addition to these professional propagandists, thousands of part-time specialists are engaged in the same anti-religious work, including all Communist Party and Komsomol members, veteran workers and soldiers, teachers and university professors, village elders, kolkhoz executives, and medical workers.[68]

Since 1980, party and Komsomol central and district committees have held numerous seminars on atheistic propaganda and atheistic education. Examples include the plenum of the Turkmen SSR Komsomol Central Committee (Ashkhabad, 1983);[69] the "zonal seminar" in Andizhan (January 1983) devoted specially to the formation of anti-religious activists in the Ferghana Valley;[70] another "zonal seminar" in the same city (March 1983) for the benefit of anti-religious militants of Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, Kirghizia, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan;[71] the conference of the Ashkhabad City Party Committee (September 1982) devoted to improving atheistic propaganda in the Turkmen SSR;[72] and the seminar organized by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan (Baku, December 1982) on "How to Improve Atheistic Propaganda and Education."[73]

All educational institutions—from the lowest kindergarten to universities and academies of sciences—are expected to participate actively in the new anti-Islamic campaign.[74] All Soviet higher educational institutions now have a "Department of Scientific Atheism."[75] Recently, special "people's universities" were created in all Muslim republics, where scientific atheism is one of the main subjects. In the Turkmen SSR alone there are 360 such "universities" with 93,000 students.[76]

Many other institutions are also mobilized for the intensified anti-Islamic work. Various writers' unions have been recently reminded that atheistic themes must be prominent in native-language literature.[77] Then, too, village councils of elders *(aqsaqals)*—in areas where clan and tribal structures survive (mainly in Turkmenistan, Kirghizia, and the northeastern Caucasus)—are being pushed to participate more actively in the introduction of new secular domestic rites and ceremonies to replace religious ones.[78] Moreover, famous "holy places" are being turned into anti-Islamic museums: examples are the Shah-i Zenda mausoleum and the Khizr mosque, both in Samarkand.[79]

In 1982 a new anti-religious institution was created in Central Asia, a republic "House of Scientific Atheism" in Uzbekistan. Located in Tashkent and having affiliates in every oblast of the republic, this organization has the mission of publishing anti-religious books and other materials, training anti-Islamic experts, and improving the activities of atheistic schools and people's universities.[80] It is probable that similar institutions now exist or are planned for other republics of Central Asia and the Caucasus. Yet another type of anti-religious institution, an "Ideological Center" *(Ideologicheskiy Tsentr)*, was founded in 1982 or 1983 in the Azerbaijan SSR. Its purpose is the preparation and inculcation of new "Soviet" traditions and rites to replace existing religious ones.[81]

Despite its vehemence, this new anti-Islamic campaign has a curiously defensive character.[82] All Soviet sources focus on the shortcomings rather than on the successes of the campaign in the Muslim republics.

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[64] These figures come from the lead editorial of *Kommunist* (Baku), Feb. 19, 1983.

[65] "Perfect Marxist-Leninist Instruction," *Sovetskaya Kirgiziya*, Sept. 25, 1982.

[66] *Sovet Özbekistoni*, July 15, 1983.

[67] A. Berdiyev in *Sovet Türkmenistany*, June 4, 1983.

[68] From an article by M. Khodzhayev, director of the agitprop department of the Aini District Party Committee, and G. Mu'manov, editor of Aini district broadcasting, in *Kommunisti Tojikiston* (Dushanbe), October 1983.

[69] *Sovet Türkmenistany*, July 17, 1983

[70] *Oqituvchilar Gazetasi* (Tashkent), Jan. 29, 1983.

[71] *Yosh Leninchi* (Tashkent), Mar. 24, 1983.

[72] M. Orazova in *Sovet Türkmenistany*, Sept. 22, 1982.

[73] *Kommunist* (Baku), Dec. 18, 1982.

[74] At the secondary-school level, responsibility for anti-religious education is entrusted to history teachers. See, e.g., the article by A. Mamutova, in *Oqituvchilar Gazetasi*, Sept. 8, 1982; and that by G. Rahmanov in *Mugallymlar Gazeti* (Ashkhabad), May 20, 1983, in *FBIS*, Sept. 9, 1983, p. 24.

[75] S. H. Botirov, "Young People and Atheistic Education," *Yosh Leninchi*, Oct. 14, 1982.

[76] Editorial in *Sovet Türkmenistany*, Nov. 11, 1982.

[77] Report on a meeting of the Secretariat of the Uzbek Writers' Union Board, *Özbekiston Adabiyati* (Tashkent), Aug. 5, 1983.

[78] Among the many recent articles, see the one by Mohammed Soyunov and Khodzhageldi Korkhanov in *Adäbiyät vä Süngvät*, Aug. 5, 1983.

[79] Z. Bahriyev, "Filling Out the Knowledge of Young Atheists," *Oqituvchilar Gazetasi*, Feb. 26, 1983, in *FBIS*, July 20, 1983, p. 41.

Despite these measures, an individual known to the author who visited Samarkand in the summer of 1983 observed collective prayers being conducted at Shah-i Zenda.

[80] M. Dzhabborova (Jabborova), "Fruitlessness of Atheistic Training," *Yosh Leninchi*, Mar. 22, 1983, in *FBIS*, Aug. 16, 1983, p. 38.

[81] *Kommunist* (Baku), June 24, 1983.

[82] Soviet anti-religious propagandists in the Muslim republics frequently use the expression "our counter-propaganda work" *(nasha kontrpropagandistskaya rabota)*. See in particular, Usmanov, "Greater Effectiveness for Atheistic Education."

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

The Imam Isma'il al Bukhari madrassah in Tashkent, one of only two legal madrassahs in the USSR.

—Courtesy of the author.

They acknowledge, for example, that some "atheistic educational councils" are dominated by believers, who attempt to "substitute one religious custom for another," and that too many representatives of official Soviet organs, including members of the Communist Party, believe that "religion is so well entrenched that nothing will do any good in any case."[83]

Still, there are some creative, if poorly informed attempts. For instance, G. Aqyniazov, Candidate of Philosophical Sciences at the Turkmen State University, has introduced classical Central Asian literature into the fight against Islam:

Anti-clerical and atheistic traditions of the past must be used in our educational work, especially Magtymaguly's (Mahtum-Quli) poems—directed against religion, other-worldliness and clerics, as well as his clear advice against falling into the hands of healers, fortune tellers, ishans and mullahs, and the lies and intrigues of (Sufi) sheikhs at the "holy places"—which retain their importance to this day and can be profitably used in atheistic education.[84]

Does Candidate Aqyniazov really not know, or is he simply pretending not to know, that Mahtum-Quli, the most celebrated Turkmen poet of the 18th century, was an ishan—a sheikh of the Naqshbandi Sufi order—and that all his poems are deeply marked by Sufi mysticism? Such are the dilemmas of anti-Islamic propaganda!

Role of the Official Muftis

In this climate of strict anti-Islamic vigilance, a temporary change occurred in 1980 in relations between the Soviet regime and the official Muslim hierarchy, which is headed by the Muslim Spiritual Board of Central Asia and Kazakhstan in Tashkent. In the Brezhnev period, a mutually fruitful modus vivendi was established between the official Islamic hierarchy and the Soviet government. Anti-Islamic pressure was

[83] See, e.g., Q. Amanbaiyev in *Kazakhstan Kommunisti* (Alma-Ata), No. 8, 1982, pp. 63–90.

[84] *Sovet Türkmenistany*, Mar. 15, 1983.

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reduced during this period: after 1968 a few new mosques were opened every year and an institute for advanced Islamic studies—the "Imam Isma'il al-Bukhari" madrassah—was founded in Tashkent in 1971. For their part, official Muslim leaders acted as loyal middlemen between the Communist regime and believers at home (a role similar to that of the Russian Orthodox hierarchy) and as "itinerant ambassadors" to the Muslim world abroad.

Among various manifestations of this seemingly paradoxical cooperation were numerous international Islamic conferences organized by the mufti of Tashkent in different cities of Central Asia, visits of Soviet Muslim religious delegations abroad, and visits of foreign spiritual leaders to Central Asia. All were intended to depict the Soviet regime as the "best friend of Islam" and the USSR as a "great Muslim power."[85]

In the autumn of 1980, this strategy met with a major setback. Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, a large international Islamic conference planned for Tashkent to mark the 15th century of the Hegira was boycotted by the majority of the important Muslim states, causing it to fail spectacularly. This aspect of the Soviet Islamic strategy was put on ice, with no Islamic conferences being organized in the USSR after that date. Moreover, foreign travel by official Soviet muftis was temporarily reduced to a minimum.

Cooperation between official Islam and the Soviet regime resumed in late 1981, and in the 1982–83 period Soviet Islamic dignitaries visited Saudi Arabia and Egypt, Tunisia, several African Muslim states, the Maghreb, Ethiopia, Finland, Bulgaria, Canada, Kuwait, and Jordan. Lest anyone think that these were merely routine visits, it is revealing to know that Mufti Tajuddin Talgat of Ufa was received in Mecca in 1982 by King Khaled; that Mufti Mahmud Gekkiev of Makhach-Qala (Daghestan) was received in Kuwait (October 1983) by the Crown Prince; and that in August 1983, a delegation led by the Qadi of Tajikistan was greeted in Amman by the Crown Prince and prime minister of Jordan. During this same period, foreign Muslims once again began to visit Soviet Central Asia: these included delegations from Nigeria, Benin, North Yemen (led by the Supreme Mufti, Ahmad Zabara), Syria (led by the Supreme Mufti, Ahmad Kuftaru), Tunisia (led by the dean of Tunis University and the mayor of Tunis), Jordan (led by the rector of Jordan University), India (led by the director of the Islamic Cultural Center of Hyderabad), Bangladesh (led by the secretary general of Islamic Societies and Organizations), Algeria (a delegation from the Islamic Council), and of course from various communist countries (Bulgaria, South Yemen, and Ethiopia) and Afghanistan. Without doubt, the official Soviet Islamic establishment is once again entrusted with an important high-level diplomatic mission.

Moscow's aim in sponsoring the official Islamic establishment is both transparent and highly successful. In the Muslim world, Soviet Muslim dignitaries are accepted as "We Muslims," even when they serve loyally a godless regime. The message they bring to their co-religionists abroad may not be very different from official Soviet propaganda, it may be rather crude and not very sophisticated, but it is accepted with a certain sympathy because it is presented by authentic Islamic scholars, persons trained in the best Islamic universities of the Muslim world (Al-Azhar in Cairo or

An international Islamic conference opened in Tashkent in September 1980, under the cloud of the ongoing Soviet occupation of Muslim Afghanistan.

—TASS from SOVFOTO.

[85]Since 1970, six major international Islamic conferences have been organized by the mufti of Tashkent: October 1970, in Tashkent ("The Unity and Cooperation of Muslim Peoples Struggling for Peace"); 1973, in Tashkent ("Soviet Muslims Support the Struggle of the Arab Peoples"); August 1974, in Samarkand (on the 1,200th anniversary of the birth of Imam Isma'il al-Bukhari); October 1976, in Tashkent (celebration of the 30th anniversary of the founding of the muftiat of Tashkent); July 1979, in Tashkent (celebration of the 10th anniversary of the founding of the journal *Muslims of the Soviet East*); and September 1979, in Dushanbe ("The Contribution of Soviet Muslims to the Cause of Peace and Social Progress").

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Qarawiyin in Fez). Thanks to the activity of these representatives, Moscow managed to neutralize to a certain degree the disastrous propaganda image of the Afghan genocide, as well as foreign Muslims' criticism of Soviet domestic treatment of Islam. It also enables the Soviet regime to retain in the larger Muslim world political options it might otherwise find more problematic. One might well ask how long the Soviets can play the sophisticated but dangerous game of supporting Islam abroad while trying to destroy it at home. Stalin could get away with it after World War II when Central Asia was well shielded by an iron curtain. But is this strategy realistic today?

Conclusion

We are in no position directly to assess the real impact of the Islamic Revolution in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan on Soviet Central Asians. Yet we do have the Soviets' own testimony and the limited fieldwork of those who have been fortunate enough to gain recent access to Soviet Muslim regions. From this evidence alone, it is clear that the Soviet authorities believe that events in Iran and Afghanistan are directly or indirectly responsible for the heightened interest in Islam among all social strata of the Soviet Muslim population. Although events in Iran and Afghanistan (or elsewhere in the Muslim world) did not create the Islamic revival, they did impart to it a new, concentrated energy, and are likely to continue to have this reinforcing effect in the foreseeable future. Indeed, the influence may even intensify.

Soviet official sources betray anxiety about a number of social and political problems in the Soviet Muslim territories, but Islam and the problems associated with it are rapidly becoming among those most discussed. There is no doubt that the Soviets recognize the need to counter strongly the renewed interest in religion, religious culture, and religious traditions among the Muslim population of the USSR. Islam is viewed as disruptive to Soviet social engineering at home, and as an opportunity for foreign interference in Soviet affairs. Judging from the vast amount of Soviet media space, educational programs, and man-hours allotted to anti-Islamic activities, the Soviet leadership is taking this matter seriously.

The Afghan war continues, as does Islamic militancy in Iran. It is naive to believe that if, or when, these two situations begin to lose their edge the threat the Soviet authorities perceive in Islam will recede. It would be rash to believe that ideological forces once set in motion can be easily restrained, even in the improbable event of a Soviet military victory in Afghanistan or a collapse of Khomeyni's revolution in Iran. Islam today is a potent ideological and political force. The war in Afghanistan and the revolution in Iran are first of all ideological conflicts, and it is primarily in the realm of ideology that the long-term effects will be felt in Central Asia. Soviet Muslims can no longer be isolated from foreign "contamination," as Soviet sources themselves acknowledge. "There can be no harmless religious beliefs," noted an Uzbek anti-Islamic specialist recently.[86] He was certainly speaking for all of Soviet officialdom, his eyes upon the present but his thoughts upon the future.

Ahmad Keftaro, left, Chief Mufti of the Syrian Arab Republic, with Mirzoabdullo Kalonov, center, member of the Ecclesiastical Board of Muslims of Central Asia and Kazakhstan, and Muslihiddin Mukarramov, Imam Hatib of the Leninabad Mosque, during a 1982 visit to the Soviet Union.

—TASS from SOVFOTO.

[86]T. K. Dzhavliyev, head of the Surhan Darya district branch of the republican House of Scientific Atheism of the Uzbek SSR, in *Pravda Vostoka*, Mar. 27, 1984.

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Books

Hellenic Time of Troubles

R. V. Burks

EVANGELOS AVEROFF-TOSSIZZA. *By Fire and Axe: The Communist Party and the Civil War in Greece.* Trans. by Sarah Arnold Riggs. New Rochelle, NY, Caratzas Brothers, 1978.

LAWRENCE S. WITTNER. *American Intervention in Greece, 1943–1949.* New York, Columbia University Press, 1982.

JOHN O. IATRIDES, Ed. *Greece in the 1940s: A Nation in Crisis.* Hanover, NH, University Press of New England, 1981.

JOHN C. LOULIS. *The Greek Communist Party 1940–1944.* London, England, Croom Helm, 1982.

THE WORKS under consideration are based in good part upon an increased supply of primary sources that have recently become available for the history of what I choose to call the Greek Time of Troubles—the nine-year period commencing with the Italian invasion of Greece on October 28, 1940, and ending on October 16, 1949, with the conclusion of the Greek civil war. The new sources, coming primarily from the Communists, appeared for the most part after the demise of the dictatorship of the colonels in 1974 when the leaders of the Greek Communist Party (KKE) were allowed to return from exile abroad. Former members of the KKE Politburo have published interviews and autobiographies, while the party itself has issued five volumes of official documents. The records of the Democratic Army of Greece, the fighting force of the KKE during the civil war, have been uncovered, although parts of them have been retained by the Greek authorities "for cataloging."[1]

There are also sources from noncommunists. In the early 1970's, the General Staff of the Greek army produced several rather one-sided volumes on the civil war. In addition, the volume by Evangelos Averoff-Tossizza is a military history of the civil war by a cabinet-level participant on the winning side. It relies heavily on personal experience and a fund of apparent insider information. The now available US military records, when combined with American diplomatic documents, are especially rewarding. Except for Lawrence Wittner, who deals with American policy, all the authors whose works are reviewed here depend on this voluminous new material. Unfortunately, however, none of them has made use of the station reports of the United Nations Commission for Observation in the Balkans. Of course, many sources still remain inaccessible. This includes many records of the American CIA, Britain's Special Operations Executive and Foreign Office, and to be sure, the holdings of the Greek, Yugoslav, Albanian, Bulgarian, and Soviet governments. Nonetheless, with the new sources that have become available, a new plateau in our knowledge of the Hellenic Time of Troubles has been climbed, one on which we are likely to remain for many years to come.

The works reviewed here also represent a new stage in the controversy that began in the West with the mutiny of the Greek armed forces in Egypt during April 1944, and that has continued to the present day. Currently, the protagonists in this debate, which concerns the nature of the political struggle in Greece, can be most conveniently classified as revisionists and traditionalists. Altogether the four works under review have 22 different authors, 20 of whom contributed to the collective work edited by John Iatrides and published under the auspices of the Modern Greek

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[1]John O. Iatrides, "Civil War 1945–1949: National and International Aspects," in Iatrides, Ed., pp. 195–96.

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Studies Association. The 22 authors are numerically evenly divided between revisionists and traditionalists, although the traditionalists have written many more pages than the revisionists. Many of the authors are Greek, which facilitated the utilization of the newly available Greek-language sources.

In what follows I attempt to state the essentials of the line of argument of each side as it deals with the successive struggles between the forces of the Left and those of the Right: the April 1944 mutiny and the December 1944 rising; the nature of the National Liberation Front (EAM); the civil war of 1946–1949; and, finally, the role the two superpowers played in Greece during this time. In summarizing the respective positions of the two schools, I attempt the perhaps impossible task of putting forward what seem to me the most convincing of the arguments advanced by each side, without comment of my own, in the belief that a systematic contrast and comparison of the best in both positions may help to expose the inner nexus of the dispute, and therewith reveal the current state of our understanding of this complex and still controversial period of Greek history.

April Mutiny–December Rising

ACCORDING to the revisionists, the origins of the April 1944 mutiny lie in the competition between two governments. The royal government-in-exile, together with the remnants of the royal army (the Middle East Armed Forces—MEAF), was located in Cairo, Egypt. Since King George II had turned his people over to the fascist dictatorship of General John Metaxas in 1936, and since this same people was now determined to prevent a postwar restoration of the inequitable and outmoded social order that the king had come to symbolize, the government in Cairo was virtually bereft of legitimacy and depended entirely for its revenues and credibility on the backing of the British (and the Americans).

In Greece, meanwhile, the principal mass resistance organization, EAM, had set up a provisional, clandestine government of its own in March 1944. Known as the PEEA, this body enjoyed the support of the overwhelming majority of Greeks and was backed by a guerrilla army, ELAS, which was actively engaged in fighting the Axis powers. The creation of the PEEA resulted in the mutiny of most units of MEAF, with the leaders of the mutiny demanding the merger of the royal government with the PEEA and the transfer of some ministries from Cairo to "the mountain" (i.e., the underground) in mainland Greece.

But the mutiny was short-lived since, on Churchill's personal instructions, the British forces in the Middle East suppressed it and purged MEAF of those who had declared in favor of PEEA. The British then counterattacked politically, undertaking to reorganize the Cairo government in such a way as to swallow up EAM. Their immediate purpose was to guarantee—once the Axis occupation forces had withdrawn from Greece—the unopposed return of the royal government, guarded of course by British troops. To achieve this end a conference was convened in Lebanon in May 1944, to which not only a representation of the PEEA but delegates from other, albeit minor, resistance movements in Greece were invited, as were leaders of the traditional parties, the Liberals and the Populists.

Instructed to demand one-half of the ministries in the Government of National Unity that was to be created, the delegation of the PEEA found itself condemned and politically isolated by the other representations. The delegation was faced with the alternative of entering the new government as a minority party or of standing in the way of national unity. In signing the Lebanon Agreement, the PEEA delegation accepted a minority position, even though EAM probably represented the overwhelming majority of the Greek people.

A further agreement was reached at Caserta, Italy, in September 1944, according to which EAM was to disband ELAS, its guerrilla army, and place it under British command, once the Government of National Unity had moved to Athens. All other Greek forces, whether guerrilla or regular, would be disbanded as well.[2]

THE TRADITIONALISTS reply that in initialing the Lebanon and Caserta pacts the KKE, of which EAM was in fact a mere front, was not engaging in compromise but was instead signing documents of surrender. The PEEA, assert the traditionalists, was created to constrain the government in Cairo to accept unification with the PEEA on KKE terms, or face a powerful rival government in the homeland. In the event of merger, the ministries of defense, interior, and justice—to be held by Communists—were to be transferred to Greece. To make sure of the royal government's compliance, KKE organized the mutiny in MEAF.

The PEEA delegation came to Lebanon instructed to demand one-half plus one of all ministries. Instead, the delegation had to settle for only four ministries, out of a total of 14, none of them crucial. It

[2]Procopis Papistratis, "The Papandreou Government and the Lebanon Conference," in ibid., pp. 121–24, 127–30.

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also agreed to the ultimate replacement of all guerrilla forces with a new national army. This capitulation is largely to be explained, assert the traditionalists, because the PEEA delegation had to accept blame for KKE's orchestration of the April mutiny, and because ELAS had attempted for months prior to the creation of the PEEA to destroy or disperse all competing resistance movements in order to improve its bargaining position.

Upon learning what had happened in Lebanon, KKE initially undertook to disavow its delegation and reopen the negotiations, only to drop the matter when both the Soviet chargé in Cairo and a newly arrived Soviet military mission in Greece advised KKE to join the new Government of National Unity as it stood. Since the other resistance forces agreed at Caserta to accept British command upon the return of the government to Athens, KKE had little choice but to agree also, even though the intent of this agreement was prevention of a takeover by KKE-EAM-ELAS, through a British military presence in Greece after German forces had withdrawn.[3]

In effect, if not explicitly, the traditionalists insist, Lebanon and Caserta had provided for the transfer of power within Greece from KKE to the Government of National Unity, in which KKE was represented. However, once the Government of National Unity reached Athens in October 1944, the KKE Politburo, by refusing to disarm ELAS, attempted to nullify its surrender and convert its military superiority within Greece into control of the government.[4] For this reason, no agreement could be reached on the demobilization of ELAS. On November 30, the Communist leadership received a message from Belgrade reporting that the Yugoslav and Bulgarian parties advised against the demobilization of ELAS and suggesting that, in the event of an armed confrontation, the British would not intervene. And on December 2, on orders from the Politburo, the EAM ministers resigned, breaking up the Government of National Unity and calling for a showdown.[5]

At this juncture, ELAS units stationed on the periphery of the capital had already been instructed to close in and prepare for attack. ELAS commands elsewhere had been ordered to destroy the National Republican Greek League (EDES), a noncommunist resistance group based in Epirus. On December 3, KKE staged a massive demonstration in the streets of Athens during which the police fired on the demonstrators. On the following day, as KKE called for a general strike, ELAS began its advance on the national capital.[6]

The revisionists insist that there was nothing to prevent EAM from seizing control when the Government of National Unity actually reached Athens in October 1944. Except for the towns, especially in the Peloponnesus, where there remained Security Battalions organized by the Axis powers from among Greek reactionaries, and except for remote and isolated Epirus, which was dominated by EDES, and except also for Greater Athens, where the reconstituted Cairo government was guarded by a handful of British troops, Greece was ruled by EAM.

Instead of resorting to a coup, however, EAM, like its French and Italian leftist counterparts, plunged into conventional politics. EAM did not feel any need to seize power, continue the revisionists, for it had the support of the masses and therefore believed it could implement its political program by democratic means.[7] Thus the December 1944 uprising was not the outcome of a prepared plan. Rather, EAM fell victim to a carefully set trap. Backed by the British, George Papandreou, the head of the Government of National Unity, demanded that ELAS disarm and demobilize, whereas the purged remnant of MEAF, which had also reached the capital, was to remain intact. To EAM this smelled of military dictatorship. Years of fascist rule had made the police, the gendarmerie, and the royal army, upon whom the new government would have to depend, fanatically anti-leftist. EAM therefore took the position that while the new national army was being formed, both ELAS and MEAF should be disbanded. In the course of difficult negotiations, the police opened fire on unarmed demonstrators, killing many. ELAS units responded by attacking police stations, intending only to force a reorganization of the government so that a reasonable compromise might finally be reached. Churchill, however, seized upon the occasion to crush ELAS.[8]

The arrival of British reinforcements in divisional strength between December 13 and 16 turned the tide in what, according to the traditionalists, had become a very close thing. On December 19,

[3]Loulis, pp. 85–103, and passim.

[4]For the troop figures, see ibid., p. 154.

[5]George M. Alexander, "The Demobilization Crisis of November 1944," in Iatrides, p. 161; Averoff-Tossizza, p. 111. For a somewhat different version of the message from Belgrade, see Alexander, p. 165, and Loulis, pp. 169–70. See also Loulis, pp. 174–75; and Averoff-Tossizza, pp. 113–14. For the resignations see Loulis, pp. 169–71.

[6]Loulis, pp. 172 and 171.

[7]Wittner, p. 9; Nicolas Svoronos, "Greek History, 1940–1950: The Main Problems," in Iatrides, pp. 12–13; John L. Hondros, "The Greek Resistance: A Reevaluation," in ibid., pp. 45–46.

[8]Hondros, pp. 45–47; Svoronos, p. 13; Wittner, p. 10; and Alexander, pp. 162–63.

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Georgiy Dimitrov, leader of the Bulgarian communist party, telegraphed his Greek opposite number, George Siantos, that armed assistance from abroad was out of the question (had Siantos asked for help?) and that KKE should negotiate. Yet when Churchill arrived on the scene on the 25th, KKE not only rejected terms of surrender but again insisted on being given 40 to 50 percent of the ministries, including those of defense, interior, and justice.[9]

Nature of EAM

SINCE EAM proved to be an indispensable element in both the April mutiny and the December rising it is not surprising that the two parties to our dispute disagree about the nature of this institution. For their part, the revisionists hold that EAM represented a continuation of the national unity achieved by the lower classes in reaction to the Italian invasion of 1940. Of 7.5 million Greeks of all ages, 1.5 million were enrolled in EAM, which succeeded, by means of its guerrilla army ELAS, in pinning down many divisions of enemy troops and inflicting thousands of casualties upon them. Furthermore, EAM frustrated Axis plans for conscripting Greek labor for service in the German Reich; cut the German take in chrome, nickel, and bauxite by destroying mines; sabotaged Axis lines of communication; and rescued thousands of Jews, prisoners, and downed Allied airmen.[10]

To be sure, the revisionists explain, EAM was also a political movement, with a program for reshaping Greek society. But the important point was not that the masses of the population in their quest for social justice had accepted a communist-inspired leadership, but rather that for the first time in the history of Greece those masses had undertaken to intervene directly in the political arena, tearing to pieces the petty-bourgeois clientelist straightjacket that had hitherto bound and deformed Greek political life.[11]

With the advent of John Metaxas and the disappearance of the parliamentary system of government in 1936, the revisionists continue, the historical parties were no longer able to service the clienteles which constituted their raison d'être; they were even less able to create the nationwide bureaucratic structure of modern parties. They became instead leaderships without followings. In Greece, the KKE alone was a modern party.[12]

Moreover, assert the revisionists, the historical parties proved unable to perceive the popular demand for a new and more equitable social order, a desideratum that the suffering of the war greatly accentuated. For this reason the traditional parties lost most of their popular following to the Left, making it necessary for them to cosy up to the King and the British. In so doing, they shed their republicanism instead of evolving a noncommunist program of meaningful social reform. It is not even clear that these parties, had they been absolutely sure that KKE was willing to accept conventional parliamentary democracy, would not have continued to oppose its participation in public life because of its capacity for mass mobilization. Opposed to resistance in principle, the old-line politicians nonetheless encouraged the foundation of guerrilla movements antithetical to EAM. This accounts for the existence of EDES (which collaborated with the Germans), EKKA, and the rest. The policy of the Liberal and Populist parties in this respect paralleled that of the royal government-in-exile, which purged the remnant of the Greek armed forces of elements favorable to EAM so as to create an instrument capable of restoring bourgeois rule.[13]

TRADITIONALISTS reply that EAM was less the wave of the future than the product of special and time-bound circumstances created by the Axis occupation. The per capita burden of occupation expenses for the Axis was five times higher in Greece than in occupied France, for example. In Greece the transportation system broke down, cutting off the urban from the rural areas and transforming the economy into localized, noncommunicating zones. Massive unemployment was accentuated by the destruction of bridges and the removal of machinery. A burgeoning black market combined with a runaway inflation to fashion a new and more gallingly inequitable distribution of wealth while, at the same time, expropriating the petty bourgeoisie. There was widespread hunger in Greece and outright starvation in Greater Athens. Acts of resistance brought reprisal against randomly chosen hostages.[14]

In these unique circumstances all social classes became radicalized—the middle class and the peasantry as well as the urban proletariat—and the better elements

[9] Loulis, pp. 176–78; Averoff-Tossizza, p. 125.

[10] For the membership of EAM, see Loulis, p. ix, but also Hondros, p. 41, Wittner, p. 3, and Constantine Tsoucalas, "The Ideological Impact of the Civil War," in Iatrides, p. 327. Other details in Hondros, pp. 43–45.

[11] Tsoucalas, p. 327.

[12] John A. Petropoulos, "The Traditional Political Parties of Greece During the Axis Occupation," in Iatrides, pp. 27–29; Loulis, pp. 15–17, 24–25.

[13] Petropoulos, pp. 32–35; Loulis pp. 24, 26–27.

[14] Starvos B. Thomadakis, "Black Markets, Inflation and Force in the Economy of Occupied Greece," in Iatrides, pp. 65–66, 71–75; Loulis, pp. 23–24.

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of each. Both EAM and ELAS had widespread support among civil servants, white-collar workers, merchants, shopkeepers, and professionals in urban areas and among the better-off peasants in the countryside. Its working-class members tended to be above average in education.[15]

Not only did class structure undergo transformation under Axis occupation, but the national territory was threatened as well. The Albanians annexed Chamuria, or northernmost Epirus, while the Bulgarians occupied western Thrace as well as much of Greek Macedonia. To a population living in such misery and facing such danger, resistance came naturally. It was in *these* circumstances, the traditionalists reason, that KKE provided an indispensable leadership: a nationwide clandestine bureaucracy able to recruit a guerrilla force; a fighting gospel for the present but also the promise of social justice and people's democracy for the future; and a military discipline that could accept the high human cost of resistance activity.

For the traditionalists, the contrast with EKKA and EDES carries final conviction. Both were officered largely by the same sort of people that commanded ELAS—professional soldiers and reservists who had been cashiered for participation in the failed republican coup d'état of 1935. But EDES and EKKA were different in being local resistance movements composed of clientelist followings of prominent personalities, with a nationalist orientation but without real ideological commitment, though in the end both were forced in self-defense to adopt socialist programs.[16]

At the same time, assert the traditionalists, KKE profited also from an enormous ideological confusion, which again was specific to wartime Greece. The government-in-exile was tarnished with a fascist discoloration while the Nazi German occupiers represented the very epitome of fascism. The Western democracies had allied themselves with communist Russia in a life-and-death contention with the fascist powers. The German-controlled Greek media repeatedly lashed out against the communist danger, accusing EAM of being a communist front, an assertion which, because of its source, most Greeks refused to believe. EAM itself claimed legitimacy as a national front. How was the average Greek to know that two of the five parties that constituted this front were communist dependencies while another two were socialist and lacking in significant popular followings? The insignia of ELAS, finally, were identical with those of the royal army while the acronym that stood for this guerrilla force was the homonym for Greece.[17]

Nor was it easy for the average Greek to perceive that the Germans had only a limited interest in actually destroying the Greek resistance movements, especially after it had become clear that the Axis had lost the war. Or that, acts of sabotage apart, ELAS did precious little fighting against the Germans, in order to conserve its strength for the postwar period. All this notwithstanding, it must be made clear that ELAS had a better combat record than any other Greek resistance force.[18]

Yet, the traditionalists continue, the firm hold of ELAS on the population of Greece was shattered in the course of 1944. The mutiny within MEAF in April shook that hold, while the rising in December reduced it from something over two-thirds of the electorate to approximately one-third. This shift in the popularity of ELAS the revisionists refuse to recognize.

It seems useful at this point to compare the size of the various military formations in order to have a rough indication of the magnitude of this change. The purge of MEAF during the summer of 1944 brought the strength of that force down from 15,000 to 3,000 so that EAM adherence in the armed forces in Egypt, as distinguished from the population in Greece, was probably on the order of 80 percent. At the time of the December 1944 rising, ELAS boasted 80,000 regulars, whereas the strength of EDES was 30,000 and that of EKKA perhaps 1,000. Thus, Greek resistance had fielded altogether some 111,000 men, of which ELAS represented 72 percent. By the time of the September 1946 plebiscite on the monarchy, that institution, once the bugbear of EAM propaganda, won the approval of two-thirds of the voters, with 94 percent of the electorate participating. In comparison, the Democratic Army of Greece, the insurgents of 1946–49, never mustered more than 28,000 combatants. Even that figure overstated Greek support for the Democratic Army, since guerrillas of the Greek Slavophone minority, who owed their primary allegiance to Skopje, constituted at all times a sizeable element of that force.[19]

The explanation of this dramatic change in popular allegiance is, in the traditionalist view, at least threefold. First is the withdrawal of

[15] Hondros, p. 42.
[16] Loulis, pp. 14–15, 17–27.
[17] Ibid., pp. 7–13, 40–41, and 66, n.22.
[18] Ibid., pp. 12, 81–83.
[19] Ibid., pp. 104, n. 8, 153–54; Hondros, p. 41, n. 23. For significantly smaller estimates of ELAS strength see Hondros, p. 41.

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the Axis occupation forces and the liberation of the country. The hated enemy had been defeated and an all-out resistance effort was no longer necessary. Then came the realization that EAM was not really a national front resisting a foreign invader but a communist enterprise attempting to impose its rule on Greece and opposing Britain, a country that in 1940 had put scarce English infantry divisions into Greece in what everyone recognized as a hopeless effort to turn back the Axis juggernaut. This realization in turn helped to change the perception of George II from chief obstacle to a more equitable social order into paladin of domestic peace.[20]

The Civil War

AT VARKIZA, where an armistice was signed in January 1945, the Communists made every concession compatible with the continued existence of the KKE, if we are to believe the revisionists. KKE agreed to disband ELAS, to surrender its weapons, and to give up de facto control of three-fourths of the country. In exchange for these concessions, KKE received promises of free elections, a plebiscite on the monarchy, a wide-ranging amnesty for political crimes, a purge of Axis collaborators in the army and the police, and the enrollment of ELAS veterans in the ranks of a new national army.[21]

The aim of KKE was to labor henceforth within the framework of the constitution and to win back the support of the vast majority of the people. To this end, Siantos sought to reconstruct the wartime national front within an electoral setting. Upon returning from Dachau in May 1945, Nicos Zachariades replaced Siantos as first secretary of the KKE but adopted an identical strategy. Had the terms of Varkiza been adhered to, there would have been no civil war, the revisionists emphasize.[22]

But, unfortunately, turbulence in the form of a "white" terror was spreading. Even the Liberals demanded that the election be postponed; the Communists decided to boycott it. As it was, a mere 49 percent of the voters turned out on March 31, 1946—an enormously low figure by Greek standards—and only 65 percent of the vote cast (or 32 percent of the whole electorate) went to the Right. Even this low proportion was exaggerated by corruption and coercion. The results of the subsequent plebiscite on the monarchy were also distorted by a combination of terror and corruption. Such tampering with the electoral process created a popular basis for a new appeal to arms.[23]

Admittedly, the boycott of the March 1946 election was a strategic blunder on the part of the Left, since it threw the government into the hands of a minority of the far Right, leaving the Liberals to provide protective coloration for that minority in return for ministerial posts. In any case, the revisionists add, the cabinet was forbidden by the British to intervene in the affairs of the military and the police, an impediment to a balanced policy which was magnified by the refusal of the Liberal prime minister to appoint ELAS veterans to the armed forces.[24]

Such policies led to the formation of a shadow or parallel state—*parakratos* in Greek—made up of fanatical royalists, former fascist collaborators, and Metaxas holdovers. The ensuing conditions cast their shadow even on the reporting of US Ambassador Lincoln McVeagh, who complained in his dispatches that law and order were in the hands of unscrupulous reactionaries. Thus, the revisionists conclude, parliamentary democracy had become the convenient disguise of a genuinely authoritarian regime.[25]

Behind the *parakratos* another reality appeared—a new version of the petty bourgeoisie, as the revisionists see it. The grey eminences of the parallel state used their influence with the publicly visible politicians and bureaucrats to channel funds and appointments so as to put in place a new hierarchy of sponsored privilege. This restoration of an outmoded class was only made possible, moreover, by the bounteous largesse of the United States, which explains why the men of the Right were so willing to put up with the dictates of a foreign power.[26]

The revived petty bourgeoisie soon came to serve as the nexus between the *parakratos*, on the one hand, and the outer ecumene, on the other, making it possible to "insert" the Greek national economy into the world market as a de-

[20] Loulis, pp. 180, n. 32, 199; Wittner, pp. 28–29; Averoff-Tossizza, pp. 124–25. Averoff-Tossizza argues (pp. 121–22) that the mass executions carried out by ELAS during the December rising played an important role in changing the popular appreciation of the monarchy.

[21] Wittner, pp. 32, 29.

[22] Ibid; Heinz Richter, "The Varkiza Agreement and the Origins of the Civil War," in Iatrides, pp. 177–78; Nicos C. Alivazatos, "The 'Emergency Regime' and Civil Liberties, 1946–1949," in Iatrides, p. 222.

[23] Lawrence S. Wittner, "American Policy Toward Greece, 1944–1949," in Iatrides, p. 231; George Th. Mavrogordatos, "The 1946 Election and Plebiscite: Prelude to Civil War," in Iatrides, pp. 183–88; Wittner, pp. 40–41, 44, 193–94; Averoff-Tossizza, p. 166; Richter, p. 71.

[24] Mavrogordatos, pp. 188, 182–83, 190–92; Wittner, p. 38.

[25] Alivazatos, p. 222; Tsoucalas, pp. 324–25, 320–21; Wittner, p. 42; Wittner in Iatrides, p. 236.

[26] Tsoucalas, p. 328; Van Coufoudakis, "The United States, the United Nations and the Greek Question, 1946–1952," in Iatrides, pp. 276–77.

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pendency. Henceforth, according to the revisionists, the basic decisions governing the Greek economy would be taken by a decentralized network of international institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund or the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, all of them dominated by the United States. Under this colonial arrangement, it was only with continuous help from America that Greece could acquire the needed technology and capital. In effect, the unprofitable new Greek industries—as well as the petty bourgeoisie—had to live on handouts. As "insertion" in the world market went deeper, and as dependent industry grew, the new class of parasites—who of course adhered to the ideology of anti-communism—proliferated. Between 1940 and 1970, when the total population of Greece increased by 19 percent, the number of civil servants—to take them as one measure—grew by 140 percent.[27]

At the same time, former resistance members—instead of former collaborators—were purged from government employment. Court procedures were virtually a travesty of due process, with persons who had executed defendants condemned to death by EAM courts now being accused of murder. If the evidence was inadequate to stand up in court, ministerial orders hustled off EAM militants to indeterminate periods of exile on barren islands. Beyond this semi-legal persecution were the activities of monarchist toughs, the gendarmerie, and the police, who took it upon themselves to harass and punish the ordinary members of EAM and their families. There was, in short, a veritable white terror, which contributed to a steady augmentation of the still surviving ELAS bands as well as to the flight of terrorized cadres to refuge in the countries to the north. A new guerrilla force was in the process of formation.[28]

Thus, the Athens government was the victim not of premeditated aggression but rather of the exercise by the Left of an inherent right to self-defense. The plenum of the KKE Central Committee held in February 1946 did not decide for civil war but only authorized the use of arms to resist the rightist terror in the countryside. The party itself continued to work within the limits of the constitution, attempting to organize strikes and demonstrations in towns and cities in the hope of changing the make-up of the government from ostensibly Center-Right to genuinely Center-Left.[29]

But as the months passed, the pressure of guerrilla operations on the government grew. In August 1946, Markos Vafiades was dispatched to the mountains to pull together the separate guerrilla bands operating there. By October the bands were formally subordinated to a central command, and in December the whole was christened the Democratic Army of Greece. Seven months later, in July 1947, it dominated three-fourths of Greece and the Greek National Army was in disarray. It was also in July 1947 that the KKE Politburo made a last offer: the dissolution of parliament; the organization of a purely Center government which would negotiate with KKE a guaranteed amnesty; and new elections. British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin was interested in the proposal, but American Secretary of State George Marshall was not.[30]

Actually KKE First Secretary Zachariades preferred compromise to a passage at arms, according to the revisionists. He had been advised by the Kremlin to pursue the parliamentary course. Moreover, unlike Mao Zedong, he found it difficult to believe that a successful revolution could be based on a guerrilla movement. That he saw civil war as a last resort was demonstrated by his insistence until July 1947 that leftists called to serve in the Greek National Army answer that summons. Later, when he needed these men for a hard-pressed Democratic Army, some 30,000 of them had already been confined to the island exile of Makronisos.[31]

In September 1947, Zachariades finally decided that he must move party headquarters to the mountains. In December, he established a Provisional Democratic Government (PDG) there. Athens responded by oulawing the KKE.[32]

THE TRADITIONALISTS deny that the Left was forced to take up arms by the intransigence of the Right. There was indeed a white terror, they acknowledge, even though the *parakratos* existed primarily because, and only as long as, the royal government was physically unable to assert its authority beyond the periphery of urban centers. Paralyzed with fear, the police and the gendarmerie simply could not cope with the remnants of the Security Battalions nor with other

[27]Kostas Vergopoulos, "The Emergence of the New Bourgeoisie, 1944–1952," in Iatrides, pp. 300–301, 310, 313–16.

[28]Alivazatos, p. 225; Tsoucalas, p. 328; Richter, pp. 172–73, 169–70; Wittner, pp. 141, 144, 148, 155; Mavrogordatos, pp. 182, 185–86; Averoff-Tossizza, p. 149.

[29]Richter, pp. 177, 179; Mavrogordatos, p. 184.

[30]Wittner, pp. 177–79, 45, 231–32.

[31]Ibid., p. 45.

[32]Iatrides, p. 210; Averoff-Tossizza, p. 234.

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rightwing thugs. In the countryside the maintenance of order was thus often left to inexperienced auxiliary formations. Staffed by Metaxas holdovers, the bureaucracy permitted rightist gangs to hunt down ELAS fighters and their families; and a Metaxas judiciary cracked down on leftwing militants while proving scandalously lenient when dealing with wartime collaborators.[33]

Even so, much of what the Left stigmatized as rightwing terror could more accurately be characterized as regime response to leftist terrorism. The execution of some 200 Communist prisoners, long condemned to death for crimes such as murder, for example, actually took place only after the assassination in May 1948 of the royal minister of justice, an act accompanied by an appeal from the rebel radio for the liquidation of the prime minister and the minister of public order. Once the royal government had grown stronger, it took action against the miscreants of the Right. In March 1947, rightist elements in the Peloponnesus massacred 71 leftist prisoners in retribution for the assassination of two of their leaders. This time Athens imposed martial law throughout the region, dissolved the rightwing organizations there and—although it could scarcely spare them at the time—sent regular troops to arrest the wrongdoers.[34]

But there was also a red terror, the traditionalists aver. In the Peloponnesus in late 1944, ELAS engaged in a massacre of the personnel of the Security Battalions, and did not except their wives or children. By the spring of 1945, there were as many as 5,000 ELAS veterans armed and in hiding throughout Epirus, Macedonia, and Rumeli, who were not averse to seeking revenge against those whom they regarded as their persecutors. In the early months of 1947, when the fighting became severe, the rebels, upon entering villages or towns, shot well-known supporters of the Right and "drafted" young adherents of the Left.[35] Furthermore, say the traditionalists, despite Varkiza, the KKE retained and hid the best of its arms and developed in the town of Bulkes, in the Yugoslav Vojvodina, a center for KKE and ELAS personnel which would become the officers' training school for the Democratic Army. As early as December 15, 1945, representatives of the KKE met at Petrich, capital of Bulgarian Macedonia, with members of the Bulgarian and Yugoslav general staffs and agreed to reorganize the Greek guerrillas for a new insurgency.[36]

The traditionalists also disagree with the revisionists on the importance of the assistance coming to the Democratic Army from Greece's northern neighbors. While the revisionists agree that civil war could not have been waged without help from the north, they not only play down this help but appear to argue that the supply of arms and equipment from these communist neighbors was so meager that it limited the recruitment of guerrilla manpower.[37]

The traditionalists, however, contend that even if supply was thus limited (which it was not), the revisionists gravely underestimate the importance of sanctuary to the Democratic Army operations, giving the guerrillas hospital services, rest, training facilities, and equipment, without any danger of pursuit. Only sanctuary explains the ability of a force of somewhere between 20,000 and 28,000 strong to hold off a force of some 265,000 men armed and, in effect, commanded by the Americans.

According to Averoff-Tossizza, the expulsion of the Yugoslav party from the Cominform was what put an end to sanctuary and to the rebellion.[38] Toward the end of 1946, Vafiades, in search of more men and the facilities and supplies to sustain them, paid a visit to various Balkan capitals. Subsequently, there emerged a network of 12 supply bases and six rest and recreation camps for his forces, stretching across three countries. In exchange, Vafiades reportedly signed written promises concerning the correction of frontiers and the status of minorities in Greece.[39]

The proclamation of the Truman Doctrine in March 1947 suggested that existing logistical arrangements might soon be beggared. That same month the UN Commission for Observation in the Balkans moved to Thessaloniki, and no less a personality than Nicos Zachariades visited the Macedonian seaport for conversations with the Soviet, Polish, Albanian, Bulgarian, and Yugoslav delegations to that body. The advice he received (from the Soviets and the Poles) was that the time had come for the KKE officially to adopt the Democratic Army, abandoning the political campaign in the cities. Any further increase in logistical support would, however, have to await the capture and control by the insurgents of a small region that could seat a provisional government. In

[33] Iatrides, pp. 197–98.

[34] Averoff-Tossizza, pp. 263–65, 218–19.

[35] Lars Baerentzen, "The Liberation of the Peleponnese, September 1944," in Iatrides, pp. 136–37, 139; Averoff-Tossizza, pp. 106–7; Iatrides, p. 199.

[36] Averoff-Tossizza, pp. 171–72.

[37] Wittner, p. 107.

[38] Averoff-Tossizza, p. 254.

[39] Ibid., pp. 199–200. For the bases and the camps, see the map in ibid., p. 419.

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that event the socialist countries would recognize the new government and negotiate agreements with it making possible the delivery of whatever aid was required.[40]

Immediately after these conversations in Thessaloniki, the First Secretary of the KKE left for visits to Belgrade, Prague, Moscow, and Strasbourg. He reached the last-named city in June, addressing the congress of the hard-line French Communist Party, which was convened there, and suggesting, to waves of applause, that it was time to organize a free government in Greece. Vafiades meanwhile was at Bled, the summer residence of Yugoslav Marshal Tito; there he renegotiated, this time with members of the Yugoslav and Albanian general staffs, the agreements reached at the end of 1946 in Petrich. This time Soviet officers were also present. Aid to the Democratic Army was to be increased once again and henceforth to include artillery, trucks, and wireless stations, but not aircraft. In addition, bloc troops would be stationed near the Greek frontier, in case the Democratic Army were encircled or pursued outside Greek territory. Finally, a joint Balkin headquarters was created, with the right to veto the assignment of ranking officers in the Democratic Army.[41]

With these agreements concluded, the insurgents made an all-out effort between July and December 1947 to capture and hold a town of sufficient importance to serve credibly as the capital of the rebel government. In July it was Grevena that was attacked; in October, Metsovon; in December, Konitsa—all of them strategic locations in mountain valleys in the far northwest. In all three assaults, however, the Democratic Army failed, incurring heavy casualties. The formation of the Provisional Democratic Government was proclaimed over the Belgrade radio during the fighting for Konitsa, with General Vafiades as prime minister and minister of war.[42]

As suggested earlier, it was the expulsion of the Yugoslav party from the Cominform that brought the civil war to an end. Not only was the Yugoslav League of Communists cast into outer darkness by the Muscovite pope, but Yugoslavia itself was put under an economic blockade by all the Cominform states, a pressure so damaging that Tito had to fear the collapse of the country's economy, unless he could persuade the Western powers to aid him. But the capitalist powers made it clear that no help would be forthcoming as long as Belgrade continued its sponsorship of the Democratic Army. The Yugoslav frontier was finally closed to the Greek rebels at the end of July 1949. The consequence was that the Democratic Army ceased operations and withdrew into foreign exile on October 16, 1949.[43]

However, the Yugoslav tap had been turned off only by degrees. Meanwhile, the KKE went through a series of astonishing contortions in an effort to save its forces from final defeat. In January 1949, Vafiades, who had always been an advocate of a pro-Yugoslav policy, was dismissed from all his posts. In February the insurgents made a last desperate effort to capture a suitable town, this time Florina, the principal city in the Slavophone area in northwesternmost Greek Macedonia adjacent to both the Yugoslav and the Albanian frontiers. Again the assault was turned back. Also in February, a Central Committee Plenum of the KKE suddenly declared itself in favor of an independent Macedonia. In April three Slavo-Macedonian members were added to the PDG at the ministerial level.[44]

These were astonishing developments, and they produced in the Greek prisons a veritable flood of repentance declarations, signed by KKE and ELAS veterans who felt themselves betrayed. The creation of an independent Macedonia would have meant the unification of the three parts of the province. This would have entailed the loss by Greece of its half of Macedonia, where nearly 90 percent of the population was ethnically Greek; the loss by Yugoslavia of its 40 percent; and the loss by Bulgaria of its Slavic-speaking 10 percent. The proposal for an independent Macedonia threatened Yugoslavia, therefore, with the loss of its southernmost republic, and Greece with the cession of its largest and most fertile province. But it promised Bulgaria an enormous gain, since Sofia could only conceive of an independent Macedonian state as a second Bulgaria, the predominant (even if not majority) population there speaking what could be construed as various dialects of the Bulgarian language. In exchange for the prospect of an independent Macedonia (by an arrangement no doubt worked out when Zachariades addressed a congress of the Bulgarian party at Sofia in November 1948), Bulgaria was to assume the role of principal supplier and patron of the Democratic Army, a function previously performed by Yugoslavia.

To complete the picture, the reader should be informed that Albania had meantime made use of the Cominform excommunication of Yugoslavia to escape from

[40] Ibid., pp. 213–14.
[41] Ibid., pp. 234–35.
[42] Ibid., pp. 237–41, 243–51.
[43] Ibid., pp. 276–79, 317–19.
[44] Ibid., pp. 327–29, 324, 334–35.

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the tutelage of Belgrade and become a Soviet satellite instead. The Albanians were prepared to cooperate with the new strategy, no doubt hoping to slice off the northwestern strip of Yugoslav Macedonia, which was preponderantly Albanian in population. In other words, what the bemused outer world was probably witnessing was an effort to continue the operations of the Democratic Army under the aegis of those countries that had remained loyal to the Cominform, and to make use of the Greek imbroglio to dismember heretical Yugoslavia as well as capitalist Greece.

If I may supply a paragraph of my own to the traditionalist account, I would suggest still another motive—and not the least important—behind the new program for an independent Macedonia. That was the need of the Greek guerrilla command to maintain the loyalty and discipline of its own Slavic-speaking units. At the time of the civil war the Slavophone population of Greece, i.e., those who spoke Slavo-Macedonian (or Bulgarian, according to Sofia) as well as Greek, probably numbered about 140,000. During the Axis occupation this minority had, under the protection of Tito's Partisans, formed a resistance force of its own. Known by the acronym SNOF, it was one of the competing movements that ELAS had chosen to attack, forcing SNOF to retreat to the safety of the Yugoslav part of Macedonia. Once the Axis had withdrawn, the royal Greek gendarmerie undertook to administer a proper vengeance on the Slavophone villages for their friendliness to the Partisans, an action that ended by producing a reconstitution on Yugoslav soil of the former guerrilla force, henceforth known as NOF. At the beginning of the Greek civil war in 1946, the 6,000 men of NOF became, with the approval of Belgrade, a component of the Democratic Army, constituting perhaps a quarter of that force. By the beginning of 1948, however, NOF was reportedly 11,000 strong, comprising something less than half of the Democratic Army. After the proclamation that an independent Macedonia was a principal objective of the PDG, the number of Slavophones (who saw themselves as fighting a war of national independence) probably rose to some 14,000. These men may have been as many as two-thirds of those who, in August 1949, so desperately and with such heavy casualties defended the complex fortifications installed on Mts. Vitsi and Grammos in what proved to be the last battle of the civil war.[45]

Role of the Superpowers

THE REAL architects of the Hellenic Time of Troubles, the revisionists argue, were Britain and America. Britain must bear responsibility for the civil war because it insisted on the restoration of George II. While British statesmen believed that the reestablishment of the monarchy would provide a guarantee of domestic order within Greece, and at the same time help to hold the country in the British orbit, their policy in fact virtually guaranteed a popular resort to armed resistance.[46]

The Americans were responsible for the Greek fratricide, it is argued, because they overestimated Soviet interest in penetrating the Middle East, of which they regarded Greece as the linchpin; and because they saw the civil war in Greece as a crucial engagement in the struggle between East and West for the domination of the world. For this reason Washington refused to consider the possibility of a political settlement.

The enormous increase in the consumption of oil brought on by World War II, and the realization that more than half of foreign oil reserves were found in the Persian Gulf, created in Washington a deep concern about the possibility of Soviet adventurism in the Middle East. Washington also had an interest in hardening the exploitative grip of American capital on the oil-producing countries of that important area.[47]

Therefore, in August 1946, Washington began subsidizing the Republic of Turkey. The Soviet Union had demanded that Turkey share with it the defense of the Straits of Constantinople. Rather than negotiate, Turkey had mobilized for an indefinite period, which it could ill afford to do. In September, Washington resolved to station a naval task force in the Mediterranean permanently. In November, American economic aid was extended in support of the collapsing Greek economy. March 1947 brought the proclamation of the Truman Doctrine, under which US assistance would be offered to any free people resisting subjugation by armed minorities or outside powers. The fall of Greece, Dean Acheson is quoted as saying, would bring the eventual loss of the entire Middle East! Such a reaction represented typical American overkill.[48]

American officials, the revisionists continue, also believed that the

[45] R. V. Burks, *The Dynamics of Communism in Eastern Europe*, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1961, pp. 97, 93, n. 1, 98–104.

[46] Richard Clogg, "The Special Operations Executive in Greece," in Iatrides, p. 115; Loulis, pp. 76–77; Wittner, pp. 13–17.

[47] Loulis, pp. 17–22.

[48] Ibid., pp. 55–56, 80; Wittner in Iatrides, p. 234.

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Greek civil war was the direct result of Soviet expansionism, with the Left merely executing orders from Moscow. The Greek Center was regarded as a collection of self-serving politicians lacking any constituency. Only the Right was an autonomous force enjoying genuine popular support. A political settlement of the war, Americans believed, would require a general election carried out under a government that would have to include fellow travelers, if not outright Communists. This, together with the opportunity that an election would give the KKE to carry on open as well as clandestine political activity, could bring disaster.[49]

Contrary to American preconceptions, the revisionists say, Stalin was *not* attempting to add the unhappy Hellenes to the communist fold. In July 1944 his emissaries had advised that Greek Communists participate in the Government of National Unity on any terms. During the December rising a KKE leader dispatched to Moscow was arrested by the Soviets and unceremoniously dumped back across the Greek frontier. At the crucial plenum of February 1946, Politburo member Ioannis Ioannides, just returned from Moscow, was shouted down by Zachariades when he attempted to report that the Kremlin advised the party to go to the polls rather than to the mountain. The founding meeting of the Cominform, in September 1947, refused to admit a KKE delegation or even publicly to acknowledge the existence of a civil war in Greece. In February 1948, finally, Stalin called the Yugoslav and Bulgarian leaders to the Kremlin and personally ordered them to cease supporting the Greek rebels.[50]

The considerations motivating Stalin are clear, according to the revisionists. He had written off Greece in exchange for a free hand in Romania, a country of more immediate strategic significance to the Soviet Union. For equally good reasons he supported the position taken by Sofia that most—if not all—of Greek Macedonia was properly Bulgarian. And he found the principal supporter of the rebel cause, Partisan Yugoslavia, increasingly an obstacle to his policies in many fields.[51]

But American officialdom nevertheless persisted in the view that the birthplace of Plato and Aristotle was as good a spot as any to demonstrate the effectiveness of America's bold new policy of communist containment, while simultaneously making clear to lesser powers—particularly those in the Third World—the advantages of American-sponsored strong government as a barrier to the spread of communist subversion. By adopting in the Greek case this counterrevolutionary orientation, the Americans not only fostered the bloodletting of the civil war but also facilitated the emergence of the *parakratos*, which did nothing for the many awesome Third World problems affecting Greek society.[52]

From the American point of view, the revisionists assert, a communist Greece ought to have been preferable to the colonial waif that the country became. A Greece turned communist would not necessarily have turned into a dreary Soviet satellite. Rather, the history of the Yugoslav and Albanian regimes suggests that communist governments based on victorious guerrilla armies tends to become independent of both East and West. Washington might well have learned to live with an Athens that pursued a policy of nonalignment. In that case, America would not have engaged in neo-colonialist exploitation of a small but friendly people, as during the tyranny of the colonels, whose seizure of power was assisted by the CIA. Moreover, they stress, America would not have continued with its cold war policies until its defeat and humiliation in Vietnam.[53]

AS IT HAPPENS, the books under review do not include a traditionalist interpretation of the role of the superpowers in the Greek Time of Troubles. In the interest of overall balance, therefore, I shall try to supply this deficiency with an analysis of my own. I shall, however, concentrate my attention on the role of the Soviet Union—partly because I lay no claim to expertise in US foreign policy, but mainly because it seems to me that the proposition that the USSR was opposed to the effort of its Balkan satellites to give aid and comfort to the Democratic Army is central to the revisionist position.

Organization of a rebel government in Greece was announced in December 1947. In January 1948, Georgiy Dimitrov, an old Comintern hand and leader of the Bulgarian party, held a press conference in Bucharest. In February 1948, both the Bulgarian and the Yugoslav leaderships were summoned to the Kremlin for a confrontation with Stalin. The three events were interconnected, and each was far more important than it seemed at the time.

Dimitrov's press conference took place during the Romanian stage of a triumphal progress by Marshal Tito through the East European

[49] Mavrogordatos, p. 193; Coufoudakis, p. 289; Wittner, p. 134.

[50] Wittner, pp. 27, 259; Loulis, p. 141; Svoronos, p. 13; Iatrides, pp. 203, 206.

[51] Wittner, pp. 59, 255.

[52] Coufoudakis, p. 289; Wittner, p. 312.

[53] Wittner, pp. x, 305, 310–11; A. Lilly Makris, "Preface" in Iatrides, p. x.

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communist states, promoting a federation of those states—an East European USSR so to speak. This enterprise had begun as a revival of a Comintern project of the 1920's for a Balkan federation. In the name of the latter the Yugoslav Partisans had made the newly created republics of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Hercegovina, Montenegro, and Serbia charter members of a Yugoslav or South Slav Federation. With an eye to bringing Albania into the Federation at an early date, the Partisans created both an Albanian communist party and an Albanian guerrilla army, which they supplied and led. As the defeat of the Axis drew near, the Slavic-speaking population of the Yugoslav 40 percent of Macedonia accepted the Partisan teaching according to which they were not Bulgarians, as Sofia claimed, but a separate and distinct Slavo-Macedonian people, with a right to be joined together in a single federal republic with the Slavo-Macedonians of Bulgaria and Greece. The Slavophone SNOF, mentioned earlier, and its successor NOF, were expressions of this new national consciousness.

At the close of World War II, the Yugoslav Partisans and the new communist government in Bulgaria entered into negotiations for a federation. Fearing to be swallowed up, the Bulgarians balked, until presented with the idea that the three parts of Macedonia might somehow be united and joined to the federation as a separate republic. The Bulgarians found this prospect alluring, especially when the Yugoslav negotiators suggested that once Greek Macedonia was extracted from Greece, it might be possible to return western or Greek Thrace to Bulgaria, thus giving Sofia once again an outlet on the Aegean Sea. These territorial transfers might become possible if they were undertaken in exchange for support enabling the KKE to become master of Greece which, as a partly dismembered country, would require membership in what by now would have become a Balkan federation.

Averoff-Tossizza has reported that Markos Vafiades entered into written agreements with representatives of Yugoslavia, Albania, and Bulgaria to get logistical support for the Democratic Army. I have suggested elsewhere what the terms of such agreements might have been, including the participation of the Slavophone NOF in the operations of the Democratic Army.[54]

The proposed federation had been discussed at the founding Cominform meeting in September 1947. The formation of the PDG in the Greek mountains during December was another major step toward federation. Then came Tito's tour and Dimitrov's interview with the press, in which he averred that the idea of a federation was still premature—meaning no doubt that the victory of the Democratic Army was still pending—but that when the matter became ripe, "the nations of People's Democracy, Romania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Albania, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, and Greece [mind you, Greece!] will settle it."[55]

This was too much for the Kremlin, which had good reason to prefer dealing with each of its satellites separately, and no doubt saw Tito as attempting to create a second, and independent, center of world communism. *Pravda* sharply condemned the idea of federation, and the Yugoslavs and Bulgarians were summoned to Moscow for an accounting. Stalin made two things clear to them. First, there was little prospect for the Greek enterprise, because the Western powers would never permit their lines of communication through the Mediterranean to be severed and the USSR had no fleet in those waters. Therefore no further aid should be given to the rebels. Second, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria should federate at once on Bulgarian terms, i.e., Bulgaria should not become one of several Yugoslav republics, as Belgrade proposed, but should unite with the whole of Yugoslavia on a one-to-one basis, as Sofia preferred. Since Stalin probably knew that these terms were unacceptable to Belgrade, he was in fact also vetoing the project of Balkan federation. On June 13, 1949, *Pravda* "acknowledged" the territorial integrity of Greece.[56]

Stalin's personal intervention in the affair came some 10 months after the proclamation of the Truman Doctrine, sufficient time for him to have seen whether the US would fully implement its new policy of communist containment with respect to Greece. Off hand, there is no reason to believe that Stalin would not in principle have welcomed a communist Greece, since its emergence would have threatened the Western position both at the Straits and in the Middle East more generally. Vojtech Mastny, in a work that has been generally acclaimed, has argued that Stalin's minimal war aim was the restoration of the 1939 frontiers, the scotching of postwar federation schemes among East European states, and the survival of communist parties underground in Eastern Europe. His maximum aim, conceived after Stalingrad, was Soviet hegemony over a pros-

[54]Burks, op. cit., pp. 100–101. The reader will find a detailed analysis of the federation schemes in ibid., chaps. 5 and 6.

[55]Wittner, p. 261.

[56]Wittner, pp. 262–63.

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trate Europe—emerging from an East European base, but not at the cost of confrontation with the Western allies. Such a maximum position included all of Germany, and certainly does not appear to have excluded Greece if it could be acquired through subversion.[57]

In Soviet thinking, the Greek civil war was undoubtedly but one aspect of a more fundamental problem: whether capitalist society, reeling from the devastation of World War II, was on the verge of collapse. The Leningrad faction led by Andrey Zhdanov believed that a series of well-delivered blows would bring about the disintegration of the capitalist system. Another group, headed by Georgiy Malenkov, argued that capitalism was again achieving a temporary stabilization and that moderation was therefore advisable.

The factional infighting was heavy. Zhdanov wished to revive the Comintern—which Stalin had formally abolished in 1943 as a gesture to his Western allies—to serve as the general staff of the ultimate onslaught on capitalism. Malenkov managed to whittle down Zhdanov's proposal until, as the Communist Information Bureau or Cominform, its membership was confined to the European parties in power, plus the French and Italian parties. A more limited subject of controversy was the extent of the assistance to be given to the Greek guerrillas. Not only Zhdanov, Tito, and Dimitrov, but also the leading hard-liners in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Romania favored the Greek enterprise.[58]

The importance of the division in the Soviet party becomes clearer if it is understood that Zhdanov and Malenkov were both treated by Stalin as potential heirs apparent. In this fashion the aging dictator sought to reduce the danger of his assassination while retaining freedom of decision in matters affecting policy and personnel. The excommunication of the Yugoslav party on June 28, 1948, meant the political ruin of Zhdanov. His leaderless faction was decimated by a vengeful Malenkov in a purge so bloody that it was still an issue in Kremlin politics until recently. Khrushchev was brought from his post as party first secretary in Ukraine to serve in Moscow as the alternate heir apparent. Dimitrov went off to the Soviet Union for medical treatment and never returned alive to his native land.[59]

Had victory in Greece fallen to the communists, it seems probable that the schism in the Cominform would not have taken place, or at least not in 1948. That and other even more thorny differences than continued assistance to the Democratic Army would no doubt have been papered over in the euphoria of a great communist victory.

It also seems clear that the decisive element in bringing the Democratic Army and the Zhdanov faction to defeat was American intervention. Otherwise the combination of guerrilla warfare, Cominform sanctuary and supply, and the near collapse of the Greek economy would very probably have turned the balance against the government in Athens.

Moreover, the schism in the Cominform—totally unforeseen in the West—produced a broad range of equally unforeseen and even unimaginable consequences. One of the weaknesses of the revisionist argument is that, until it actually happened, no one in the West could possibly have conceived of such a fissure. It was years before Western scholars and government officials began to comprehend the nature of the quarrel between Belgrade and Moscow and the impact of the division on the entire bloc. This was not so much ideological blindness, although assuredly that was present, as it was downright ignorance of communist regimes and movements, an analytical debility that continues to plague us.

CONCLUSION

FINALLY, let us consider some of the longer range consequences, at least as we now see them, of a communist national deviation that was the unintended consequence of American intervention in the Greek civil war. Perhaps most important was the loss by the Yugoslav regime of the implicit Soviet military guarantee that served to underpin the stability of all the East European regimes, i.e., the intervention of the Soviet military if, for example, a given regime found itself faced with a spontaneous popular rising, which it could not suppress. The consequence of the loss of this guarantee in the Yugoslav case was that Tito's government had to seek a modus vivendi with the peoples of Yugoslavia and accept a military and economic subsidy from the Western powers (but without a comparable military guarantee of internal stability) to offset the Soviet economic and ideological subsidies it had lost. This new and, under communism, unprecedented situation gradually brought about an alternative and,

[57] Vojtech Mastny, *Russia's Road to the Cold War: Diplomacy, Warfare, and the Politics of Communism, 1941–1945*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1979, pp. 97, 110, 132–33, 181–82, 224, 266.

[58] For a more extensive analysis of Soviet factional development in this period, see R.V. Burks, "Eastern Europe," in Cyril E. Black and Thomas P. Thornton, Eds., *Communism and Revolution: The Strategic Uses of Violence*, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1964, pp. 83–86.

[59] For a consideration of the broader issues involved, see R. V. Burks, "The Arcane Art of Kremlinology," *Encounter* (London), March 1983, pp. 20–32.

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as far as the governed were concerned, much more acceptable form of communist rule. In addition, ruling communist elites everywhere in the world learned that it was possible to survive independently of the USSR.[60]

The existence of the Yugoslav alternative served as a placet for the domestic reforms of Khrushchev and as a catalytic agent in the Sino-Soviet break as well. The Yugoslav alternative was also an active ingredient in the Hungarian revolution of 1956, the Romanian national deviation of 1962, and the Czechoslovak thaw of 1968. Even today, Yugoslavia stands as an experiment in the viability of a European communist system separated from Soviet military power. In the sense of hastening a perhaps inevitable evolution of the Soviet bloc in the direction of greater national—if scarcely democratic—pluralism, nothing in the history of the cold war has been quite so (unexpectedly?) successful as American intervention in the Hellenic Time of Troubles. That intervention probably played a decisive part in producing, as unforeseen consequences, the breach in the Cominform and the Yugoslav national deviation.

[60]For an attempt at systematic analysis of the post-excommunication changes in Yugoslavia, see R. V. Burks, "Liberalization of Dictatorship: The East European Experience," a paper presented to the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, September 1967, Chicago; and idem, "Titoism and Eurocommunism," in George Schwab, Ed., *Eurocommunism: The Ideological and Political-Theoretical Foundations*, Westport, CT, Greenwood Press, 1981, pp. 33–54.

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Whatever Happened to Eurocommunism?

Michael J. Sodaro

DONALD SASSOON. *The Strategy of the Italian Communist Party: From the Resistance to the Historic Compromise.* New York, St. Martin's Press, 1981.

GRANT AMYOT. *The Italian Communist Party: The Crisis of the Popular Front Strategy.* New York, St. Martin's Press, 1981.

CARL BOGGS and DAVID PLOTKE, Eds. *The Politics of Eurocommunism: Socialism in Transition.* Boston, South End Press, 1980.

CARL BOGGS. *The Impasse of European Communism.* Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1982.

CESES. *Il PCI allo specchio: Venticinque anni di storia del comunismo italiano* (The PCI in the Mirror: Twenty-five Years in the History of Italian Communism). Renato Mieli, General Editor. Milan, Rizzoli, 1983.

LAWRENCE L. WHETTEN. *New International Communism: The Foreign and Defense Policies of the Latin European Communist Parties.* Lexington, MA, Lexington Books, 1982.

IRWIN M. WALL. *French Communism in the Era of Stalin: The Quest for Unity and Integration, 1945–1962.* Westport, CT, Greenwood Press, 1983.

GEORGE ROSS. *Workers and Communists in France: From Popular Front to Eurocommunism.* Berkeley, University of California Press, 1982.

RICHARD KINDERSLEY, Ed. *In Search of Eurocommunism.* New York, St. Martin's Press, 1981.

GEORGE SCHWAB, Ed. *Eurocommunism: The Ideological and Political-Theoretical Foundations.* Westport, CT, Greenwood Press, 1981.

VICTOR ALBA. *The Communist Party in Spain.* New Brunswick, NJ, Transaction Books, 1983.

EUSEBIO MUJAL-LEÓN. *Communism and Political Change in Spain.* Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1983.

ALDOUS HUXLEY once suggested that "the proper study of mankind is books." While the proposition itself may be debatable, the plethora of books on West European communism that has been published in the past 10 years or so has indeed given us much to study. Moreover, much of what they have had to say has changed perceptibly in recent years. Significant differences have emerged between certain writings that appeared on the subject in the 1970's and the books under review here, all of which have been published since the start of the present decade. These differences in large measure reflect the fluctuating fortunes of the most important communist parties of the region, particularly in the last five or six years.

Although the 1970's produced a number of outstanding works on what used to be called "Eurocommunism," at least some of them betrayed the weaknesses of instant analysis. To a large extent this was understandable. At the time, Eurocommunism was a fast-moving object. The three largest communist parties of Western Europe—the Italian, the French, and the Spanish—dazzled observers with what seemed to be bold departures from past doctrines and practices and with the heady prospect that their revived popularity would bring them a share of power in their respective national governments. The suddenness of these events generated optimism in some quarters and anxiety in others. The op-

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timists either looked forward to the sweeping social changes that would presumably ensue upon communist participation in power, or, alternatively, took comfort in the hope that Eurocommunism marked a giant step in the direction of the further deradicalization (read: social democratization) of these parties and their ultimate break from Moscow. The more pessimistically inclined analysts expressed fears of major social, economic, or political disruption in the event of a sharp left turn in government policy in the countries in question, and voiced alarm at the potential for a breach in Western security should any of these traditionally anti-NATO parties gain access to power. (The pessimists were particularly troubled by the Portuguese Communist Party, whose unreconstructed Stalinism contained all the negative features of communism and none of the redeeming aspects of Eurocommunist revisionism.) In short, Eurocommunism in the 1970's provoked fascination with its apparent originality, and uncertainty over its ultimate direction.

Over the past several years, however, much of this excitement (or, where applicable, nervousness) has died down. Eurocommunism, at least until now, has been a failure. Not only have the Italian and Spanish parties failed to gain entry into their respective governments, but they have been effectively rebuffed by the Catholic and Socialist forces they had assiduously courted as coalition partners. In Italy this is still the case in spite of the PCI's success in recent elections to the European Parliament. In France the communists joined the French government in 1981 in a position of marked political inferiority to François Mitterrand's Socialist Party, and proved incapable of restraining President Mitterrand's vocal support for new US medium-range missiles in Europe or his equally vocal criticism of the USSR. As this essay goes to press, the disarray in the ranks of the three leading communist parties of Western Europe continues. The Italian Communist Party (PCI) is reassessing its future following the death of its leader, Enrico Berlinguer, the architect of the "historic compromise" with the Christian Democrats that never quite came about. The French Communist Party (PCF) has withdrawn from the cabinet in the aftermath of a disastrous showing in the June elections to the European Parliament and in protest at Mitterrand's determination to pursue centrist economic and political strategies. And the Spanish Communist Party (PCE), after garnering only 3.8 percent of the vote in the 1982 elections, has been tearing itself apart in leadership struggles, ideological warfare, and fratricidal recriminations. The books examined here were written for the most part in this context of Eurocommunism's eclipse.

As a consequence, virtually all of these volumes emphasize the limitations of Eurocommunism as opposed to its potentialities. By the same token, most of them stress the continuities linking the Eurocommunist phase of these parties' development in the 1970's with strategies and behavioral patterns rooted in earlier decades of party activity. Without denying that significant changes took place in the parties' doctrines and policies in the 1970's (above all the categoric rejection of the Soviet model of socialism as inapplicable to Western Europe), most of the authors tend to downplay the degree of real creativity exhibited by these parties under the rubric of Eurocommunism. The West European communist parties emerge from these studies very much as prisoners of their own past, ready for change but unable—and perhaps unwilling—to make the decisive breakthrough necessary to sever themselves from all residual attachments to the Soviet Union externally, and from the strictures of democratic centralism internally.

Beyond these similarities, however, this mixed bag of recent books reflects a wide range of critical approaches to the study of West European communism. Although most of the authors share a commitment to academic objectivity, some are also politically engaged. Their empirical analyses are in some cases tinged with critical judgments reflecting their own political predilections. Broadly speaking, there are two main tendencies represented here. One is a centrist (or, in some cases, a more markedly conservative) point of view, the other is unequivocally leftist in its orientation. Each approach has its own answers as to why the promise of Eurocommunism in the 1970's remained unfulfilled. There also exist some interesting points of convergence between the centrist-conservative analysts and the writers on the left.

THESE AREAS of disagreement and of relative harmony, respectively, are for the most part centered on the fundamental issue of how West European communist parties identify themselves and how they seek to legitimize their ideological positions and political activities. In general the three major parties examined here have traditionally sought to base their identity (or legitimacy) on three sources: (1) the world communist movement, and especially the USSR; (2) the working class and allied social forces within their own countries; and (3) the traditions and rules of pluralist democracy as

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developed in the West. At various times and in varying degrees, the PCI, the PCF, and the PCE have tried to prove their fidelity to all three sources of legitimation, with varying success. What was especially distinctive about the Eurocommunism of the 1970's was the express intention of these parties to reduce their reliance on the Soviet source of legitimacy and to enhance their commitment to the other two sources. As a general rule, the centrist-conservative writers reviewed here criticize the Eurocommunists for failing to move convincingly enough in the direction of Western pluralist democracy, while the leftist critics chastise them for failing to make good on their promises to deliver economic relief and social justice to their working-class supporters. In a word, the former group faults the Eurocommunist parties for not behaving more like social democrats (especially in terms of their commitment to pluralism), while at least some of the leftists chide them for behaving too much like social democrats (above all in terms of their economic and social commitments). At the same time, however, both sets of analysts condemn the Italian, French, and Spanish parties for not making a clean and final break from the Soviet Union and for not opening up their internal processes to greater democratization.

ALTHOUGH the space available does not permit me to do full justice to these numerous volumes, I shall look briefly at the way these themes are played out in them, concentrating on two key questions: Was Eurocommunism in the 1970's a new phenomenon? Why has it failed?

The PCI. Donald Sassoon's *The Strategy of the Italian Communist Party* addresses itself primarily to the first of these questions, and the answer it provides is preponderantly negative. Sassoon's intention is to trace the roots of the 1970's strategy of historic compromise back to the critical decision taken by Palmiro Togliatti and the PCI leadership in the 1940's to pursue social alliances and political compromises with the nonfascist conservative forces that were to dominate postwar Italy. In Sassoon's view, this was a "definitive decision" firmly anchored in the PCI's collaboration with Italian Catholics during the Resistance period and destined to survive, albeit in muted form, throughout the 1950's and 1960's, when the PCI was essentially banished to the wilderness of political isolation. Moreover, as Sassoon amply demonstrates, it was a decision intended to go well beyond the parameters of the popular front strategy of the 1930's—which emphasized a "united front from above" with the socialists—by involving the PCI in an active effort to broaden its own social base of support beyond the working class to include small landowners and elements of the middle class. Indeed, as far as Sassoon is concerned, the PCI had no effective alternative to this embryonic historic compromise. Despite the preferences for a more pronouncedly leftist strategy articulated by orthodox militants such as Pietro Secchia, who laid down a challenge to Togliatti's leadership in the 1950's, the PCI emerges from Sassoon's account as largely unified behind Togliatti's revisionist orientation. Even in 1981, Sassoon regarded a compromise with the Christian Democrats as "the only way out" of the party's dilemmas.

In contrast to Sassoon's favorable evaluation of the historic compromise, Grant Amyot's *The Italian Communist Party* subjects this strategic choice to a sharp critique from the left. Like Sassoon, Amyot highlights the continuities between the PCI's strategies of the 1970's and its earlier efforts to collaborate with Italy's nonfascist Right. Indeed, Amyot contends that the policy of the historic compromise was nothing more than an adaptation of the popular front ideas first articulated by Togliatti in the late 1920's, and that the PCI was motivated in both instances by fear of fascist extremism. The gravamen of Amyot's argument, however, is that the PCI's revisionist course from Togliatti to Berlinguer was a serious political error. Instead of compromising its revolutionary ideals, the party in his view should have held to a leftist alternative designed to maximize the chances for the peaceful socialist transformation of Italy. The main subject of Amyot's empirical analysis is the left wing of the PCI, which he views as the repository of these socialist ideals. Although he recognizes that this leftist current has over time involved a variety of individuals and ideas, ranging from the hard-liner Secchia to the radical "Manifesto Group" (which was expelled from the party in 1969), Amyot centers his focus on Pietro Ingrao, the party leader most sympathetic to leftist impulses in recent years. He spends the better part of his book analyzing the social, economic, and political factors contributing either to the relative strength or weakness of the "Ingrao left" in five provincial party federations. While this analysis is very informative, and constitutes the chief scholarly contribution of the book, Amyot acknowledges that his conclusions are not applicable to Italy as a whole or even to other key federations. Somewhat disappointingly, his data in these chapters are largely confined to the pre-1973 period, when the left in the

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PCI was at its peak. Consequently, his analysis of the years of the historic compromise is somewhat divorced from the empirical investigations that form the heart of his book. This is too bad, as it would have been interesting to see how these federations responded to Berlinguer's Eurocommunist tactics.

Perhaps the chief question mark in this otherwise intriguing study, however, relates to Amyot's declared preference for a leftist approach for the PCI. On the basis of what program would such a strategy be launched? Amyot himself concedes that the ideas propounded by Ingrao and the leftist elements clustered around him "remained somewhat vague in nature," and that the "Ingrao left" did not clarify the differences that separated its own positions from those of the right and center of the party.

Herein lies the nucleus of the Left's answer to the question of why Eurocommunism has failed. In the eyes of the left-leaning authors under review, it is the absence of a clearly articulated program explaining how capitalism will be liquidated (rather than merely reformed) and how socialism—stripped of all the totalitarian trappings of Soviet-style communism, to be sure—will be installed in Western Europe that constitutes the chief impediment to the success of the West European communist parties.

This argument is developed with particular subtlety by Carl Boggs. In an essay in *The Politics of Eurocommunism* (a compendium of leftist critiques of Eurocommunism), and in his monograph, *The Impasse of Eurocommunism,* Boggs argues that the leading communist parties of Western Europe (and the PCI in particular) have contented themselves with a state-centered view of economic progress predicated on an excessive faith in scientific-technical rationality and on the acceptance of a hegemonic role for technocratic intellectuals. (Boggs notes with some irony that the Soviet Union has a similar outlook.) As a result, none of the West European parties has elaborated a coherent model of socialism designed to eradicate the capitalist division of labor and place real decision-making power in the hands of the working class (a term now broadly construed to include elements of the salaried middle class). Talk among West European communists of a "Third Way" between Soviet-style communism and social democratic reformism has thus turned out to be little more than "a fiction," in Boggs's view. His own proposal is that these parties should seek to promote dual power structures in Western Europe, with workers' and neighborhood councils coexisting alongside parliamentary bodies in an effort to shift effective power to the masses. In a brief concluding chapter in his book, Boggs accuses Togliatti of misinterpreting Antonio Gramsci by obscuring Gramsci's commitment to revolutionary change and by distorting his theories so as to square them with the PCI's "clearly nonrevolutionary objectives."

While Boggs decries the "pervasive logic of deradicalization" that is transmuting the West European communists into reformist social democrats, the various authors of *Il PCI allo specchio* complain that the PCI has not deradicalized itself enough. Renato Mieli, the chief editor of this huge collaborative work undertaken by the Milan-based Center for Socioeconomic Studies (CESES), summarizes the group's conclusions by arguing that the PCI's revisionism is still "incomplete," and that only by moving toward further "Westernization" can the party expect to gain "credibility" in Italy. The volume's eight sections, each consisting of an analytical essay and a heavily documented research report, spell out this centrist-conservative case through detailed explorations of the PCI's postwar approach to ideology, party strategy, terrorism, foreign policy, economics, political institutions, and trade unions. It also includes an analysis of the social composition of the PCI by Giuseppe Are. Mieli himself argues that the PCI's assurances of its acceptance of pluralist democracy in the 1970's "remained nothing more than declarations of intent." Another author, Luciano Cafagna, dismisses the PCI's economic proposals as ritualistic invocations of "mythological" and ill-defined planning mechanisms.

Of particular interest is this book's chapter on foreign policy (by Piero Ostellino). It argues that although the PCI has forcefully criticized the Soviet Union over the invasion of Afghanistan and the imposition of martial law in Poland, and has largely acknowledged that a disequilibrium exists in favor of the Soviets in medium-range missile systems in Europe, the PCI still clings to pro-Soviet positions in a variety of areas ranging from its perennial attacks on "US imperialism" to its support for various Soviet clients in the Third World. Berlinguer, it is noted, also voiced support for Yuriy Andropov's proposals for the inclusion of British and French nuclear arsenals in any calculation of the European missile balance.

The ambiguity of the PCI's foreign policy orientation also emerges as a central theme of Lawrence Whetten's *New International Communism.* Based on the work of a team of researchers who combined their documentary research with interviews of leading

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foreign and defense policy specialists of the PCI, the PCF, and the PCE, Whetten's study ably traces the evolution in these parties' positions concerning the USSR and the NATO alliance. The PCI has of course gone further than the PCF in its criticisms of Soviet policies and in its appeals for a "new internationalism" that would replace the Soviet-inspired concept of "proletarian internationalism" with a new alignment of leftist forces involving selected social democratic parties. But, as Whetten notes, this new formulation still needs to be given concrete form. Meanwhile, the PCI—like the other two parties—insists on its autonomy from the Soviet Union but still has too much invested in its historical relationship with Moscow and in its communist identity to sever ties completely with the Soviets.

The Italian Communists, Whetten observes, also share with the PCF and the PCE a fundamentally ideological approach to foreign and security problems, and lack sufficient expertise to evaluate complex defense issues with technical proficiency. This is another factor retarding these parties' emancipation from the Soviets, although the PCI may be moving more swiftly than the others in acquiring greater competence in these areas.

Finally, Whetten seeks to allay fears that the inclusion of communists in a West European government may jeopardize Western security secrets. A detailed case study of Portugal demonstrates how NATO acted in the mid-1970's to protect itself in this regard at a time when the PCP and its anti-NATO allies were maneuvering for power.

The PCF. Of the three leading West European parties, it was the PCF that departed most abruptly and most radically from the premises of Eurocommunism. The critical turning points in this development were the PCF's decision in 1977 to provoke a rupture of the Union of the Left with the Socialists, and its subsequent outspoken approval of both the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the imposition of martial law in Poland. As most of the writings on the PCF reviewed here make clear, however, the French Communist Party leadership never felt very comfortable with the elements of anti-Sovietism or the multi-class alliance strategies that animated the PCI and the PCE, and was even less tolerant of open discussion within party ranks.

Irwin Wall's *French Communism in the Era of Stalin* locates the source of these attitudes in the party's past. Actually, the title is somewhat misleading, since Wall's study follows the PCF's story up to 1962 and concludes with a brief epilogue on the subsequent period ending with the elections of 1981. Perhaps "Stalinism" should be substituted for "Stalin," because it is the enduring Stalinist character of the French Communist Party throughout most of its history that stands out as the book's central theme.

Wall's principal thesis is that from the PCF's inception until the present, its leadership has oscillated between two forms of Stalinism. The first was originally represented by Maurice Thorez, the Soviet-backed apparatchik who headed the PCF from the 1930's until his death in 1964. Wall characterizes Thorez as a "Stalinist Frenchman" who organized the party along rigidly hierarchical lines and orchestrated his own personality cult, while at the same time striving to cut out for the PCF a margin of autonomy from Soviet foreign policy dictates. Thorez emerges from this portrait as a dedicated protagonist of a popular front with the Socialists, "the only real tactic he understood to be possible." Periods of "class against class" confrontation with the French Socialists, particularly after 1934, are interpreted by Wall essentially as efforts by Thorez to pressure the Socialists into accepting leftist unity on his terms. In contrast, Wall defines the second tendency as more openly compliant with Soviet foreign policy preferences and hence as less interested in promoting the PCF's electoral fortunes through agreements with the Socialists. The chief proponent of this more militant "national front" tactic was "the French Stalinist," Jacques Duclos.

The bulk of Wall's effort is devoted to a detailed account of the in-fighting between these two groupings. Wall also notes that Thorez occasionally shifted to more openly pro-Soviet positions when his preferences for a popular front could not be realized. While some of the evidence is necessarily circumstantial and perhaps open to differing interpretations, Wall's scholarship is insightful and nuanced.

Although Thorez and Duclos have long since departed from the scene, Wall argues that Georges Marchais, the current leader of the PCF, has adopted policies exhibiting many of the features of Thorez's "French Stalinism." While pursuing cooperation with the Socialists, Marchais, like Thorez, has always held open the option of adopting a more pro-Soviet stance in the event that collaboration with the Socialists should falter (as in fact it did between 1977 and 1981). Wall identifies Gaston Plissonier and Roland Leroy as the leading successors to Duclos's "French Stalinism," exerting pressure for a more pronounced pro-Soviet and anti-Socialist turn within the PCF's Bureau Politique today.

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George Ross also laments the PCF's unwillingness to sever its ties with Moscow and to de-Stalinize its internal processes. The preponderant emphasis of his *Workers and Communists in France,* however, is on the PCF's relationship with the French working class and with the trade union federation it has long dominated, the *Confédération Générale du Travail* (CGT). For Ross, the principal factors accounting for the PCF's lack of success have been its historic inability to depoliticize its trade union policy and its failure to construct a realistic theory of modern French capitalism capable of guiding France toward democratic socialism. Although Ross does not conceal his own leftist sympathies, this eminently readable book is a significant work of careful scholarship and firsthand insights that will probably remain the standard volume on the subject for years to come. Moreover, Ross's central thesis is no doubt quite correct. French workers, he argues, are more interested in bread-and-butter issues than in the many political and ideological banners waved before them by the PCF. Consequently, the CGT is most successful when it manifests "relative autonomy" from the PCF.

Yet, as Ross himself warns, everything hinges on the word "relative." While the CGT has come a long way from the days when it was the PCF's sycophantic transmission belt, it still lacks leaders willing to establish real independence from the party and to devote themselves exclusively to labor market issues. Indeed, Ross observes that the present CGT leadership under Henri Krasucki—a member of the PCF Bureau Politique—has lately shown signs of increased sectarianism.

Ross's book is valuable not only for its analysis of PCF-CGT relations and trade union politics in postwar France, however. It also presents a detailed account of the Union of the Left from its inception to its breakdown. While Ross's tendency to blame the Socialists more than the Communists for the rupture that took place shortly before the 1978 elections is open to question, his narrative is generally balanced and informative.

Two essays dealing with the PCF also deserve mention. Jean Elleinstein's contribution to the volume edited by Richard Kindersley, *In Search of Eurocommunism,* is the most interesting piece in this collection of essays by scholars from Britain, Israel, and Yugoslavia and by such bona fide Eurocommunists as Manuel Azcárate (formerly of the PCE) and the PCI's Giuseppe Vacca. While most of the authors cover fairly well-trodden ground in a competent if not especially original fashion, Elleinstein's essay marks another milestone in this French Communist historian's progression from youthful admiration of Stalinist Russia to trenchant criticism of Stalinism in its Soviet and French communist manifestations. In this essay, Elleinstein attacks the PCF for its refusal to declare full independence from the USSR or to abolish its "disgraceful" inner-party authoritarianism. With views like these, it is not surprising that Elleinstein was recently expelled from the PCF.

The other essay is Bernard Brown's piece in *Eurocommunism: The Ideological and Political-Theoretical Foundation,* edited by George Schwab. Brown concentrates on the PCF's decision in 1976 to abandon its support for an eventual "dictatorship of the proletariat," and concludes that "what has changed is the phraseology but not the reality" of the term.

* * *

The PCE. Perhaps the best essays in the Schwab volume (which is on the whole somewhat dated) are those dealing with Spain. Eusebio Mujal-León offers a précis of some of the major themes explored at greater length in his own book, while Juan Linz presents a microscopic analysis of the sociological bases of PCE support in the 1977 and 1979 elections. The two books on our list devoted exclusively to the PCE, the volumes by Víctor Alba and Mujal-León, are probably the two best monographs available on Spanish communism. Moreover, they complement each other. Alba's book, *The Communist Party in Spain,* is a well-documented history of the PCE concentrating primarily on the Franco period. Mujal-León's superb book *Communism and Political Change in Spain* in effect picks up where Alba's book leaves off, as it is mainly concerned with the PCE's Eurocommunist phase. Whereas Alba's approach is strictly chronological, Mujal-León adopts a more thematic technique, devoting separate chapters to insightful and comprehensive analyses of such topics as the PCE's approach to Spanish Catholicism, the labor movement, ideology, party organization, and foreign policy.

The conclusions reached by the two authors suggest that they are very much on the same wavelength in their assessments of the PCE. Both are quite conscious of the fact that the PCE's nefarious activities against Trotskyites and other rivals on the left during the Civil War are among the chief reasons for the party's inability to find significant political space in post-Franco Spain. And both voice skepticism about the sincerity of Santiago Carrillo, the now deposed PCE leader, whose trumpeted anti-Sovietism and devotion to pluralism—while clearly constituting ma-

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jor shifts from his own past positions—may not have been as far-reaching as they seemed. Mujal-León's concluding chapters detail the internecine squabbles that undermined Carrillo's stewardship and split the PCE into warring factions after 1979.

WHERE DO THESE books leave us? Although their political perspectives and analytical emphases differ, a summary evaluation based on their conclusions is not impossible. First, I believe that nearly all of the writers would agree that the primary achievement of Eurocommunism has been the definitive establishment by the three leading West European parties of real autonomy from Soviet dictates. Most would also concur in the judgment that the Eurocommunism of the 1970's was primarily a phase in the continuing (and separate) evolution of these parties rather than a sharp break with their past traditions. Furthermore, virtually all would probably agree that Eurocommunism has failed to live up to its promise—a promise of precisely such a decisive change from past policies—largely because the PCI, the PCF, and the PCE have not gone "far enough." For the centrist-conservative writers, these parties have not moved far enough toward becoming moderate, pro-Western capitalist reformers along the lines of the social democrats. For the leftists, they have not gone far enough toward elaborating an alternative "Third Way" that would replace capitalism with a democratic form of socialism. And for neither group have they gone far enough to stifle lingering pro-Soviet inclinations or to democratize their internal procedures.

Thus the leading West European communist parties remain trapped in what may be called the dilemma of the three identities. Although all three parties have made it known in recent years that the Soviet Union can no longer serve as their sole—or even as their main—source of identity, none has felt comfortable with rejecting the USSR as one of its sources of identity and legitimacy. In fact, it is their abiding commitment to this *communist* (or *Leninist)* identity that prevents them from jettisoning once and for all the internal constraints of democratic centralism.

Although all three parties speak of the necessity of overcoming capitalism and replacing it with socialism (thus reinforcing their *socialist,* or *Marxist,* identity), none has developed a viable alternative to contemporary, state-supported capitalism. On the contrary, the PCI, through its espousal of austerity policies in the late 1970's, only angered many of its working-class followers by appearing to help the capitalists save their own system at the workers' expense—as did the PCF during its period in Mitterrand's government. But here a crucial question must be raised: is "socialism," or a "revolutionary transformation of capitalism" (or even, to use Ross's phrase, "radical reformism") really possible in contemporary Western Europe? Does there really exist a "Third Way" that can avoid the hypertrophied centralism of the Soviet planning system while providing for economic growth and innovation on a par with (or better than) contemporary capitalism? If so, neither the Eurocommunist parties nor their leftist critics have specified what it is.

Finally, their insistence on maintaining a communist as well as a socialist identity has only hindered these parties' efforts to solidify their *democratic* identity in the eyes of the large noncommunist majorities in their respective countries.

Thus the Eurocommunists continue to be faced with a historic choice. They can effectively maintain an uneasy combination of all three identities only by remaining in the opposition or, at most, by sharing in power at the national level as the coopted junior coalition partners of other parties. A bid for a lasting share of real power, given the present context of West European society, will require a more determined abandonment of their communist and socialist identities in favor of their democratic identity.

Whatever happened to Eurocommunism? It is still grappling with the same problems of identity, legitimacy, and direction that West European communists have confronted since at least the end of World War II.

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Soviet "Active Measures"

John J. Dziak

RICHARD H. SHULTZ and ROY GODSON. *Dezinformatsia: Active Measures in Soviet Strategy.* New York, Pergamon-Brassey's, 1984.

ANATOLIY GOLITSYN. *New Lies for Old: The Communist Strategy of Deception and Disinformation.* New York, Dodd, Mead and Company, 1984.

STATE-SPONSORED deception has been an integral element of Soviet strategy from the earliest years of Bolshevik rule. To be sure, the tradition of deception antedates Soviet practice—as seen in Mongol methods of both warfare and rule in 13th and 14th century Russia, in the "Potemkin village" of the 18th century, or in the elaborate penetration-provocation-diversionary schemes practiced by both the Okhrana and the revolutionaries in the final decades of tsarist Russia. Some students of Russian and Soviet thinking go so far as to suggest that deception is even more engrained, suffusing a broader national consciousness.[1] But it is certainly only with the Bolshevik accession to power that deception, disinformation, covert and overt propaganda, etc., were institutionalized and regularized—as an operational tradition that has continued to the present.

The tsarist repertoire is sparse compared to the many noteworthy schemes of deception, disinformation, and related political warfare crammed into the 67-year history of the Soviet state. These included, among others: the "Ambassador's" or "Lockhart Plot" of 1918, the "Trust" legend of 1921–27, the "Smena Vekh" and "Eurasian" movements of the 1920's and 1930's, the United Front line of the 1930's, the Tukhachevskiy affair of 1937, the spurious "Max" messages of World War II, the Peace Campaign in 1950 charging the US with biological warfare in Korea, the campaign against West Germany and NATO in the 1950's and 1960's, the numerous forgeries directed against the United States from the 1950's to the present, the frenetic campaign against the "neutron" warhead and NATO theater nuclear force modernization of the 1970's and 1980's, and the attempts to exploit and manipulate the peace movement.[2]

The ultimate purpose of such schemes, then and now, is political: to induce foreign developments beneficial to Soviet strategic purposes. Such efforts have consistently involved the senior party leadership and the intelligence and security services. Since the late 1950's, the Central Committee's International Department under former Comintern official Boris Ponomarëv, has come to play a more prominent role in overseeing and coordinating these activities.[3]

Prior to the 1960's, disinformation *(dezinformatsiya)* was coupled with a stylized Soviet lexicon of operational vocabulary—e.g., penetration, fabrication, diversion, provocation, agents of influence, combination (use of two or more of the preceding techniques on a single project)—to describe the

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[1]The art of *"vran'yë"* (fibbing, nonsense, rot) or the supreme art of the *"naglaya lozh'"* (blatant lie) appear to be illustrative of such a characteristic. See, for instance, Ronald Hingley, *The Russian Mind,* New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1977, Ch. 2, "Communications Systems."

[2]Unfortunately, no single work collectively addresses all these examples. For several of the pre-World War II cases, see Geoffrey Bailey, *The Conspirators,* New York, Harper & Brothers, 1960; George H. Leggett, *The CHEKA: Lenin's Political Police,* Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1981; Michael Kettle, *Sidney Reilly: The True Story, London, Corgi Books, 1983; Natalie* Grant, *Dezinformatsiya,* unpublished manuscript, 1975; S. L. Voytsekhovskiy, *Trest: vospominaniya i dokumenty* (The Trust: Recollections and Documents), *London, Ontario, Zarya Publishers, 1974.* On the "Max" messages, see David Kahn, *Hitler's Spies: German Military Intelligence in World War II,* New York, Macmillan, 1978. For post-World War II Soviet political warfare and "active measures," see Robert Strausz-Hupé et al., *Protracted Conflict,* New York, Harper & Brothers, 1959; Ladislav Bittman, *The Deception*

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types of actions mentioned above. By the mid-1960's "active measures" *(aktivnyye meropriyatiya)* appeared to have become the operational argot of Soviet state security for connoting that range of overt and covert techniques aimed at influencing events and people in foreign countries in ways benefiting the USSR.

Had it not been for the magnitude of Soviet "active measures" in the 1970's and 1980's and the attention drawn to them by the US and other Western governments in order to counter them, it is probable that little scholarly research would have been undertaken on this topic. In another era, few people outside of émigré and specialist circles were aware of, let alone did serious writing on, some of the cases mentioned earlier. But, as the reviewed volumes demonstrate, the theme of Soviet "active measures" has been discovered in the 1980's. Together, these volumes are provocative, curious, informative, and penetrating, although one of them has some troubling aspects that detract from its contribution.

READERS will be hard pressed to find a better descriptive analysis of contemporary Soviet "active measures" than that offered by Richard Shultz and Roy Godson in *Dezinformatsia: Active Measures in Soviet Strategy*. Their work has high utility on several counts. First, it is an introduction to the current strategy, structure, and techniques of the Soviet party-state for conducting "active measures." Such activities are no mere theoretical constructs created by either Soviet party ideologues or Western academicians. They are concrete tasks performed by party, state-security, and other Soviet government organs, and by Soviet front organizations, and hence, they leave a trail of institutions and personalities engaged in the work. While Shultz and Godson deal primarily with contemporary structures and people, this trail can be traced back to Lenin's and Felix Dzerzhinskiy's Cheka (Vserossiyskaya Chrezvychaynaya Komissiya po Bor'be s Kontrrevolyutsiyey i Sabotazhem).

Dezinformatsia provides the reader with a clearly marked guide to such institutions as Ponomarëv's International Department and its pivotal role not only in "active measures" but in overall foreign policy as well. The principal international front organizations subject to the ID likewise are charted. Next, there is the Central Committee's International Information Department under Leonid Zamyatin, which coordinates Soviet propaganda outlets—including, among others, TASS, Novosti, and Radio Moscow. Last, but certainly not least, is the Committee for State Security (KGB), the principal executor—historically and currently—of the party's covert "active measures" initiatives. The operative element here is "Service A" of the KGB's First (Foreign) Chief Directorate.

As a distinct element dedicated solely to disinformation, "Service A" dates only back to 1959 (more on this when Anatoliy Golitsyn's book is discussed), although state-security elements and personalities charged with "active measures" have always functioned in Soviet history. "Service A" and the rest of the KGB's First Chief Directorate work closely with the ID, whose chief, Ponomarëv, is also an alternate member of the Politburo and a Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, as well as chairman of the foreign affairs commission of one of the Supreme Soviet chambers. It is also worth noting that the chief of the KGB's First Chief Directorate, Lt. Gen. Vladimir A. Kryuchkov, is rumored to be a former member of Ponomarëv's ID.

Dezinformatsia is exhaustively researched and documented, and presented in a straightforward manner eschewing any hint of sensationalism or didacticism. Particularly noteworthy is the case study of Pierre-Charles Pathe, a KGB agent of influence convicted of espionage in France in 1979. Pathe's biweekly newsletter, *Synthesis*, partially funded by the Soviets, served as a subtle funnel through which Moscow sought to influence the French political and media establishments. *Synthesis* fed both covert propaganda and disinformation themes to this select audience. Based on interviews with knowledgeable French journalists and former French intelligence officers, plus a survey of most of the issues of *Synthesis* published during its existence (1976–79), Shultz and Godson discern several subtle and connected themes. These included an offensive against NATO, criticisms of Western defense policies, attacks on French policies with an eye toward inhibiting any French government move toward rapprochement with the US and NATO, and attacks on a broad spectrum of US policies—all of which was coupled with a persistent defense of Soviet-bloc policies

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Game, Syracuse, NY, Syracuse University Research Corp., 1972. For Soviet "active measures" in the contemporary period, see US Congress, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, *Soviet Active Measures*, US Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 1982; John Barron, *KGB Today: The Hidden Hand*, New York, Reader's Digest Press, 1983.

[3]On Ponomarëv and the International Department see: Leonard Shapiro, "The International Department of the CPSU: Key to Soviet Policy," *International Journal* (Toronto), Winter 1976–1977, pp. 41–55; Elizabeth Teague, "The Foreign Departments of the Central Committee of the CPSU," Radio Liberty Research Bulletin (Munich), Oct. 27, 1980; and Robert W. Kitrinos, "International Department of the CPSU," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), September-October 1984, pp. 47–75.

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and objectives. The Pathe case indeed was a landmark both in the juridical sense (in that an agent of influence was actually caught and convicted of espionage) and in the insight it provided into Soviet operational practice.

Finally, *Dezinformatsia* includes revealing interviews with two practitioners of the Soviet art of "active measures." The first, Ladislav Bittman, as deputy chief of the Disinformation Department of Czech intelligence, ran deception, manipulation, and agent-of-influence operations until 1968, when he sought political asylum in the United States. The second, Stanislav Levchenko, formerly a member of the ID, conducted "active measures" for the KGB from Moscow's embassy in Tokyo until he fled to the US in 1979.

ANATOLIY GOLITSYN'S *New Lies For Old* poses a dilemma. On the one hand, it is a treasure trove of insight based on access to sensitive KGB–party data, associations with state-security and party personnel, and practical knowledge of KGB operational practices from 1946 until the author's defection from the KGB in 1961; as such, it certainly deserves to be read. On the other hand, the author reaches some questionable conclusions about selected international events that are not necessarily warranted on the basis of his direct personal experiences in State Security.

To dispose of the problems first, one must question Golitsyn's schema that posits that the "splits" that have appeared to fracture the unity of the communist movement around the world are only a Soviet stratagem to further split the credulous West. In the author's words:

Whatever the appearances, since 1957–60 the regimes in China, Romania, Yugoslavia, and Dubcek's Czechoslovakia have not been motivated by different brands of national communism; their actions have been consistently dictated by Leninist ideology and tactics directed toward the pursuit of long-range interests and goals of the communist bloc as a whole, to which the national interests of the peoples of the communist world are subordinated. (p. 84)

However, although one can debate how much freedom of action Romania enjoys (encapsulated geographically as it is within Warsaw Pact real estate), it seems hard to sustain an argument for a bloc cohesiveness that encompasses Albania, China, and Yugoslavia, the generally pro-Soviet voting records of the last two notwithstanding.

The author's insistence on this conjectural theme tends to detract from other insights of real contemporary relevance that abound in the book. For instance, his observation that "visible evidence of foreign economic support for communist regimes, far from stimulating internal opposition to them, has the opposite effect" speaks far more eloquently against underwriting Ceausescu's despotism than do Golitsyn's questions regarding the seriousness of Romanian "independence."

His schema also leads Golitsyn astray when it comes to Poland today. True, Russian and Soviet operational traditions included the creation of notional opposition groupings for the purposes of controlling and channeling dissent and surfacing real opponents to the regime, à la the "Trust."[4] Was Solidarity really a contrived creation, the first phase of a Polish "renewal" designed to result in a coalition government that "would in fact be totalitarianism under a new, deceptive, and more dangerous guise" (p. 335)? Can one really argue that Solidarity was made in Moscow?

Based on such a questionable outlook, Golitsyn goes on to conclude that Moscow would not have ordered the KGB to arrange the attempt on the life of Pope John Paul II in 1981, because it had no motivation to do so, given its control of Polish events. If Moscow truly feared the Pope, he argues, it would not have allowed his visit to Poland in June 1983. Finally, the author regards as "erroneous the perception that the KGB is a primitive and inefficient service that would resort to the use of the Bulgarian service to recruit a killer for hire" (p. 353) But this is no compelling argument why the KGB would not have used this instrumentality if it was thought the approach would work, which came perilously close to being the case.

There is more that one could challenge in this unusual book. Nevertheless, one must not overlook the mine of fact and insight contained in the first part of *New Lies for Old*. There, Golitsyn provides historical perspective on the continuity of Soviet deception and disinformation operations. "Active measures" did not burst forth full blown in the 1960's, but benefited from prototypes such as the use made of the New Economic Policy (NEP) under Lenin and Dzerzhinskiy to defuse Western fears, attract Western capital, and arouse expectations of rapprochement.

Golitsyn spells out in exquisite detail the beginnings of the current

[4]The "Trust" operation of 1922–27 was based on a notional opposition group in the USSR created by Dzerzhinskiy's OGPU; it successfully targeted selected anti-Soviet émigré individuals and groups and certain European intelligence services and governments. The activities of the "Trust" included disinformation and deception along with adroit counterintelligence operations. See Bailey, op. cit., and Voytsekhovskiy, op. cit.

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stage of KGB development, which began in 1958, when Aleksandr Shelepin replaced Gen. Ivan Serov as KGB chief and Nikolay Mironov, the former head of the Leningrad KGB, took over the Central Committee's Administrative Organs Department. Between them they had discussed with Khrushchev and Brezhnev the reorientation of the KGB from a brutish secret police into a sophisticated political action instrument of the party à la Dzerzhinskiy's Cheka. To help effect this transformation, Shelepin created Department "D" within the KGB's first Chief Directorate, and assigned it to Colonel Ivan Agayants, a man noted for his successful disinformation work in the KGB's Paris residency several years earlier. Growing in importance concurrently was Ponomarëv's International Department. Thus, in a few swift moves, the party emplaced the institutional network for "active measures" that exists and operates to this day.

The author notes that to ensure the refocusing of the KGB, Shelepin in May 1959 called a major conference of senior KGB officers, the Ministers of Defense and Internal Affairs, and senior party members. In addition to other tasks, the KGB and its new Department "D" were to focus on supporting Khrushchev's new long-range policy of "peaceful coexistence" and on destabilizing the Soviet Union's "main enemies" and weakening the alliances between them.[5] This ushered in the contemporary period of "active measures." By the time of his death in 1968, Department "D" head Agayants had been promoted to KGB general. Shortly thereafter his creation was elevated to the status of a "service" *(sluzhba)*, the "Service A" we know today.

Golitsyn is at his best when he builds his case drawing from his own, or others', operational involvement. This is perhaps best illustrated by that portion of the book (pp. 282–87) dealing with operations in Finland, where Golitsyn served. He describes in blunt but authoritative detail the process by which the KGB, acting under party direction, pursued the goal of "Finlandization" in the 1950's and 1960's, partially throught the adroit use of agents of influence. Principal among these was a prominent Finnish leader whose cryptonym was "Timo" and who was recruited in 1948 while a government minister. According to Golitsyn, "Timo's" greatest single service would turn out to be the help he gave in convening the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, which met in Helsinki in 1975. However, based on the data Golitsyn develops in this section, "Timo" also performed truly yeoman service in helping to pressure out the older anticommunist generation of Finnish Social Democratic leaders in favor of persons more accommodating to Moscow.

THE MORE one scrutinizes *Dezinformatsia* and *New Lies for Old* the more they seem to complement one another. It is disturbing to this reviewer that it has taken so long for books of this calibre—works that come to grips with some unpalatable features of international politics—to have made their appearance. Could the inflated expectations of détente finally have run their course? *Dezinformatsia,* for one, has reportedly gone through several printings since its appearance in the spring of 1984.

As scholarly treatment of Soviet political warfare techniques progresses, the most pressing need now is to set Soviet deception practices in context, to examine in a detailed and comprehensive manner what we know about past Soviet deception practices and organizations and the people engaged in them. The cases cited at the outset of this review have never really been treated as part of a continuum of Soviet deception operations. Numerous questions from each of these and other cases remain unanswered. As with the broader history of Soviet intelligence and security operations, Soviet deception cases still await their chroniclers.

[5]This conference was reported in *Pravda* (Moscow), May 18, 1959. An account may also be found in V. Minyailo, "The Conference of the State Security Organs," *Bulletin: Institute for the Study of the USSR* (Munich), September 1959, pp. 21–23.

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Exploring Afrocommunism

Michael Clough

CARL G. ROSBERG and THOMAS M. CALLAGHY, Eds. *Socialism in Sub-Saharan Africa.* Berkeley, University of California Press for the Institute of International Studies, 1979.

DAVID and MARINA OTTAWAY. *Afrocommunism.* New York, Africana Publishing Company, 1981.

ALLEN ISSACMAN and BARBARA ISSACMAN. *Mozambique: From Colonialism to Revolution, 1900-1982.* Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1983.

MICHAEL WOLFERS and JANE BERGEROL. *Angola in the Frontline.* London, Zed Press, 1983.

M. CRAWFORD YOUNG. *Ideology and Development in Africa.* New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 1982.

ON DECEMBER 20, 1969, Major Marien Ngouabi, who had come to power in a military coup in late 1968, reconstituted the Congo Republic (Brazzaville) as Africa's first "people's republic" formally committed to the principles of Marxism-Leninism. Despite Ngouabi's efforts to present this development as a historic event of global importance, most of the world paid little attention. For example, *The New York Times* of the following day devoted less than half a column at the bottom of page 18 to the story. Several weeks after the event, the paper's editorial writers briefly reexamined the developments in the Congo only to note that they had "provoked mainly yawns."[1] Ten months later a like turn of events in another African country, Somalia, elicited a similar nonreaction.

By the late 1970's, however, these two precursors had been joined by five more African states—Benin, Madagascar, Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Angola, in that order—in opting, at least in theory, for Marxism-Leninism. As a consequence, Africa watchers began to debate seriously the meaning and significance of what Carl Rosberg and Thomas Callaghy in their volume reviewed here have labeled the "second wave" of socialism in Africa, the first having crested in the early 1960's.[2] The rise of this second wave, which came to be called "Afrocommunism," generated fears in conservative circles, cheers in radical circles, and research opportunities in academic circles.

What is Afrocommunism? Is it fundamentally different from the first wave of "African socialism"? What accounts for its emergence in the late 1970's? Does it constitute a threat to Western interests? These are the issues at the heart of current academic and policy debates concerning Afrocommunism.

At the risk of oversimplification, one can divide writings on this subject into three broad categories: critical, skeptical, and supportive. Although the arguments of writers within each group vary widely, they can be usefully categorized on the basis of their answers to three questions: (1) Should the claims of Afrocommunist regimes to be following a Marxist-Leninist path be taken seriously? (2) Is Afrocommunism an indigenous phenomenon? and (3) Is the emergence of Afrocommunism a positive development?

CRITICS do take the rise of Afrocommunism very seriously. For example, Thomas Henriksen discerns a "sharp contrast" between the outlook of the new Marxist poli-

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[1] *The New York Times,* Jan. 10, 1969.

[2] On the "first wave," see William H. Friedland and Carl G. Rosberg, Eds., *African Socialism,* Stanford, CA,: Stanford University Press, 1964.

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tics and that of earlier radical regimes in Africa. For the Afrocommunists

"espousal of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism has become more than a militant critique of European colonialism, as it was for moderate nationalists of the post–World War II period; rather, these concepts have become a ready blueprint for reordering society toward egalitarianism and for attaining power against opposition. . . . Planning beyond decolonization, the revolutionary parties envision noncapitalist development and centralized control over the political life of the nation.[3]

A common thread running through the arguments of analysts in the critic category is the belief that Afrocommunism is an ideology alien to Africa, which has been imposed on hapless populations by narrowly based urban elites aided and abetted by the Soviet Union and its "surrogates," especially Cuba and East Germany. Again citing Henriksen:

In their zeal, the new Afrocommunist governments seek to transplant the orthodox features of communist states, such as the party structure, from local cells to central committees, a system of party congresses, neighborhood vigilance groups, mass organizations, and the secret police.[4]

The critics argue that if Afrocommunism is not "contained" (or, as some would prefer, "rolled back"), it will eventually threaten Western economic interests, particularly access to minerals, endanger the security of shipping lanes, and destabilize countries friendly to the West like the Sudan and Zaire.[5] These views, I would note, are strongly rejected by all of the authors reviewed in this essay.

SKEPTICS are distinguished by their belief that the rhetoric of Afrocommunists is taken too seriously by both the critics and the supporters. An excellent statement of the skeptical view is Kenneth Jowitt's highly original and thought-provoking essay "Scientific Socialist Regimes in Africa: Political Differentiation, Avoidance, and Unawareness" in the Rosberg and Callaghy volume.

Jowitt, who has devoted most of his career to the study of Leninist development strategies, cautions against a too hasty acceptance of African leaders' attempts to appropriate the "scientific socialist" designation. Instead, he argues that such "regimes might best be considered as organizations with identifiably non-Leninist characters who for particular reasons have formally adopted Leninist facades." The essence of Jowitt's argument is summarized in the following paragraph:

Self-designation as "scientific socialist" or "Marxist-Leninist" may be seen as an act of limited political differentiation, as an attempt by certain African elites to simultaneously balance the imperatives of political relation and separation in three arenas: (1) domestically, (2) in connection with former colonial powers, and (3) in connection with the "socialist camp." The defining feature of self-designation by an African elite as either "scientific socialist" or "Marxist-Leninist" appears to be its effort to establish an intermediate domestic and international political position—to avoid hard (i.e., mutually exclusive) choices of international alignment and domestic political organization. (p. 146)

In Jowitt's view, the existence of a "multidimensional international order" (i.e., one that is not rigidly divided into two opposing camps but instead allows for the adoption of various intermediate—"nonaligned"—positions) and the absence of a single authoritative Leninist state capable of setting and enforcing an internationally "correct line" means that African states are free to attempt to reap the advantages of ideologically identifying with the socialist camp without paying a price in terms of greatly reduced freedom of maneuver. The potential international advantages of the scientific socialist designation include military and political support from the socialist bloc, greater regional autonomy for states such as Benin, Congo-Brazzaville, and Tanzania that risk "being overshadowed by a more economically viable, politically visible, and militarily developed neighbor," and enhanced status as a result of identification with a powerful and prestigious global movement. Domestically, the scientific socialist designation provides "unestablished elites comprised of individuals coming from previously subordinate tribal groups, neglected regions, or generational strata that have been excluded from the highest power positions" with a means of compensating for their "low status, lack of experience, and need for internal bonding and external boundaries" (p. 140).

[3] Thomas Henriksen, "Communism, Communist States and Africa," in Henriksen, Ed., *Communist Powers and Sub-Saharan Africa*, Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press, 1981, pp. 115-16.

[4] Ibid.

[5] For representative statements of the "critic" viewpoint, see Michael Radu, "Ideology, Parties and Foreign Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa," *Orbis* (Philadelphia), Winter 1982; and Morris Rothenberg, *The USSR and Africa*, Miami, FL, Advanced International Studies Institute, 1980.

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In a long and not easily summarized passage, Jowitt carefully distinguishes between Leninism and populism. He clearly believes that Afrocommunist regimes, rhetoric notwithstanding, ought to be placed in the populist category.

A second variant of the skeptical view seeks to sidestep the debate over intentions by focusing on environmental constraints. Briefly stated, the argument of analysts in this category is that the options open to African leaders, especially in the economic realm, are so limited that it is misleading to pay too much attention to ideological declarations. Reflecting this view, Rosberg and Callaghy observe that

the economies of African socialist states remain dependent on and integrated into the world capitalist economy.... Economic autarky is not a viable option. Heavily dependent on commodity trade, they are also dependent on outside sources for capital accumulation, technical assistance, and investment plans. The relations between socialist states and multinational corporations appear to be little different from those in non-socialist states. Despite the ideological ties and orientation of scientific socialist African states with external socialist powers, no dramatic economic alternatives have become available. (p. 6)

Given the dire economic condition of these states, skeptics question the argument made by many in the critic category that Afrocommunist states are likely to threaten Western economic interests by withholding mineral exports from international markets.[6]

THE FINAL category of analysts, which I have categorized as supportive, are distinguished from the skeptics by their belief that the Marxist-Leninist aspirations of the Afrocommunist leaders ought to be taken seriously, and, to varying degrees, they regard the appearance of such leaders as a potentially positive development. Among the supporters, however, there is considerable variation, ranging from the relatively detached arguments of supporters like David and Marina Ottaway to the outright enthusiasm of Allen and Barbara Issacman or Jane Bergerol and Michael Wolfers.

The term Afrocommunism was coined by the Ottaways. In their view, regimes like those in Ethiopia and Mozambique "should be considered as Marxist-Leninist ones, albeit in the initial stages of organization and consolidation" (p. 10). In contrast with Jowitt's stress on the pragmatic reasons behind African leaders' decisions to adopt a scientific socialist designation, the Ottaways emphasize ideological considerations. "Ideology," they contend, "has determined the choice of institutions, the thrust of foreign relations, the direction of major policy decisions, and has even created the major dilemmas these countries are facing today" (p. 195). More specifically, the "theory" of Afrocommunism is said to combine belief in a single scientific socialism, class conflict, the leading role of the proletariat, the need for a small vanguard party, the legitimacy of coercion as part of a socialist transformation, and proletarian internationalism. However, ideological identification with the international communist movement does not mean, in the Ottaways' view, that Afrocommunist regimes are extensions of the Soviet bloc. They write:

Like the European proponents of "Eurocommunism," the African Marxist-Leninist states are setting forth the argument that communism does not imply blind imitation of, and enslavement to the Soviet Union, but can be a choice freely made by independent states, adapted to local circumstances, and implemented with subservience to no foreign power. (p. 11)

Although acknowledging that relations between the Afrocommunist states and the United States are likely to be difficult, the Ottaways suggest that an informed and balanced policy would permit the United States to influence to its advantage the path that the Afrocommunists take, especially with regard to their relations with the Soviet Union. They offer "the Algerian outcome" as a possible end point for these states:

The United States has learned to live with, and has come to respect, Algeria as a representative of a militant but independent Third World position. The Afrocommunist states already share with Algeria its militant Third World outlook and its desire for economic relations with the West. They could well evolve toward a less aligned position on geopolitical issues once they feel they are not so threatened and their need for the Soviet military shield slackens. (p. 213)

Although the underlying tone of their argument is clearly supportive of the Afrocommunist option, the Ottaways acknowledge that it is too early to know with confidence which way Afrocommunist states will move or whether this phenomenon will prove to be a positive development for Africa.

This caution distinguishes the Ottaways from the school represented by Allen and Barbara

[6] For an excellent statement of this position, see Robert Price, "US Policy toward Southern Africa," in Gwendolen Carter and Patrick O'Meara, Eds., *International Politics in Southern Africa*, Bloomington, IN, Indiana University Press, 1982.

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Issacman, who over the past decade have become America's most prolific interpreters of the historical development and current politics of Mozambique. An unconcealed bias in favor of the present government there strongly colors the Issacmans' writings, as demonstrated in their characterization of the Mozambican "experiment" as

a synthesis of the concrete experiences and lessons of the armed struggle—experimentation, self-criticism, self-reliance, peasant mobilization, and the development of popularly based political institutions—and the contemporary Mozambique reality with the broad organizing principles of Marxism-Leninism....

Mozambique's social experiment ... merits critical attention because of its highly visible campaign against tribalism and racism. In a continent marred by ethnic, religious, and regional conflict, the intensity with which the Mozambican government is combatting these divisive tendencies is unprecedented. (p. 3)

The Issacman's personal identification with the Mozambican revolution is reflected in a tendency to see all opposition to the "progressives" within Frelimo (the ruling Mozambique Liberation Front) as the result of Portuguese subversion and the "narrowly nationalist," "racialist," and "tribalist" posture of the progressives' rivals. The possibility that there might have been legitimate grounds for disagreement with the progressives' strategies and long-term plans (and that such factors might have something to do with Mozambique's current problems) does not appear to have been considered.

While the Issacmans acknowledge many of the problems that have beset the government of Samora Machel, they always do so in a way that tends to absolve it of any responsibility for them. For example, Portuguese propaganda, Rhodesian and South African agents, and petty bourgeois self-seekers are blamed for the failures of the so-called dynamizing groups set up by Frelimo in 1974–75 "to familiarize people with Frelimo's goals and to provide them with a crash course in decisionmaking" (p. 107).

Throughout the book they paint a picture of a committed, sensitive Frelimo leadership with considerable mass support struggling to overcome a legacy of poverty, tribalism, and oppression in order to bring into existence an egalitarian, participatory socialist democracy and to further racial justice in southern Africa. Without making judgments about the intentions of President Machel and his aides, one must question whether leaders fighting for survival—as they have been for so much of their political lives—can match up to the sort of idealized portrait sketched by the Issacmans.

Mozambique is at present a country that is, by Machel's own admission, facing a major national crisis. Its economy is on the verge of collapse; its countryside, torn by war. So dire are the straits it is in, Mozambique has welcomed a security pact with and economic assistance from its greatest enemy, South Africa. The Issacmans' book provides little analysis that can help us understand how such a situation could develop. Admittedly, Mozambique's problems have been seriously complicated by first Rhodesian and later South African support for anti-Frelimo guerrillas, but then, as Frelimo's own supporters had argued before they achieved independence, a guerrilla insurgency cannot survive on external support alone. Had Frelimo made the tremendous strides in winning over the masses that the Issacmans imply were made in their description of the creation of participatory institutions in Mozambique, it is unlikely that the current insurgency would have ever reached threatening proportions.

Despite its problems, the Issacmans' book definitely ought to be read by anyone interested in the development of Afrocommunism. The same cannot be said of *Angola in the Frontline* by Michael Wolfers and Jane Bergerol. This is a highly partisan account of the Angolan civil war and the policies of the MPLA (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola) government. Many of the details in this book are highly suspect. For example, Wolfers and Bergerol write that Nathaniel Davis was appointed US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs in March 1974 and imply that Davis's appointment marked the beginning of US efforts to intervene in the Angolan civil war (p. 5). In fact, Davis was appointed in March *1975* and resigned a few months later because he *opposed* covert intervention in Angola. These facts were widely reported,[7] which makes the error more serious. This example should serve as a caution against relying on the accuracy of this entirely unfootnoted account of Angola's recent history. This book's only real value is as a reflection of how some groups in Angola perceive this history.

THESE LAST two books point out a larger problem. In most Third

[7] See John Marcum, *The Angolan Revolution Vol. 2: Exile Politics and Guerrilla Warfare, 1962-1976*, Cambridge, MIT Press, 1978; Nathaniel Davis, "The Angola Decision of 1975: A Personal Memoir," *Foreign Affairs* (New York), Fall 1978; and Gerald Bender, "Kissinger in Angola: Anatomy of Failure," in René Marchand, Ed., *American Policy in Southern Africa: The Stakes and the Stance*, Washington, DC, University Press of America, 1978.

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World countries, critics and skeptics are not extended a warm welcome. This means that such writers are often forced to rely on newspapers, public speeches, interviews with nationals who have left the country, and secondary sources for information. This situation tends to discourage many researchers. As a result, the majority of books written on radical regimes are authored either by critics who use available sources to develop evidence to support their preconceived views or by enthusiastic supporters who use their access to find further grounds for their enthusiasm. Ironically, among the major victims of this situation are the countries under scrutiny. Since the enthusiasts are seldom seen as credible observers by mainstream opinion leaders in the United States, they are incapable of creating the kind of understanding of Afrocommunism that might foster the "more balanced" policy toward Afrocommunist countries called for by the Ottaways (and strongly opposed by the critics).

One recent book that takes a step in the right direction is *Ideology and Development in Africa* by M. Crawford Young. The objective of this book is, in the author's words, "to explore the interrelationship between ideological preference and developmental performance" (p. 9). In order to do this, Young divides African states into three groups—Afro-Marxist, populist socialist, and African capitalist—and attempts to compare them in terms of six criteria: economic growth, equality of distribution, autonomy and self-reliance, preservation of human dignity, participation, and expansion of societal capacity.

As Young acknowledges in his appropriately titled final chapter "By Way of Conclusion: A Preliminary Appraisal of Ideology and Performance," this book does not constitute a final answer to the question of which development path offers the best hope for Africa. But it does provide a good basis for moving beyond the rather sterile debates between Afrocommunism's critics and its enthusiasts. Young's own analysis of the Afro-Marxists makes use of insights from both skeptics like Jowitt and cautious supporters like the Ottaways.

Interestingly, Young identified Mozambique as the country upon whose political evolution and economic performance the ultimate verdict on Afrocommunism would hinge. Given that country's current plight, most critics would surely say we need wait no longer to render a negative verdict. However, even if the critics are right, Afrocommunism is not likely to disappear from the African scene in the near future. For that reason, scholars and policymakers would be well advised to read with care the Rosberg and Callaghy, Ottaway, and Young volumes.

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Urban Policy in China

William T. Rowe

CHRISTOPHER HOWE, Ed. *Shanghai: Revolution and Development in an Asian Metropolis*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1981.

MARTIN KING WHYTE and WILLIAM L. PARISH. *Urban Life in Contemporary China*. Chicago, IL, and London, The University of Chicago Press, 1984.

LAWRENCE J. C. MA and EDWARD W. HANTEN, Eds. *Urban Development in Modern China*. Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1981.

Shanghai is a non-productive city. It is a parasitic city. It is a criminal city. It is a refugee city. It is the paradise of adventurers.[1]

WHEN the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) moved in 1949–50 from the rural areas upon which the success of its revolution had been based into the country's major cities, its leaders faced wide-ranging and serious problems. They inherited localities with accumulated inadequacies of housing and supply services, as well as productive capacities devastated by years of invasion and civil war. They needed a quick restoration and expansion of production in order to finance their continuing consolidation of domestic control and, very quickly, a new foreign war. At the same time, they needed to demonstrate at least some progress toward fulfilling their political promises of greater economic equality and a guaranteed subsistance for all citizens. In achieving these (quite possibly contradictory) aims they faced a number of special handicaps, including a potentially hostile, demoralized, and politically cynical urban class, and—as the above quotation illustrates—the parochial anti-urban attitudes of many influential party members themselves.

In the longer term, the Communists under Mao Zedong faced an even more formidable task. As each of the works under review argues, industrialization in virtually all societies has left an inevitable mark on the nature of urbanism, creating cities far larger than those in the past and replete with the social problems urbanologists often refer to as "alienation" and "anomie." Clearly, the CCP sought the economic benefits of industrialization while sensing and seeking to avoid its related social problems. In the attempt to realize their new "Chinese model" of industrial urbanism, the Communists have displayed a remarkable fertility of invention in organizational forms and mobilizational strategies, along with an equally notable willingness to backtrack and discard experimental forms according to evaluations of success and to shifting priorities. To what degree have they succeeded in achieving their ends, and what have been the effects (intended or unintended) on the lives of Chinese urbanites? These three books, all important contributions to the growing literature on contemporary Chinese cities, provide many answers.

ALL THREE BOOKS begin, as they must, with a consideration of the unique historical traditions of Chinese urbanism. In the view of the Communists, and indeed of many 20th-century Chinese intellectuals, this legacy was almost completely negative. There was, on the one hand, the older, indigenous tradition of the city as political-military control center for its surrounding territory and as residence of the landlord-literati class. On top of this had been superimposed in the 19th century a new level of predominantly coastal treaty-port cities, the locus of investment and

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[1] *Jingji Zhoubao* [Economic Weekly—1949], quoted in Howe book under review, p. 46.

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extraction by agents of foreign metropolitan economies. Both urban types were seen as holding exclusively "parasitic" relations with the "real" China, that of the peasantry.[2]

Recent Western scholarship, however, has been kinder in its view of the legacy of Chinese urbanism. The indigenous tradition is now recognized as having generated at least certain urban centers that were truly productive sites of commerce and handicraft manufacture, and spawning grounds of progressive social change. Moreover, as Martin Whyte and William Parish point out, Western scholarship now tends to acknowledge the potential benefits enjoyed by China, relative to other developing nations, as a result of the even spatial distribution of urban centers and the unusually fluid and penetrable rural/urban continuum bequeathed by the late imperial hierarchy of administrative capitals.[3]

The treaty ports too have come in for reevaluation. In the volume edited by Lawrence Ma and Edward Hanten, for example, Lynn White offers a provocative argument that the heritage of cities such as Shanghai was an unusual degree of urban societal self-reliance (or "nongovernmentalism") that, while it undoubtedly made mobilization for political campaigns more difficult, offered corresponding advantages in efficiency of administration. Marie-Claire Bergère's path-breaking essay in the Christopher Howe volume, furthermore, demonstrates that the "other" China of the coastal cities represented a tradition smaller and more recent than, but every bit as real as, that of the countryside, and contributed a capable and cosmopolitan population that was persistently there for communist authorities (such as the current leadership) to draw upon when necessary.

DESPITE these positive legacies, the CCP saw itself as inheriting a disequilibrium between the more Westernized coastal centers and the interior, and recent scholarship generally confirms the validity of this perception.[4] The expanding Communist urban-planning repertoire, then, was developed largely to resolve two key problems: (1) to strike the proper balance between large and small settlements, and between coastal and interior, without faith in the trickle-down effect of socioeconomic benefits; and (2) to fix upon the optimal levels or spans of authority *within* the cities for the carrying out of various administrative or mobilizational tasks. In the party's efforts to overcome these shortcomings, the three goals of stimulating productivity, achieving efficiency in control and delivery of services, and promoting socioeconomic equality have continually been at the fore, although the relative priority accorded each of the three has often shifted. The goals of maintaining maximal levels of personal freedom and representation in decision-making for urban residents, which Westerners might see as strongly affected by choices regarding organizational levels, have clearly played little part in the Chinese planning process; on the other hand, the goals of preventing social isolation and fostering participation in collective affairs have by no means been absent.

While situations and nomenclature have varied, most large cities in the People's Republic of China (PRC) have had four levels of organization: the municipality (*shi*); the ward or district (*chu, xiang*); the neighborhood or precinct (*pai*) of several-hundred households; and the street (*jie*) of about 25 families. In the cities the Communists occupied during the civil war (1945–49), the CCP set up "self-government" organs at each municipality, ward, and neighborhood level, emphasizing the last of these in their early effort to bring about a sort of grass-roots democracy. Street-level "residents' committees" followed soon thereafter, as the new rulers sought to affix responsibility for self-reliance as closely as possible to what they saw as the natural community. However, as early as Liu Shaoqi's famous inspection tour of Tianjin in April 1949—during which he devised a strategy calling for a more disciplined, centralized political organization—the goal of increased productivity began to take precedence.[5] In order to streamline the chain of authority and to make maximum use of scarce cadre resources, Liu initiated a policy vesting greater power in the municipality level, transforming formerly "autonomous" ward and neighborhood offices into mere branches of city governments and stripping them of many of their regulatory functions. Input from the grass roots was in theory to

[2]Perhaps the classic statement of these views appeared in the work of the non-Communist intellectual Fei Xiaotong. See especially his *China's Gentry: Essays in Rural-Urban Relations*, Chicago, IL, University of Chicago Press, 1953, based on Chinese originals in 1947–48.

[3]In late imperial times, capital cities, usually walled, were assigned to each of China's roughly 1,000 counties, as well as to higher level administrative units such as prefectures and provinces. For a concise discussion, see G. William Skinner, "Cities and the Hierarchy of Local Systems," in Skinner, Ed., *The City in Late Imperial China*, Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press, 1977, esp. pp. 301–7.

[4]See especially Rhoads Murphey, *The Outsiders: The Western Experience in India and China*, Ann Arbor, MI, University of Michigan Press, 1977.

[5]See Kenneth G. Lieberthal, *Revolution and Tradition in Tientsin, 1949–1952*, Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press, 1980, pp. 7, 42–52.

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come primarily through the hierarchically structured mass organizations: labor unions, women's and youth associations, and the like. Shortly thereafter, though, with the revival of emphasis on class struggle during the Three-Anti Five-Anti Campaign of 1952,[6] the pendulum swung back toward decentralization; ward and neighborhood autonomy was gradually reinstated, and the street-level residents' committees took on the expanded range of functions (for example, firefighting, care for the aged and children) that they have generally exercised since that time.

THE REAL beginnings of a coordinated urban policy date not from these preliminary experiments but from the First Five-Year Plan of 1953–57. This of course was the period of highest Soviet influence, with stress on urban-located heavy industry, and policy was generally favorable to large cities. "New Industrial Districts" such as Zhabei in Shanghai were planned in the slum-ridden heart of older cities; considerable new housing, transport facilities, water and sewage systems, and parks were constructed; and Soviet-style monumental halls and great revolutionary public spaces (Beijing's Tian An Men Square being merely the most famous) were carved out of old city centers. At the same time, however, concern for the dispersal of industry led to a new development of surburban areas and the revival of archaic interior cities. Semi-autonomous "satellite towns" such as Shanghai's Minxing and "new villages" like Beijing's Baiwan zhuang and Shanghai's Caoyang xincun were laid out as combined industrial, residential, and community service centers at the fringes of existing large cities. Special emphasis was placed on the industrialization of "key-point cities" (*zhongdian chengshi*) such as Lanzhou, Xi'an, Taiyuan, Baotou, Wuhan, Shijiazhuang, Luoyang, and Zhengzhou—inland, medium-sized administrative centers favored by new or existing transport systems. These cities saw remarkable growth; Henan's cotton textile center Zhengzhou, for example, more than quintupled its population in the decade prior to 1958.[7] Finally, "New Industrial Cities" like Yinquan in Ningxia and Yumen in Gansu were created virtually *ex nihilo* in frontier areas.

In order to populate these various urban projects and to curtail the population growth of the largest cities, party leaders relied on the *xiafang* ("sending down") process—the forced relocation of urban youth, introduced by Zhou Enlai during the First Five-Year Plan.[8] Thus the Plan in essence created not only the strategic repertoire but also most of the vocabulary that was selectively drawn upon in later periods. In fact, as Clifton Pannell and David Buck separately point out (in the Ma and Hanten volume), this era marked the beginning of the long-term trend toward the smoothing of China's rank-size curve of urban places, with the growth of the largest coastal cities proceeding more slowly than that of interior smaller cities (*xiao chengshi*)—a deliberate and successful reversal of an older trend dating from the rapid intensification of foreign trade in the mid-19th century.

If this is so, the trend certainly accelerated in the period following the Plan, that of the Great Leap Forward (1958–60), when Soviet influence was formally denounced in favor of the "Chinese model."[9] Policies of this time were oriented toward narrowing the "three great differences": those between mental and manual labor, between industry and agriculture, and between urban and rural. Almost all big-city construction projects came to a halt, in part out of the hope of decreasing the incentive for rural-to-urban migration. The policy of "urbanizing the countryside" could be seen on a small scale in market towns like Hongqi (near Beijing), where hinterlands were gobbled up and local cities grew in their place, and on the larger scale in Shanghai municipality, where surrounding counties were incorporated into the metropolitan area during the course of 1958.

Yet not all Great Leap urban policies were so pragmatic. The most utopian innovation was the ill-fated "urban commune." Organized around a factory or other production unit, urban communes were to combine worksite and residence

[6]Ostensibly designed to combat corruption in business and government, the Three-Anti Five-Anti campaigns were in reality the first stage in the socialization of urban industrial and commercial enterprises. See Lieberthal, op. cit., chap. 7; and John Gardner, "The *Wu-fan* Campaign in Shanghai," in A. Doak Barnett, Ed., *Chinese Communist Politics in Action*, Seattle, University of Washington Press, 1969.

[7]Zhengzhou's population was estimated at 150,000 in 1948, and 785,000 in 1958. See David D. Buck, "Policies Favoring the Growth of Smaller Urban Places in the People's Republic of China," in the Ma and Hanten book under review, pp. 122–23.

[8]Zhou put forth the notion of *xiafang* in his report to the 8th Party Congress of 1956. Though originally conceived of as a way to streamline the cumbersome Chinese bureaucracy, the *xiafang* process, owing to its early success and to Mao's injunction that rusticated cadres "share in the masses' suffering," became in 1957 a major developmental approach. For a detailed study of *xiafang*, see Thomas P. Bernstein, *Up to the Mountains and Down to the Villages*, New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 1977.

[9]According to Roderick MacFarquhar, in a speech at the Chengdu conference in March 1958 Mao attacked the Chinese "slavish copying of Russian regulations and system" as lacking the "spirit of creativity" (*Origins of the Cultural Revolution, Vol. 2: The Great Leap Forward 1958–1960*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1983, p. 35). MacFarquhar notes that Mao himself traced the beginning of his efforts to "emancipate China from the thralldom of the Soviet economic model" to his April 1956 speech "On the Ten Great Relationships" (ibid., p. 39).

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organization, local administration and production-unit leadership, and worker-resident ownership of the means of production much more completely than had the "new villages" or other previous experiments.[10] The ideal of chopping up large cities into a number of smaller communities, each as nearly as possible self-sufficient in food production, meant a greater emphasis on administrative decentralization to the ward or precinct (now "commune") level than at any time since prior to Liu Shaoqi's 1949 reforms. But, as is well known, the urban commune movement was one of the most notorious failures of the generally disastrous Leap. The simultaneous goals of rapid collectivization and increased production proved less compatible than anticipated; the total integration of worksite and residence was more feasible in theory than in practice; and experiments in dormitory living and large mess-hall dining constituted too great an assault on the basic Chinese family system for even Maoist rhetoric to make palatable.

A more practicable attempt to combine urban and rural lifestyles also had its genesis in the Great Leap, but was further developed in the post-Leap retrenchment of the early 1960's. This was the creation of "city regions," large administrative units integrating city and countryside. In 1958, 58 City Region Governments were established, the most notable being those centered on the country's three provincial-level "special municipalities" (*tebie shi*): Beijing, Tianjin, and Shanghai. According to Ka-iu Fung (in the Howe volume), these regions represented both a complete departure from the Soviet model and a true Chinese contribution to the solution of global urban problems. Jane Jacobs's recent work in fact underscores the appeal of this approach to some Western urban theorists;[11] yet, as both Fung and Lynn White (in Howe) point out, the "rural-urban symbiosis" traditional to Chinese urbanism quite possibly made the regional development solution uniquely practicable in the Chinese case. Throughout the early 1960's, the city region model was applied to smaller as well as larger urban places, often, as in the case of the national-model Daqing (in Heilongjiang), newly planned and constructed as self-contained industrial agricultural complexes.

But the city regions created new social tensions of their own. During the period of retrenchment the goal of productivity once more became paramount, and as in the past this seemed to demand greater centralization of authority. In most cities, municipal governments once again arrogated to themselves powers only recently farmed out to the ward/urban commune levels. In cities with Regional Government arrangements (now sometimes dressed up as huge, "new-style" urban communes) there seems to have developed a pattern of enacting policies favorable to the industrialized urban cores at the expense of rural peripheries. As John Lewis earlier demonstrated in his study of Tongshan[12] and Raymond Wylie again shows in his fine, detailed analysis of Shanghai dock workers (in Howe), perhaps the most aggravating of these policies were those favoring permanent, skilled industrial workers over "casual" laborers, who were frequently drawn on a seasonal basis from suburban districts under the administration of the City Region.[13] These tensions were to flare up into open fighting during the Cultural Revolution.

The Cultural Revolution itself produced little in the way of urban policy, but did leave its mark on the cities in a variety of ways. Urban construction, recommenced for a period during the early 1960's, was once more brought to a standstill, and this hiatus seems largely responsible for shortages in housing and urban services today. On the positive side, the intensified drive for rustication of youth, combined with the shipping off of urban bureaucratic functionaries to rural May 7th Cadre Schools,[14] led to the most restrained population growth of the major cities of any time since 1949. After almost complete breakdowns of authority, city administrations emerged from the Cultural Revolution even more centralized than when they had entered it. Dramatic-sounding local autonomous organizations such as "urban workers' militias" and the "Shanghai People's Commune" of 1967 (ostensibly modeled on the Paris Commune of 1871) very quickly gave way to city-level Revolutionary Committees, which despite their name were the most bureaucratized and arguably the most effective municipal govern-

[10]Janet Salaff, "The Urban Communes and Anti-City Experiment in Communist China," *China Quarterly* (London), January-March 1969, pp. 82–110.

[11]Jane Jacobs, *Cities and the Wealth of Nations*, New York, Random House, 1984.

[12]John W. Lewis, "Commerce, Education, and Political Development in Tangshan, 1956–69," in Lewis, Ed., *The City in Communist China*, Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press, 1971.

[13]For example, short-term workers on the Shanghai docks in the early 1960's typically received 40 yuan a month, while permanent workers doing the same job received 70 yuan. Raymond F. Wylie, "Shanghai Dockers in the Cultural Revolution: The Interplay and Political and Economic Issues," in Howe, pp. 100–101.

[14]During the Cultural Revolution, "May 7" schools were set up to "reeducate" urban cadres in manual labor. By October 1968, 10,000 cadres from Shanghai alone had been shipped to such schools. See Janet Salaff, "Urban Residential Communities in the Wake of the Cultural Revolution," in Lewis, op. cit., pp. 302–3.

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ments China had known since 1949—indeed quite possibly *ever* known.

The era of succession struggle from 1969 to 1976—that is, from the convening of the landmark 9th Party Congress to Mao's death—was nevertheless an uncertain one, characterized in urban policy primarily by an abrogation of national leadership and a call for local "self-reliance," epitomized in the revived model of Daqing and the new one of Xiyang, seat of the much-touted Dazhai brigade. But with the consolidation of the current leadership and promulgation of the current Eight-Year Economic Plan in 1978 a clear urban-planning approach has emerged that largely returns to the policies of the mid-1950's, with some selective use of successful later programs. The new regime has once more accorded priority to addressing the problems of large cities, with the goal of improved material conditions now sharing precedence with those of efficient management and increased productivity. Considerable inner-city renewal and construction of high-rise housing has taken place, and more is projected. This has been accompanied by revived construction of satellite cities such as Shanghai's Baoshan and Jinshan, along lines initially anticipated by the First Five-Year Plan. This clearly meets the approval of the authors reviewed here, especially of the geographers and planners represented in the Ma and Hanten volume.

However, policy shifts announced since the publication of these books may contain reversals that dampen the authors' enthusiasm. For example, the April 1984 proclamation of the "14 coastal cities" policy, allowing special economic privileges to Shanghai, Guangzhou, Tianjin, and others, seems to contradict the time-hallowed policy favoring development of smaller, interior cities.[15] Rather than favoring urban heavy industry as under the Soviet-style five-year plans, this policy places emphasis squarely on promotion of foreign trade. Common to both eras, however, is a faith in the "trickling down" of economic benefits from larger to smaller settlements, which seems to be the antithesis of the Maoist approach that characterized the period from 1958 to the late 1970's.[16] It is still too early to determine if this new policy will produce the political antagonisms and popular grievances that aborted earlier programs.

TO WHAT EXTENT have China's roughly 200 million city-dwellers been the beneficiaries of the prolonged and tortuous process of social experimentation? Materially, they continue to be better off than rural residents. As Lawrence Ma points out, the problems of inadequate sanitation, sewage, and electrical facilities, as well as squatters and pavement-dwellers, so frequently encountered in urban centers of developing nations have been essentially eliminated. While per-capita housing space has fallen since 1949 to its current inadequate level,[17] the quality of this housing has greatly improved, and continues to do so. Subsistence guarantees have almost universally been provided, and, as Bruce Reynolds demonstrates in the Howe volume, urban real incomes have risen overall—if irregularly and very modestly.

But some problems remain. While job security for those who are employed is virtually absolute, the number of young people who have been unable to find permanent jobs has soared. In recent years, because the state-owned sector of the economy has proven unable to accommodate this new work force, the current leadership has authorized a rapid expansion of the collective ("neighborhood workshops" owned and run by precinct- or street-level residents' committees) and private sectors. Although youth unemployment remains severe (perhaps 10 to 20 million), this approach has been fairly successful. In Changsha, for example, nearly half of all 1979 school graduates entered this new collective sector.[18] The new liberalization, which many scholars trace back to the 3rd Plenum of the 11th CCP Central Committee of December 1978, has also had a positive effect on the availability of routine services to urbanites, services that began to fall off during the socialist transformation drives of the 1950's and became extremely scarce with the advent of the Cultural Revolution. Since 1978 the number of retail stores, repair shops, and restaurants in cities has mushroomed, about 80 percent of which have been in the private or "self-employed" sector.[19]

The more intangible areas of quality of life and of behavioral or

[15] See "14 More Coastal Cities To Be Opened," *Beijing Review*, Apr. 16, 1984, p. 6; and Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: China* (Washington, DC—hereafter *FBIS-CHI*), Apr. 9, 1984, p. K/7.

[16] See, e.g., "Let the Coastal Areas Become Rich First," *Jingji Ribao* (Beijing), Apr. 4, 1984, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Apr. 13, 1984, p. K/13.

[17] Ma cites average figures of 6.3 square meters per person in 1949 and 3.1 square meters in 1960. He estimates that new housing construction may now have expanded the average to between 4 and 5 square meters per person, but notes that this contrasts unfavorably with the 7.84 square meters in Soviet cities and the 6.3 square meters in public housing in Singapore. Ma, "Urban Housing Supply in the People's Republic of China," in Ma and Hanten, pp. 244–48.

[18] David Bonavia, *The Chinese*, Middlesex and New York, Penguin Books, 1982, p. 23.

[19] *The New York Times*, Apr. 1, 1984. Official sources now place the number of "self-employed" Chinese at 7.5 million; see ibid., Sept. 15, 1984.

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attitudinal responses of the urban population to new conditions is a major focus of the Whyte and Parish book—for a nonspecialist audience certainly the most compelling of the works under review. Time after time, in evaluating the specific goals of the CCP's urban policy, the authors accord it basic or even complete success. Despite this, however, the authors repeatedly discover that the utopian predictions of Marxian theory regarding the end of social alienation have not been realized, and indeed that the very successes of CCP policies have had often unanticipated negative consequences for popular morale.

In one sense, *Urban Life in Contemporary China* is a perplexing book. It is a first-rate piece of research, and probably more focused theoretically than the authors' earlier companion volume on rural life (now deservedly the standard work on that subject).[20] Moreover, it is as comprehensive, objective, and balanced a treatment of city life in China as we are ever likely to get. And yet, despite their almost chilly tone of clinical detachment, the authors appear with surprising frequency to judge Chinese society by Western liberal standards. They lament that Chinese urban dwellers have "remained victims rather than masters of their own fate" (p. 295), that the political system denies "a direct voice in government for ordinary citizens" (p. 296), and that even today "much of the political system that once oppressed so many people is still in place" (p. 299). While most of their audience will no doubt share their preference for an open society and for pluralist political institutions, the authors' clear disappointment at China's failure to produce these seems a bit odd, especially when coupled with their recognition of the success planning has brought in areas such as economic equality and security, improvement in the position of women, and so on. Unquestionably, the People's Republic of China has been subjected to more than its share of political excesses but, given its low ratio of resources to population, certain hard trade-offs may have appeared unavoidable to Chinese leaders.

The most telling aspect of Whyte and Parish's critique comes in their chapter on "Crime and Social Control." Based on quantitative analysis of interview data, the authors determine, perhaps not surprisingly, that a lower incidence of social deviance and a higher popular willingness to cooperate in the pursuit of communal and national goals were found in those periods in PRC history, and in those particular urban neighborhoods, in which the public's perception of "a predictable set of legitimate opportunities in life" (p. 234) was highest. They are thus led to support that school of urban social theory (identified by them with Daniel Patrick Moynihan[21] and others) that emphasizes the need for unimpeded provision of such an opportunity structure for the achievement of social stability and productivity. Most evidence suggests, and Whyte and Parish agree, that the current Chinese leadership shares an appreciation of this logic. If Deng Xiaoping and his colleagues can continue to demonstrate sincerity and success in this area, they may be on their way to consolidating and extending the gains made since 1949 in achievement of a distinctly Chinese style of contemporary urbanism.

[20] William L. Parish and Martin K. Whyte, *Village and Family in Contemporary China*, Chicago, IL, University of Chicago Press, 1978.

[21] Daniel P. Moynihan, *Maximum Feasible Misunderstanding: Community Action in the War on Poverty*, New York, The Free Press, 1969; see the discussion in Whyte and Parish, pp. 234–36.

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Beijing and the Superpowers

Steven I. Levine

U. ALEXIS JOHNSON, GEORGE PACKARD, and ALFRED WILHELM, Eds. *China Policy for the Next Decade.* Cambridge, MA, Oelgeschlager, Gunn and Hain, 1984.

GENE T. HSIAO and MICHAEL WITUNSKI, Eds. *Sino-American Normalization and Its Policy Implications.* New York, Praeger Publishers, 1983.

HERBERT J. ELLISON, Ed. *The Sino-Soviet Conflict: A Global Perspective.* Seattle and London, University of Washington Press, 1982.

DONALD S. ZAGORIA, Ed. *Soviet Policy in East Asia.* New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1982.

DOUGLAS T. STUART and WILLIAM T. TOW, Eds. *China, the Soviet Union, and the West: Strategic and Political Dimensions in the 1980s.* Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1982.

HUNG-MAO T'IEN, Ed. *Mainland China, Taiwan, and U.S. Policy.* Cambridge, MA, Oelgeschlager, Gunn and Hain, 1983.

AT THE CHINESE court during the ancient Zhou dynasty, diviners, invocators, and sorcerers were employed respectively to forecast the future, prescribe courses of action in accordance with ritual, and implore divine assistance. Although no one has tried to forecast the state of Sino-Soviet-American relations using scapulimancy, geomancy, or similar techniques, contemporary policy analysts, whose works are well-represented in the books under review, are in some measure the intellectual heirs to these ancient Chinese public servants. Those among them who have accurately forecast the evolution of these tortuous trilateral relations have done so more through luck or accident than through science or experience. Ever since consciousness of the so-called strategic triangle emerged in the post–World War II years, most analyses of Sino-Soviet-American interactions, not surprisingly, have been implicitly or explicitly policy-oriented.

From a historiographical perspective, the six books under review are part of a Third Wave in postwar studies of the subject. The First Wave, inspired by the ill-fated Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance of 1950, focused on whether this alliance could long endure, and on what were the implications for US and global security. The Second Wave, following hard on the first, explored the origins, scope, and implications for the United States of the Sino-Soviet conflict during the early and mid-1960's. Thereafter, serious interest in the seemingly frozen landscape of Sino-Soviet relations abated with the exception of a brief flurry of attention in 1969 at the time of the Sino-Soviet border clashes. The Third Wave has been generated by the sea change in international relations brought about by Sino-American reconciliation and diplomatic normalization in the 1970's. The actual and potential impact of Sino-American relations on the regional and global balances of power and, in particular, on relations between the Soviet Union and the United States, are matters of ongoing controversy.

IT IS WORTH noting that all six works under review are conference volumes or edited collections. The popularity of these genres in recent years presumably reflects the view that collective wisdom is superior to individual wisdom and that the

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topicality of the issues demands an expeditious means of bringing expert insights and policy recommendations to official and nonofficial readers. (Let us quietly inter the thought that academic gamesmanship has anything to do with the proliferation of conferences and conference volumes.) There are two consequences worth mentioning in this connection. First, the proliferation of authors (the Johnson, Packard, Wilhelm volume alone has nearly 30 contributors) makes it difficult to pick out individual faces and voices from the crowd. With some notable exceptions, the range of opinions within and across the volumes is distressingly narrow. This is probably less the result of close editorial control than of the fact that the intellectual *problematique* of these books—if one may employ such a term—derives almost exclusively from contemporary political concerns, chief among them being the policy question of how best to manage relations with Moscow and Beijing. Connected with this is a second consequence. The permutations of policy in Beijing, Moscow, and Washington frequently outstrip the pace of academic deliberation and publication so that by the time the fruits of analysis have been brought to market they have often lost their freshness. A new policy season may already be upon us by then. Unless one is willing to eschew, or proscribe, contemporary political analysis, there is no easy solution to this problem.

Two partial remedies come to mind, however. One is to strive for greater consciousness of the historically conditioned genesis of current issues. (For example, over the past century, the problem of how to manage relations with Japan has generally bulked larger for the Russians than have their relations with the Chinese.) Of the roughly 80 contributors to these volumes, only two—John J. Stephan and Donald W. Treadgold—are practicing historians.[1] Among the other authors, Seweryn Bialer, Thomas Robinson, and Robert Scalapino are the most sensitive to the historical context of current issues. A second partial remedy is to reconceptualize the Sino-Soviet-American triangle by venturing off the well-trodden path of the realist paradigm (balance of power, strategic equations, spheres of influence) and attempting to examine the significance of these relations from a functional or a world order perspective. What have been the consequences of Sino-Soviet, Sino-American, and triangular relations for such issues as refugees, human rights, population, food, the global environment, international trade, terrorism, resources, and so forth?[2] How has the disintegration of Marxist internationalism in the Soviet Union and in the People's Republic of China (PRC) into neonationalist chauvinism affected the prospects for world order, arms control, or nuclear nonproliferation? The answers to these questions may be harder to come by, but they would at least take us beyond the familiar preoccupations with power politics of the works under discussion, and perhaps even serve to temper the enthusiasm that many American practitioners of realpolitik have for the Sino-Soviet conflict and Sino-American strategic alignment.

THREE central topics emerge from these books: the value of a Sino-American alliance; the prospects for Sino-Soviet relations; and the impact of the Sino-Soviet conflict within the international system. Let us look at these in turn.

That the Sino-American reconciliation of the 1970's should culminate in a strategic alliance aimed at countering Soviet hegemonism was an idea that received widespread currency among official and academic circles in the United States from 1979 to 1981. This was actually a rather peculiar notion, given China's historical role as the center of an autonomous system of foreign relations and its unhappy experience in the 1950's with the Sino-Soviet alliance, although it was grounded to be sure in the existence of some parallel strategic interests the two countries shared. It was a blend of excess American enthusiasm, unfamiliarity with the history of China's foreign policy, and a misinterpretation of Beijing's global strategy of the late 1970's as exemplified by Deng Xiaoping's call in early 1979 for a global united front vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. The changes in US policy toward China that led to Secretary of State Alexander Haig's June 1981 declaration of American willingness to sell defensive weapons to China on a case-by-case basis were accompanied by escalating press commentary in the United States about the global importance and instrumental value of Sino-American strategic alignment.

However, just as the loose talk about a Sino-American alliance was reaching a fever pitch in the summer of 1981, Beijing cooled things down by vigorously renewing its previously muted objections to the sale of US arms to Taiwan, and threatening to downgrade relations with Washington. The effect of Beijing's action was to pull the emergency brake on the runaway vehicle of Sino-American strategic cooperation and to place

[1] Stephan's essay, "Asia in the Soviet Conception," in Zagoria, Ed., pp. 29–56, is exceptionally fine.

[2] A. Doak Barnett, *China's Economy in Global Perspective*, Washington, DC, The Brookings Institution, 1981, is a pioneering effort in this direction.

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Washington on the defensive.[3] As Alfred Wilhelm suggests in a superb essay, PRC leaders have frequently used the Taiwan issue as a "control rod" to regulate the intensity of Sino-American interactions.[4] Responding to domestic political pressures, and no longer persuaded that the USSR posed a threat to China's security so imminent that it necessitated a US–PRC strategic embrace, Beijing began to reassert its foreign policy independence from the United States. At the same time, it continued to forge new economic links with the industrialized democracies in order to advance toward the goal of modernization—China's century-old search for wealth and power.

Enthusiasm for the benefits of Sino-American strategic cooperation, so evident in some of the earlier essays in these collections,[5] has yielded to the more cautious redefinition in the newest volume, that is to say, that the United States, while being responsive to Chinese requests for weapons and technology,

should not encourage the Chinese to carry out a program to modernize and expand its armed forces to a degree that would significantly increase the Chinese capacity to project force beyond its current borders. Neither should the United States seek to enter into a military alliance with the PRC.[6]

This restrained recommendation for Sino-American security cooperation, suggests Michel Oksenberg in an essay well worth reading,[7] is precisely the kind of incremental policy adjustment that can realistically be adopted within a bureaucratically pluralist US China policy process that is resistant to any dramatic changes. In fact, all the proposals put forward by the Atlantic Council's Committee on China Policy *(China Policy for the Next Decade)* are similar in their moderation.

Underlying the current mood of restrained realism toward China (a mood that even a presidential visit to the PRC in April 1984 did little to alter) is recognition that many unknowns remain with respect to China's political and economic future. Indeed, the dominant view here is that it is still too early to tell whether the limited reforms of Deng Xiaoping and his associates will produce the era of sustained growth required to make China a prosperous and powerful country. Dwight Perkins is almost alone in predicting that from an economic perspective the PRC may achieve military parity with the USSR within 20 years.[8]

Perhaps the most pessimistic view of China's future is given by Thomas Robinson, who offers a compelling and rather somber analysis of the impediments to economic prosperity and political moderation in the PRC.[9] In contrast to Kenneth Lieberthal's prediction that the "technology firsters" like Deng will most likely remain in power,[10] Robinson foresees a resurgence of the ideologues. A similar caution characterizes the discussion of technology transfer by Leonard Sullivan, Ellen Frost, and David Holland:

As long as the United States remains somewhat uncertain about its own ultimate objectives—or China's—the extent of technology transfers should be restrained since they are nonreversible.[11]

An additional factor that has mitigated American enthusiasm for the Chinese connection is realization that the United States's European and Asian allies tend to have a more skeptical as well as more complicated view of the benefits of Sino-American security links than do Americans.

Soviet Policy in East Asia, edited by Donald Zagoria, provides the best introduction to a consideration of Sino-Soviet relations, and of all other aspects of Soviet policy in Asia as well. It is the best edited and most cohesive of the books; each of its 11 essays deserves close attention. Richard Solomon poses what may be the central questions from a US policy perspective:

Should America view the USSR as a legitimate presence in Asian affairs or as a power to be contained and, where possible, excluded from the region? And can the United States counter Russian military capabilities while at the same time accepting Moscow's economic and political involvement in regional affairs?[12]

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[3] In a recent statement to visiting members of Japan's opposition Komeito Party, Deng Xiaoping said that there was a "possibility of an eruption between China and the United States if there is no resolution of the Taiwan problem." See "Deng Warns of 'Eruption' in U.S.-China Ties Over Taiwan," *The New York Times*, Oct. 12, 1984.

[4] "National Security—The Chinese Perspective," in Johnson, Packard, and Wilhelm, Eds., pp. 181–219.

[5] E. William Feeney, "Strategic Implications," in Hsiao and Witunski, Eds., pp. 144–91.

[6] Johnson, Packard, and Wilhelm, p. 45.

[7] "Reflections on the Making of American China Policy," in ibid., pp. 69–84.

[8] "The Economic Background and Implications for China," in Ellison, Ed., p. 110.

[9] "The Domestic Politics of the People's Republic of China," in Johnson, Packard, and Wilhelm, pp. 113–26.

[10] "The Background in Chinese Politics," in Ellison, pp. 3–28.

[11] "Trade and Technology Transfers," in Johnson, Packard, and Wilhelm, p. 313.

[12] "Coalition Building or Condominium? The Soviet Presence in Asia and American Policy Alternatives," in Zagoria, p. 302.

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How one answers these questions rests upon one's view of the thrust and intentions of Soviet policy in Asia. The composite picture that emerges from both the Zagoria and Stuart and Tow volumes is of the Soviet Union as an *opportunistic*, expansionist power rather than as a relentlessly aggressive expansionist power—a prowling rather than a rampaging bear, as it were. As elsewhere, its preoccupation with achieving security via an excessive military buildup (John Stephan diagnoses a Soviet national fixation with frontier defense) is perceived as a threat by its potential adversaries. Paul Langer, analyzing Soviet military power in Asia, sees Soviet force deployments along the Sino-Soviet border as clearly defensive in purpose. He notes that the growth of Soviet military power in Asia is not greater than but commensurate with the overall rate of growth of the Soviet armed forces. His balanced assessment of the weaknesses as well as of the strengths of the Soviet military in Asia has the effect of undercutting the sensationalism with which the subject is sometimes treated.[13]

There is universal agreement among the contributors to *Soviet Policy in East Asia* that it is only in the realm of military-security affairs that the USSR is a serious competitor of the United States in Asia. Scalapino, for example, asserting that Soviet influence in Asia peaked in the 1950's and declined thereafter, sees Moscow as unable to translate its growing military strength into political influence.[14] In terms of international trade, development assistance, ideological influence, and so forth, Moscow is Lilliputian not Brobdingnagian. Inflexible in its policies toward both Japan and China, and constrained in its approach to the Korean peninsula, Soviet policy in East Asia has been far from successful. Of course, the effect of debunking the *overall* Soviet threat to Asia is to highlight the *military* dimension of that threat, and this once more focuses attention on Sino-American security cooperation! Unfortunately, the low priority given to military modernization in Beijing's post-Mao economic plans makes the PRC less than an ideal security partner. Given the magnitude of the task, for the United States to provide military aid to the Chinese, notes Scalapino, would do no more than "marginally affect Chinese capabilities vis-à-vis the Soviet Union in the next decade."[15]

Despite the beginnings of a slight thaw in governmental relations already in evidence when the later of these books were written, none of the authors, with the singular exception of Thomas Robinson, sees much real prospect for a significant improvement in Sino-Soviet relations. The Moscow-Beijing conflict is seen as a fundamental clash of national interest, a traditional great power rivalry that is a virtually "permanent" feature of international relations. In his informative overview, Harry Gelman suggests that as a result of the evolution of the Sino-Soviet dispute, "the most fundamental issue—the incompatible geopolitical interests of the two states—has emerged in much sharper relief."[16]

Robinson's dissenting opinion is well worth pondering. (His essays in both the Stuart and Tow and the Johnson, Packard, Wilhelm volumes stand out because of their depth and originality.) Rejecting the prevailing view that Asia is an arena for intensifying Sino-Soviet competition, Robinson contends that most of Asia is increasingly impervious to Soviet and Chinese penetration, and that there has been a significant narrowing of the scope of competition:

The core of Soviet-Chinese differences is in the military security area ... and in the ideological realm, neither of which seems likely to get out of hand in the future. Otherwise, the competition has simmered down, been confined to certain areas, regularized, and tamed.[17]

Therefore, he sees a favorable mid-term (10-year) prognosis for Sino-Soviet relations, but an unfavorable long-term (50-year) prognosis as China evolves into an authentic major power.

It is certainly true that the Soviets are much more concerned with the power that China may eventually become than with the one it already is, and that this argues for a vigorous Soviet effort to reach an accommodation with Beijing sooner rather than later. By the same token, however, if things go according to plan (a sizable supposition), the PRC may be in a much stronger position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union a decade or two hence, and therefore logically may be expected to play a waiting game with Moscow. In any case, Seweryn Bialer is probably correct in suggesting that the Soviets are not likely to make an offer of reconcili-

[13] "Soviet Military Power in Asia," in ibid., pp. 255–82.

[14] "The Political Influence of the USSR in Asia," in ibid., pp. 57–92.

[15] "U.S. Military Strategy and Force Deployment," in Johnson, Packard, and Wilhelm, p. 277.

[16] "The Sino-Soviet Dispute in the 1970s: An Overview," in Ellison, p. 356. These interests focus on security concerns and involve Soviet and Chinese policies of containment and counter-containment in Asia, attempts to achieve advantage in the strategic triangle, and military dispositions along the Sino-Soviet border and the threat each perceives therefrom.

[17] "Sino-Soviet Competition in Asia," in Stuart and Tow, Eds., p. 178.

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ation attractive enough to hook the Chinese.[18] Since Chinese demands go well beyond bilateral issues to the heart of Soviet foreign policy behavior,[19] it is safe to suppose that the recent incremental amelioration of Sino-Soviet relations in the areas of trade and cultural-scientific exchanges will not spill over into the political-security arenas in the near future. That Moscow's terms for normalization with Beijing involve a return to semi-satellite status for the PRC, as Harold Hinton contends, strikes me as implausible.[20] By this time, rather than the model of Eastern Europe, I think Moscow would be well-satisfied with a relationship akin to that between the Soviet Union and India. Of course, even that is well beyond the acceptable limits of a Chinese-style independent foreign policy.

THE THIRD focus of the books under review is the broader meaning of the Sino-Soviet conflict for regional politics in Asia and elsewhere. (The Ellison and Stuart and Tow volumes are particularly valuable for their panoramic treatment in this respect.) It is difficult to generalize about such a variegated subject except perhaps to agree with the astute observation of William J. Barnds that Sino-Soviet relations are at most one factor in regional politics—and usually far from the most important—even within Asia but especially outside it.[21] What is truly remarkable is that China, still a comparatively weak and predominantly regional Asian power, has come to play a role, even if not always or often of prime importance, in the politics of the Middle East, Eastern and Western Europe, Sub-Saharan Africa, and elsewhere. This has come about in large measure by virtue of Beijing's challenge to Moscow, a challenge that orginated in issues far removed indeed from the particularities of the regional politics in which China is now a factor. The Sino-Soviet conflict, then, has been, among other things, an instrument facilitating China's dual metamorphoses from an Asian to a global power, and from a revolutionary to a nonrevolutionary actor in the international system. Of course, neither of these transitions is complete or unambiguous. Whether China aspires to be or is likely to become an Asian or global superpower at some future time is a question to which a definitive answer cannot yet be provided.

I HAVE not mentioned Hung-mao T'ien's edited volume; it differs from the others in the greater attention accorded to Taiwan. The book itself is a curious mélange of uneven essays covering such diverse topics as literary policy in the PRC, the strategy of the Four Modernizations, Sino-American relations, and Taiwan politics and Taiwan-PRC relations. Two points of interest are worth noting. One is that Taiwan, too, despite its much advertised economic success story, has had its own considerable problems with development and, more particularly, with democratization (often subsumed under the concept of "Taiwanization"). How one reads the political record of the past five years—whether as an indication of the Kuomintang's continuing commitment to democratization or as a demonstration that the ruling party is as reluctant as ever to permit a pluralist, Taiwanese-dominated polity—depends very much on partisan outlook. A virtue of T'ien's volume is that it gives readers a glimpse of this unresolved tension. The larger point it makes is that the politics of Taiwan cannot be ignored or taken for granted by either the PRC or the United States. The people of Taiwan may not speak with a single voice when it comes to their political future, but they do have voices asking to be heard. This has particular relevance to the question of Taiwan's future relationship with the PRC which, of course, claims the island as an integral part of China. Beijing's obvious disinclination to listen to the unwelcome opinions of Hong Kong Chinese residents concerning the future of that city is a sober reminder that PRC leaders remain committed to a Leninist version of Rousseau's General Will. The implications for Taiwan are disquieting.

AS INDICATED at the outset of this essay, the books under review address the task of policy prescription as well as of analysis. Let us conclude by examining the two major suggestions that emerge. First, with respect to the PRC, the consensus most clearly expressed in the Atlantic Council's study (the Johnson, Packard, Wilhelm volume), is that the United States should develop a long-term cooperative relationship with China, based only in part on anti-Soviet strategic interests, and stressing economic, cultural, scientific, and technological links. The report stresses the importance of serious consultations with Asian and European allies in the process of formulating and implementing US policy toward China.

Richard Solomon's chapter in Zagoria's book most explicitly takes up the question of US policy in

[18] "The Sino-Soviet Conflict: The Soviet Dimension," in Zagoria, p. 119.

[19] The Chinese demand, inter alia, that the Soviets terminate their military intervention in Afghanistan, cease supporting Vietnam's illegal occupation of Cambodia, and withdraw their troops from Mongolia and disputed portions of the Sino-Soviet border zone.

[20] "Sino-Soviet Relations: Background and Overview," in Stuart and Tow, p. 21.

[21] "The Impact of the Sino-Soviet Dispute on South Asia," in Ellison, p. 208.

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Asia with specific reference to the USSR. Recognizing that the United States can hardly expel the Soviets from Asia (the USSR is intrinsically a major Asian power), Solomon posits what he sees as the need to contain Soviet military expansion without exacerbating political polarization:

America's Asia policy must thus manage the game of coalition and countercoalition without unnecessarily polarizing Asian affairs. It must counter Moscow's growing military presence in the region without compounding a cycle of action and reaction that would destroy prospects for attaining a stable regional balance.[22]

This is sound advice, but how is one to follow it? Solomon himself prescribes a formula that is heavy on containment, but says little about how to avoid polarization, regional arms races, and escalating competition.

PERHAPS we have come full circle. As noted at the outset, the ancient Chinese employed diviners, invocators, and sorcerers to forecast and control events. Modern social scientists, while forecasting the future, and prescribing what are often ritualized courses of action, are powerless to control events. The job of the sorcerer of old, whose task it was to invoke divine assistance, unfortunately goes begging. We may have to await the time when sorcerers are employed on the National Security Council, and the Central Committee staffs in Moscow and Beijing too, before an age of tranquility comes to the politics of the strategic triangle.

[22] Solomon, loc. cit., p. 327.

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Correspondence

NOTE: Readers are welcome to comment on matters discussed in this journal. Letters should be addressed to the Editors, Problems of Communism, *US Information Agency, 301 4th Street, SW, Washington, DC 20547, USA.*

SOVIET GENERAL STAFF

TO THE EDITORS: Kenneth Currie's article "Soviet General Staff's New Role" (*Problems of Communism,* March-April 1984) addresses a timely subject. The evidence is, indeed, quite good that the responsibilities of this organ in military management have increased. And Currie is correct to note that Western literature on the Soviet military commonly "glosses over" the role of the General Staff. What is troubling about his analysis, however, is its theme that the General Staff has risen, as opposed to having been elevated. The evidence that he cites does not really address this matter, and I am not aware of any other data in the public realm that would permit closure on it.

Were one to draw inferences from the experience of the German Wehrmacht, it would not be unreasonable to see the Soviet General Staff as an institution with great potential to acquire an almost unchallenged voice in matters of military policy. But, the undeniable influence of the German staff model notwithstanding, a careful examination of the historical record indicates that there is very little in the modern Soviet General Staff's bureaucratic-political lineage that approximates it to its famous German counterpart. The legacy of tsarist rule and the revolution has been diversity in the military establishment. And institutional forces, some within the Ministry of Defense, have been united from the start in their opposition to the idea of the General Staff as the "brain of the army," not to mention the military brain of the entire state. Even during the crisis of the Great Fatherland War (World War II), integration of military management took place at the highest political levels, not in the General Staff.

But the General Staff has unquestionably become very prominent in military management during the past 20 years. If this cannot be attributed to a sort of bureaucratic and technological momentum that has permitted the General Staff to perhaps insert itself into the policy process, then how can it be understood? In my opinion, a very good case can be made that the Soviet General Staff has been refurbished by the authorities to substantially augment and perhaps even largely replace the haphazard patron-client approach to military management that previously existed. Paradoxically, this is a measure that allows the political elite to modernize and rationalize its personal involvement in military affairs and thereby to more effectively cope with the mysteries of military technology, the complexities of contemporary force applications, and the requirements of an offensive posture in foreign policy.

Ironically, the fact that the Soviet General Staff has considerable professional expertise but no tradition as the brain of the army undoubtedly makes it more acceptable to the contemporary Soviet leadership as an instrument of military management. Soviet General Staff personnel have a solid record of obedience to the party leadership, even to a fault. Thus, there is reason to believe that the regime's elevation of the General Staff promises to assist the Politburo in its determination to encourage and direct change rather than, as Major Currie suggests, fall victim to it. From this perspective, one would be advised to regard the General Staff as the elite's instrument in the military rather than as the military's spokesman in the policy process.

In any case, it is premature for Mr. Currie to dismiss William Odom's well-known arguments concerning the restraints on Soviet military autonomy—especially with regard to so important a matter as institutional development and military leadership. The implications for our understanding of change in the Soviet system—and for the policies that it pursues—are obvious.

SHANE MAHONEY
Professor of Government
Eastern Washington University
Cheney, WA

MAJOR CURRIE RESPONDS: There should be no surprise over the lack of a historical tradition for the General Staff's serving as "brain of the army" in the 1930's and 1940's. It is difficult to imagine Stalin conceding such a role to that body and its officers. However, I do not believe one should project that General Staff's wholly subservient position under Stalin's personal dictatorship forward to the present. I believe that argument to be irrelevant to the General Staff's current role.

Regarding that role, I do not believe it is possible to draw a sharp distinction between the General Staff's having "risen" *vs.* its having "been elevated." The party's granting of a certain measure of autonomy to the military and the military's availing itself of the opportunities created by that dispensation suggest instead a synergistic relationship.

I am not, as Mahoney suggests, cavalierly dismissing General William Odom's arguments concerning restraints on military autonomy. I agree completely with Gen. Odom's view of institutional congruence between the party and the military. What I do believe needs clarification—and I bring this out clearly in my article—is the definition of "autonomy." As the term has been used, it tends to portray party-military relations as a zero-sum game in which expansion of the role of the military in the policymaking process is viewed as a clear threat to party dominance.

Professor Mahoney appears to concede most of my major points regarding the enhanced role of the General Staff. Beyond the few areas discussed above, I really do not see any major differences between us.

KENNETH M. CURRIE
Major, USAF

The above exchange took place prior to Marshal Nikolay Ogarkov's Sept. 6, 1984, removal from duties as Chief of the General Staff.—**Eds.**

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FRELIMO MEMBERSHIP

TO THE EDITORS: In your preface to the highly useful "Checklist of Communist Parties in 1983," appearing in the March-April 1984 issue of *Problems of Communism*, you invite comments.

The membership of Mozambique's FRELIMO party given in the Checklist by author Richard Staar is 15,000. This figure was the one generally given for that party until a recruitment drive was called for in conjunction with the 3rd FRELIMO Congress in 1977. Most subsequent estimates were around 100,000. It was reported that a figure of 110,000 was announced at the 4th FRELIMO Congress in April 1983, although we have not actually seen any official statement to that effect. *African Communist* (London), No. 95, Fourth Quarter 1983, p. 43, states that as of April 1983 there were 110,323 members of FRELIMO, organized into 4,244 cells.

If Mr. Staar has any information to invalidate the above, we would certainly like to be advised, inasmuch as we are just completing work on a revised edition of our *Area Handbook for Mozambique*.

JEAN R. TARTTER
Foreign Area Studies
American University
Washington, DC

MR. STAAR RESPONDS: We appreciate the letter from Jean Tartter, whose *Area Handbook* will be awaited by our staff. The figures for Frelimo membership cited from *African Communist*, were not used because that issue was unavailable when we went to press.

The *1984 Yearbook* actually indicated a Frelimo membership of 35,000, based on *Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil* (Moscow), No. 7, April 1982. The 15,000 figure provided to *Problems of Communism* was based on an earlier source.

Subsequently, *Pravda* (Moscow) on April 23, 1984, carried a long article about Mozambique containing the following information: "Currently, approximately 4,400 party cells [primary party organizations] function throughout the entire country with a total number of members exceeding 130,000." The article enumerates considerable difficulties experienced by Frelimo, including a "lack of politically literate cadres in the central apparatus."

RICHARD F. STAAR
Hoover Institution
Stanford, CA

MOSCOW AND GRENADA

TO THE EDITORS: In their richly researched article on Grenada in the July-August 1984 issue of *Problems of Communism*, Jiri and Virginia Valenta assert that the documents captured there "refute the view that Moscow was providing mainly moral support to Grenada." Then they add: "For an example of this view see Cole Blasier, 'Comment,' in Alan Adelman and Reid Reading, Eds., *Confrontation in the Caribbean Basin. International Perspectives on Security, Sovereignty and Survival*, Pittsburgh, PA, University of Pittsburgh Press, 1984, pp. 268–74" (p. 1, fn. 3).

The "Comment" referred to discussed the Valentas' own chapter, "Soviet Strategy in the Caribbean Basin." As readers can verify for themselves, my remarks made no such assertion regarding Grenada. The comments were devoted mainly to Cuba, Nicaragua, and El Salvador. Only two sentences in six printed pages discussed Grenada, and these read: "Soviet aid to Grenada was listed specifically. The source was CANA, Bridgetown, but no explanation of where CANA got its material was given" (p. 273).

None of the conributions to the Adelman/Reading volume discuss the secret Soviet-Grenadian arms agreements or the delivery of Soviet arms to the island. This is probably because the book went to press before the US invasion and the capture and making public of the secret agreements.

COLE BLASIER
University of Pittsburgh

THE VALENTAS RESPOND: As readers can verify for themselves, Dr. Cole Blasier did not refer only to Grenada in his commentary to our chapter, but even more so to Nicaragua and El Salvador. He is right about that. However, his comment and our chapter deal with Soviet strategy in the Caribbean Basin and with Soviet policies toward all three countries. The main issue between us and Mr. Blasier is not our footnote to the *Problems of Communism* article wherein he is mentioned, but rather evidence about the military aid provided by the Soviets, the Cubans, and their clients for revolutionary regimes in the region—Nicaragua and Grenada, and also the guerrillas in El Salvador. Blasier's basic point was that there is no solid evidence about any of these cases, and that the USSR gives principally moral aid.

To prove this point, he went over many dozens of our footnotes—surely an exhausting work—and tried to show that our evidence and sources did not warrant our conclusions about communist military aid to the region. Since this is an important issue, let us highlight Dr. Blasier's point in his own words: "At the moment, the USSR is giving its full moral support to the Sandinistas .... In both countries [Nicaragua and El Salvador], the Soviet leaders are lending moral support to broad leftist forces."

Mr. Blasier also questioned our argument that the Soviets and Cubans provide military aid to Grenada. Again, going over each of our footnotes, Blasier said: "Soviet aid to Grenada was listed specifically. The source was CANA, but no explanation of where CANA got its material was given."

The evidence in the Grenada Documents clearly confirms the earlier reports from respectable Caribbean sources like CANA. In these documents, Blasier will find evidence (including Soviet/Grenadian military treaties) that disproves his views, and not just about Grenada. Thus, one also can learn from these documents valuable lessons about Soviet/Cuban policies toward Nicaragua, and even about Nicaraguan support for Grenada.

The inescapable evidence presented in the Grenada Documents also should dispel Blasier's objections to our classifying some of the revolutionaries in the Basin as Leninist. The documents clearly demonstrate that Bernard Coard's faction within the New Jewel Movement not only thought of itself as Leninist, but behaved in a Leninist fashion. Furthermore, the Soviets considered the NJM a "fraternal" Leninist party.

In brief, further study of the Grenada Documents would surely lead Dr. Blasier to revise many of the assumptions and conclusions contained in his own work. Such a revision might be more intellectually rewarding than trying to ferret out mistakes in a colleague's footnotes.

JIRI and
VIRGINIA VALENTA
Monterey, CA

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